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II 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
'^pellant, Michael R. • Barker, hereinafter referred to as 
^nt? is a fv-ee, white, citizen (de jure) of the State of 
County .shington, based upon the Preamble and the Bill 
, 3:its to : , S* Constitution and as such, the Appeals 
has the
 w ^>, * sdict ion over the subject matter to secure as 
.ate the rights of Appellant/Defendant« Respondents/Co-
. ffs a,r&* U- S* Citizens who reside in the State of Utah. 
v< 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
POINT 1. SOVEREIGN STATUS 
Is a free, white sovereign citizen (de jure) of the State of 
Utah entitled to protection of Organic Constitutional rights 
based on the Preamble and the Bill of Rights to the U.S. 
Constitution? especially when the court has taken Judicial Notice 
of* that status? 
POINT 2. VALIDITY OF FOREIGN DIVORCE DECREE 
Can a foreign divorce deor&e be estopped when the sole 
purpose is financial gain to the harm of another? 
POINT 3. DOMICILE 
Is it not arbitrary for a Judge to rule, without any 
evidence or facts, that a person did not fulfill divorce domicile 
requirements of a foreign country; when the law states that the 
burden of proof rests with the opposing parity? 
POINT 4. NON-OBLIGOR STATUS 
Is it not illegal, or at least art abuse of discretion, for a 
Judge to rule that a person is an "obligor" as defined by U.C. A. 
Section 7B-45-2, as amended^ when that person has proven on the 
administrative reaord that he is not 5 and furthermore, to do so 
when that person is not allowed by the court to ask questions 
pertaining to his defense at the trial? 
POINT 5 . VIOLATION OF PRIVACY 
Is it not unlawful, or both unlawful and illegal, or an 
abuse of process, or malicious prosecution, and against the 
intention of the Utah Legislature, and a violation of a sovereign 
state citizen's right to privacy, for the Utah Department of 
Social Services to operate outside of U.C.A. Section 78-45b~5, as 
amended to obtain private financial information about that 
person? 
POINT 6. PARTIES ACTING ON DIVORCE DECREE WITH CONSIDERATION 
Is it not arbitrary and an abuse of discretion for the court 
to rule that a foreign divorce decree is invalid because it was 
an agreement between parties to mutually divorce when the 
evidence and the facts show otherwise? 
POINT 7. COURT NOT SET PROPERLY 
Is it not a violation of the doctrine of Utah's separation 
of powers Article 5, Section 1, and a violation of basic U.S. 
vii 
Constitutional rights, for a court to rule on the validity of a 
foreign divorce and the subsequent rescission of a Utah State 
marriage license when the judge has acted ministerially for the? 
Utah Department of Social Services, and the Judge is at the same 
time acting Judicially to disolve a Utah marriage which was 
administered by the Executive Department? 
Is it not, furthermore, appropriate for the District Court 
to hear the rescission of the marriage license issue rather than 
refuse to hear it because it is not "proper"? 
POINT 8. VIOLATION OF TRIAL BY JURY 
Is it not a violation of a persons right to trial by jury 
for a Judge to refuse repeated demands for that right based on 
Article 1, Section 1®, of the Utah Constitution, and for a judge 
to refuse a tendered jury fee? 
POINT 9. RIGHT TO COUNSEL VIOLATED — ABSURDITY 
Is it not a violation of the right to due process of law for 
a judge to grant the right to counsel at a pre-trial hearing and 
then at the time of trial deny that right? Is that logic, 
furthermore, not devoid of reason and therefore absurd; and is it 
not reasonable that counsel and court cost suffered by a person 
in that circumstance should be awarded? 
POINT 1®. RIGHTS SUA SPONTE DENIED 
Is it not a violation of a person's basic Constitutional 
right to have his rights sustained by a judge, and for the judge 
to inform a person when basic rights may be in jeopardy instead 
of a judge attempting to violate that person's rights? 
POINT 11. DEFENDANT THREATENED WITH INCARCERATION 
Is it not a violation of a person's Constitutional right for 
a judge to threaten a person with incarceration if he does not 
answer questions pertaining to his financial status which have 
already been answered pursuant to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments 
to the U.S. Constitution? 
POINT 1£. VIOLATION OF RIGHT TO DEFEND—JOINDER 
Is it not a violation of a person's right to defend for the 
court to refuse to hear issues for which summons have been issued 
and parties have appeared in court 5 and further, after the Judge 
does allow summoned parties to take the stand is it not a 
violation of a person's right to due process, and right to defend 
to not allow questions pertinent to the defense to be asked? 
POINT 13. INVASION OF PRIVACY 
Is it not a violation of a person's right to defend for the 
court to not allow a person to ask questions pertaining to what 
vi ii 
statute, law or authority allows them to harm another? 
POINT 14. JUDGE GIVES LEGAL ADVISE 
Is it not a violation of a person's right to due process for 
a judge to give the advise for him to obtain a licensed attorney 
when if that advise were followed it would take away the person's. 
status and place him in the jurisdiction of the court? 
POINT 15. CONSPIRACY AND BLACKMAIL 
Is not the court a party to conspiracy when after having the 
evidence to same on the record finds that there is no conspiracy 
and blackmail? 
POINT 16. VIOLATION OF RIGHT TO RELIGION AND SPEECH 
Is it not a violation of Article 1, Sections 4, and 15, for 
the court to deny a person the right to communicate freely to his 
children concerning the destructive and malicious intentions and 
behavior of another so as to impart to them a concept of correct 
principles instead of that which leads to dissolution? 
POINT 17. BIAS AND CONSPIRACY OF ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE 
Is it not a violation of a person's right to due process of 
law for the failure of the County Attorney and the Attorney 
General to act on a criminal assault complaint and a threat to 
the person's life? 
POINT 18. COURT ATTEMPTS TO FORCE JURISDICTION 
Is it not a violation of a persons right to due process of 
law for the court to order a person to pay child support to a 
third party when, in fact, no money is due or owing to that 
third party $ and the only reason for so ordering is to bring that 
person into the court's jurisdiction? 
POINT 19. PROPERTY TO A STRANGER TO THE RECORD 
Is it not a violation of a persons right to due process of 
law for the court to rule on disposal of his property when, in 
fact he is a stranger to the record $ and is that ruling therefore 
not null and void? 
POINT £0. PRIOR PROPERTY AGREEMENT 
Is it not a well established axiom of law that equity is not 
available to reinstate rights and privileges voluntarily 
contracted away simply because a party has come to regret the 
bargain made^ especially when it is to the harm of another? 
IX 
POINT £1. CUSTODY OF CHILDREN 
Did not the court violate U.C.A. Section 3®~3~5, as amended, 
when it awarded custody and visitation rights of children when it 
had already been wade by a foreign divorce decree, since the 
foreign decree must be given full faith and credit? 
POINT 2£. VISITATION IS TOO RESTRICTIVE 
Did not the court abuse its discretion in ruling for art 
unnecessarily restrictive child visitation rights for a father 
when there was a lack of funds and a great distance which caused 
hardship; and did not the court abuse its discretion since the 
parties had acted on a prior^ agreement for visitation rights* 
which was not to the harm of the children or their father? 
POINT 23. NO CHANGE OF SUPPORT CIRCUMSTANCES 
Did not the court arbitrarily and with abuse of discretion 
issue new orders for support when, in fact, there was no change 
in circumstances of either parties to justify that order? 
x 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
UTAH CODE ANNOTAATED (U.C.A.): 
U. C. A. , 1953, as amended, Section 3©~3~5. 
U. C. A. , 1953, as amended, Section 78-27-50. 
Financial information privacy-Actinapplicable to certain 
official investigations.-Nothing in this act shall apply where art 
examination of said records is a part of art official 
investigation by arty local police, sheriff, city attorney, county 
attorney, the attorney genaral, or the state department of public 
safety, or the bureau of recovery services, department of social 
services. 
U. C. A. , 1953, as amended^ Section 78-45-S, 
<£') "Obligor" means arty person owing a duty of support. 
"Support debt" means the debt created by nonpayment of 
child support under the laws of this state or the decree of arty 
court of appropriate jurisdiction ordering a sum to be paid as 
child support." 
U. C. A. , 1953, as amended^ Section 78~45b-5. 
Notice of support debt-Absent court order-(l) In the 
absence of a court order, the director may issue a notice of a 
support debt accr^ued or accruing based upon the furnishing of 
support by the department for the benefit of any depertdertt child. 
That notice shall include a statement of the support debt accrued 
or accruing, computable on the basis of the amount of assistance 
paid or to be paid, a statement of the name of the recipient artd 
the name of the minor child for whom assistance is being 
provided, a demand for immediate payment of the support debt or 
in the alternative for a written answer from that person to the 
department setting forth arty claimed defenses to liability, and 
requesting a hearing thereon, artd a statement that if neither 
answer nor full payment ar*e received within twenty days from the 
date of service the department may assess and determine that 
support debt and that, subsequent thereto, the pt^oper^ty of that* 
person shall be subject to appropriate collection action 
including, but not limited to, execution upon liens, wage 
assignments, attachment, and garnishment. This notice shall be 
served upon the alleged responsible parent in the manner^ 
prescribed for service of notices under section 78~45b-4. 
<£) If a written answer is received by the department, 
a hearing shall be set in the manner- provided under section 78-
45b-6 and reasonable notice of that hearing shall be for\Atar^ded to 
the alleged responsible parent in the manner prescribed under 
sect ion 78-45b—4. 
(3) If payment is not received as demanded under 
xi 
subsection <1> and no written answer is filed within twenty days 
from the date of service, the department may proceed to assess 
artd determine that support debt and^ at any time thereafter, may 
proceed with appropriate collection actions as provided in that 
subsect ion. 
U. C. A. , 1953, as amended, Sect ion 78-45-9. 
Enforcement of right to support (1) The obligee may &nfor*c& 
his right of support against the obligor and the state department 
of social services may proceed pursuant to this act or any other 
applicable statute, either on its own behalf or on the behalf of 
the obligee, to enforce the obligee's right of support against 
the obligor. Whenever any court action is commenced by the state 
department of social services to enforce payment of the obligor's 
support obligation, it shall be the duty of the attorney general 
or the county attorney, of the county of residence of the 
obligee, to represent that department. 
UNITED STATES CODE (U.S.C.>s 
U.S.C. 1396-13969, Sub Chapter XIX, Chapter 7, 
Title 4£. 
Summary Judgment—811. Senerally: District court may use 
summary judgment in reviewing decision of Secretary on disability 
claim. 
8JE:8. Plaintiff could not be granted summary judgment, in 
action for social security and disability benefits, since, 
because of favorable ruling for plaintiff on divorce question, 
under which it was held that Florida divorce obtained by wage 
earner from plaintiff was invalid for social security purposes, 
no consideration was given to question of whether plaintiff 
satisfied requirements of this section concerning her own primary 
insurance benefits, and where no determination had been made of 
the amount of any benefits. 
UTAH CONSTITUTIONS 
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 1: 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy 
and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and 
protect property; to worship according to the dictates of their 
consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and 
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their 
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that 
right. 
Sect i on 3 s 
The State of Utah is an inseparable part of the Federal 
Union, and the Constitution of the United States is the supreme 
law of the land. 
xi i 
Sect i on 4: 
The right of conscience shall neveir be infringed. The State 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious test shall be 
required as a qualification for any office of public trust or 
for any vote at any election; nor shall any person be incompetant 
as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the 
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church and State, nor 
shall any church dominate the State or interfere with its 
functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated for 
or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or 
for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment. No property 
qualification shall be required of any person to vote, or hold 
office, except as provided in this Constitution. 
Sect i on 7: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
Sect i on 1 ©: 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain 
inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, except in capital 
cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors. In courts of 
inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In 
criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases 
three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil 
cases shall be waived unless demanded. 
Sect i on 11: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury 
done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have a 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without 
denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Sect i on 14: 
The right of the people to be sucure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched and the person 
or thing to be seized. 
Sect i on 15: 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the fyreedom of 
speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel 
the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall 
xi i i 
appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, 
and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, 
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right 
to determine the law and the fact. 
Section £7: 
Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential 
to the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free 
government. 
Utah Constitution, article 4, See*ti6n 1©: <Oath of office) 
All officers made elective or appointive by this 
Constitution or by the lawss madB in pursuance thereof, before 
entering upon the duties of their respective offices, shall take 
and subscribe the following oath or affirmation; "I do solemnly 
swear (or affirm) that I will support, obey and defend the? 
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of this 
State, and that I will discharge the duties of my office with 
fidelity. l" l 
Article 5, Section Is 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be 
divided into three distinct departments, the Legislative, the 
Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with the 
exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these 
departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either 
of the others, except in the cases hierin expressly directed or 
per^m i 11 ed. 
Article 8, Section 13: 
Except by consent of all the parties, no judge of the 
supreme or inferior courts shall preside in the trial of any 
cause where either of the parties shall be connected with him by 
affinity or consanguinity within the degree of first cousin, or 
in which he may have been of counsel, or in the trial which he 
may have presided in any inferior court. 
Article 8, Section 19s 
There shall be but one form of civil action, and law and 
equity may be administered in the same action. 
xiv 
V 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a divorce action based on alleged cruelty to 
Plaintiff as a first cause of action and on allegations by the 
State of Utah by and through Utah Department of Social Services, 
hereinafter r&fBrt^&d to as the Department, that the D&f&ndant is 
an obligor as d&fined in Utah Statutes as a second cause of 
action, 
D&fBndant has Counterclaimed with multiple actions arising 
out of the divorce action, alleging Want of Jurisdiction over 
subject matter and over his Person due to State citizenship <de 
jure) status based upon the Preamble and the Bill of Rights to 
the U.S. Constitution, Want of Jurisdiction over the subject 
matter based upon a prior Mexican divorce decree being valid, 
Non-Obligor status as defined by Utah Statutes, the original Utah 
State marriage having been rescinded based on constructive and 
actual fraud, Want of Jurisdiction over subject matter and 
Defendant's Person due to marxy%iaQ& rescission, violation of 
Constitutional rights, namely, right to trial by jury, right to 
counsel of choice, notification of rights sua sponte, right to 
dKxe process, right to frBedorn of religion and speech, and other 
Constitutional rights violations causing harm and suffering to 
Defendant's Person involving conspiracy and alienation of the 
affections of Defendant's children from him, loss of health, loss 
of money, loss of time from work, and physical and mental 
suffering, through illegal activity of Co-Plaintiffs, involving 
invasion of privacy, conspiracy, fraud, blackmail, malicious 
1 
process, malicious prosecution, and failure of the County 
Attorney, who is a party to the action, to act upon a criminal 
complaint of assault and battery and a threat to D&f&ndant*s life 
by the use of firearms., 
Course of the Proceedings 
Co-Plaintiff, Laura McSillivray, separated from D&f&ndant, 
Michael Barker, about IS April 1984 and laved in Portland, 
Oregon. D&f&ndant obtained a Mexican divorce 3 August 1984. Co-
Plaintiff returned to Utah to sign the divorce d&crBB on 30 
September 1984, and to live in a home in Mayfield, Utah and to 
receive child support that Defendant provided for his children. 
Defendant relocated in November 1984 to St. George, Utah. 
Property settlement and visitation rights of parties were 
mutually agreed upon during that time as stipulated in the? 
foreign divorce d&cr&&m A written contract pertaining to child 
custody was signed by both parties on IS June 1985. Defendant 
was served with a Utah divorce Summons £ January 1986. 
Co-Plaintiff applied for Welfare on £ January 1985. The 
Utah Department of Social Services obtained wage information from 
Defendant's employer in January 1985 after having been notified 
by Defendant that his children were being provided for in an 
amount greater than that required by the Department. The? 
Department proceeded to threaten and hassle Defendant and have 
not stopped for over two years. 
Defendant rescinded his marriage license with the State of 
Utah based on constructive and actual frauds Attorneys for the 
State and Utah Legal Services, Inc., held D&f&ndanfs children 
ransom for two years in an attempt to obtain quickly, a new Utah 
£ 
divorce. 
While Co-Plaintiff was helping D&f&ndant move some of his 
belongings stored in the Mayfield home on 16 June 1985 she, 
without provocation assaulted Defendant by beating him repeatedly 
with a short two by four board, and repeatedly threatened to 
kill him if she had a gun. Defendant reported, more than once, 
to the SanPete County Sheriff's Office, a Criminal Assault 
complaint which the SanPete County Attorney refused to act upon 
until Defendant reported the complaint via certified mail. The 
matter was submitted to the Attorney Ben&t^al^ since The SanPete 
County Attorney, Ross C. Blackham, was representing the 
Department in the divorce action. The Attorney General nev&r-
acted upon said complaint and Defendant feels sure that his life 
is still in danger. 
Mr. Barker was forced over his objection and against his 
will, under threat, duress, and coersion to proceed in new 
divorce proceedings because his right to be with his children, as 
contracted with his former wife, had been violated by Co-
Plaint if f s. 
Disposition of the Case in Lower Court 
The case was tried to the court on £5 March 1987. From the 
findings and order for the Plaintiff, Defendant appeals. 
Statement of the facts 
(No Court Record) 
The lower court maintained that the only actions to be ruled 
on were a divorce and the Department's claim for support money 
owed by Defendant and did refuse to hear anything other than 
those two actions. 
The Defendant maintained that after the parties separation 
and Mexican divorce that Co-Plaintiff Laura McGillivray had 
signed up for "welfare" while Defendant was providing her with a 
house to live in and $300.00 in monthly child support payments as 
agreed upon as mutually as stipulated in a prior Mexican divorce 
decree. The Department began paying Co-Plaintiff "welfare" 
monies at the same time Defendant was providing for his children. 
The Department, in violation of Utah Statutes, did contact and 
obtain wage information from Defendant's, employer upon which to 
base a claim of support. Defendant was notified by the 
Department that welfare money was being received by his children, 
whereupon Defendant timely notified the Department that he was 
already providing a house and money to Co-Plaintiff and to cease 
and desist welfare payments. The Department refused to stop the 
double payments, and then at a hearing denied Defendant credit 
for providing a home, and cash utility payments for Co-Plaintiff 
stating that it was considered payment "in kind" and would not be 
allowed as credit for support. 
Co-Plaintiff, several months later, did move out of the 
house that Defendant was providing in an attempt to force him, 
through the Department, to pay more cash money per month than 
originally mutually agreed upon which Defendant was, at that 
time, unable to do. 
Co-incidental to the above when Defendant was returning his 
children to Co-Plaintiff, Laura McGillivray did beat Defendant 
with a short two by four, and threatened to kill him with a 
firearm, with no provocation from Defendant, whereupon Defendant-
left with two of his children as witnesses, and reported the 
criminal assault to the SanPete County sheriff. The County 
Attorney Ross C. Blackham did fail to act upon that complaint 
until Defendant filed a third complaint via certified letter 
because the first two witnessed complaint statements had been 
"lost". Said Attorney who was representing the Department in the 
instant matter notified Defendant in writing that there was a 
conflict of interest and he would forward said complaint to the 
Attorney General if so notified. Defendant did notify the 
County Attorney to forward the complaint to the Attorney General 
in writing. The County Attorney did investigate said complaint 
artd "judged" in his opinion that the matter should not go to 
court, notwithstanding that he earlier had indicated his bias for 
Co-Plaint iff. The Attorney General did, notwithstanding the 
conflict of interest in the instant matter, notify Defendant that 
the County Attorney had acted "properly". Defendant joined 
County Attorney and Attorney General as parties to the action 
since it was another attempt with conspiracy to prevent Defendant 
from having his due process and equal protection under the law 
arising out of the divorce action. 
The SanPete County District Court failed to hold Defendant^s 
rights inviolate since it ruled that a separate action had to be 
initiated for that matter. 
In an attempt to recover welfare money expended, the 
Department, as indicated to Defendant m writing by Co—Plaint 1ff, 
through Utah Legal Services, Inc., initiated divorce action 
attempting to estop the Mexican divorce decree. Co-Plaintiff 
indicated in writing that she had initiated no action against 
Defendant but that the Department had determined that the foreign 
decree was invalid (Exhibit I). The Department also notified 
Defendant in writing that it intended to pursue a property 
division other than "as mutually agreed upon" as stipulated in 
the foreign decree (Exhibit 4£>. Utah Legal Service, Inc., 
Attorneys then advised Co-pla3ntiff, as indicated by Co-Plaintiff 
to Defendant in writing (Exhibit DD) to disregard a prior written 
agreement or contract between the Parties which had been acted 
upon, so as to prevent Defendant from seeing his children until 
said Defendant accepted a new Utah State divorce which provided 
for more money, more property division and different visitation 
rights with the children, than that which bad already been agreed 
to and acted upon by both parties, as per the foreign decree 
(Exhibit £>. Co-Plaint 1ff agreed to and acted upon written and 
verbal contracts as stipulated in the foreign decree, and as> 
evidenced by assuming again her maiden name on licenses, in 
telephone directories, for conducting business, etc, A recently 
discovered letter indicating the same is herewith enclosed as 
(Exhibit 3). 
Co-~ incidental with the above the Department through its 
Office of Recovery Services harassed Defendant over a two year* 
period with numerous demands and threats in writing. The 
Department placed Defendant on a "tax intercept list" until 
Defendant noticed said Department that he would take legal action 
unless his name was removed from that list since there was no 
basis in law for said harassment. The Department did then notify 
Defendant that he would be taken off of that "tax intercept 
list" (Exhibit 4J2>, however said Department notified Defendant a 
year later that he was still on the same list. After more 
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notices to the Department by Defendant he was again notified that 
he would be taken off of that list. Defendant is currently 
having to defend against the Internal Revenue Service due to the* 
actions of said Department. 
D&f&ridant has continually supported his children* 
notwithstanding the Department has continued to hassle D&fertd&nb 
arid alleges differently. 
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VI 
SUMMARY OF ARBUMENTS 
Point i. The Court did not uphold Defendant's Constitutional 
rights inviolate after having taken Judicial Notice of 
D&f&rtdartf1 s non-juristic status. 
Point S. The Court did not prevent the estoppel of the foreign 
divorce d&crBG^ notwithstanding the motivation to estop was to 
the harm of another. 
Point 3. The Court ruling to estop the foreign divorce decree 
was arbitrary, since there was no evidence given to prove that 
Defendant was not in Mexico. The Co-Plaintiffs did, in fact, 
concede that it was entirely possible that Defendant was in 
Mexico-
Point 4. The Court did B^r by not allowing Defendant to defend 
himself by preventing said Defendant from asking Co-Plaintiffs 
questions to prove that he was not an "obligor" as defined by 
Utah statutes. 
Point 5. The Court did err by not allowing Defendant to defend 
by showing that the Department unlawfully invaded his privacy 
since questions pertaining to Utah statutes were not allowed to 
be asked. 
Point 6. The court did not consider that the Co-Plaintiff acted 
upon the provisions of property settlement and child visitation 
rights with consideration but instead used abuse of discretion by 
setting aside those facts. 
Point 7. The Court was improperly set and did not act 
Judicially to protect the rights of Defendant, since a violation 
of the separation of powers doctrine was in effect. 
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Point 8. The Defendant1* s right to a trial by jury was denied, 
notwithstanding said Defendant demanded that right artd tendered a 
jury fee which was refused. Also, the money involved in the 
litigation was in the thousands of dollars. 
Point 9. The Court did grant Defendant counsel of choice at the 
2 January 1987 pre-trial hearing but did at the time of trial 
refuse to allow said counsel, over the objection of said 
Defendant, The Court's absurd reasoning and abuse of discretion 
did cause Defendant physical and emotional harm and did not allow 
said Defendant to properly conduct a defenses due to intense p a m 
from a injury that said Defendant was suffering from. Defendant 
suffered considerable expense of money and time to bring counsel 
hundreds of miles which harmed Defendant greatly. 
Point 10. The Court did not advise Defendant of rights Sua 
Sponte but did, in fact, act in a manner to take away said 
Defendant's rights. 
Point II. The Court did err by violating Defendant's right to 
privacy and did threaten and coerse him with incarceration if he 
did not answer questions previously answered on pre-trial 
interrogatories? which questions were answered under the 
protection of the Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, namely^ 
Articles 4 and 5. 
Point 12. The Court did at the start of the proceedings 
debermine that the only issues to be heard would be the Utah 
divorce and the alleged money owed to the Department since it was 
alleged that parties to the divorce action were not properly 
joined. The Court did then go through the process of allowing 
Defendant to place Summoned individuals on the stand but would 
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not allow him to ask questions so as to conduct a proper defence. 
The court by holding Defendant to the same standards as art 
attorney, is delaying justice and by its action will cause 
additional expense to said Defendant to bring action against 
several parties individually when they are already parties to the 
divorce action by their actions arid on the record. 
Point 13. The Court did not allow Defendant to ask quest ions 
pertaining to the Utah statutes so as to allow him to conduct a 
proper defense in proving that the Department exceeded its 
authority by specifically not following the Utah Code. 
Point 14. The court legally advised Defendant, which would hav& 
harmed him if the advise had been followed. Defertdartt was 
advised by the Judge to obtain art attorney. 
Point 15. Utah Legal Service, Inc., attorneys acted illegally 
artd did advise Co-Plaintiff to breech a written contract allowing 
Defendant the right to be with his children for about two years; 
that being art attempt on the part of the attorneys to force 
Defertdartt to accept a new Utah divorce decree allowing for more 
property, artd money for Co-Plaintiffs artd with less visitation 
rights for Defendant than had been agreed artd acted upon by the 
parties. The Court did not consider the above impv^oper but ruled 
against Defendant when proof of the attempted blackmail was shown 
to the court by exhibit DD. The court did abuse discretion and 
did condone said illegal action. 
Point 16. The Court did arbitrarily and with abuse of 
discretion disallow Defendant the right to converse freely with 
his children so as to convey to them, consistent with said 
Defendant's religion, what is right and wrong as it relates to 
10 
the experiences that the children have lived through relative to 
negative and harmful actions of their mother. Defendant was 
threatened with incarceration if any communication was given to 
the children which would be construed as negative towards their 
mother. 
Point 17. The Attorney General and^ the SanPete County 
Attorney failed to act on a criminal complaint of assault and 
battery and a threat to Defendant's life by Co-Plaint 1ff, 
McGillivray. The court did also prevent Defendant from defending 
the same. Bias arid conspiracy existed since Defendant was not 
allowed to defend against those parties to the divorce who 
prevented Defendant'** due process of law. 
Point Ifl. The Court arbitrarily, since it refused to hear all 
the facts and evidence, and with abuse of discretion did try to 
force Defendant to pay support money bo a third party,, namely the* 
Department, instead of the custodial parent. Defendant does not 
owe the Deoartment money. The court refused to allow Defendant 
to bring forth all the evidence proving the same. There is no 
third party interest since Defendant has always provided for hie* 
children as has been proven on the administrative record. 
Point IS. The Court did rule concerning the disposition of 
property of a stranger to the record^ which property had been 
legally conveyed by parties to the divorce action, therefore said 
ruling is null and void. 
Point £0. The Court did abuse it's discretion in attempting to 
a^ard a home that Defendant was providing to Co-Plamtiff and hn s 
children which he had obtained before the parties marriage. Co-
Plaintiff baa been occupying said home as per a prior mutual 
1J 
agreement as stipulated in the foreign divorce dear^B but then 
moved out of the home m an attempt to obtain more prop&rty than 
originally agr&Bd upon. 
Point Si. The Court did not consider a prior agreement and 
written contract mutually entered into as stipulated by the* 
foreign divorce decree, prior to Utah divorce proceedings by the 
Defendant and Co-Plaint 1 ff. The Court arbitrarily determined 
that the foreign decree was merely an agreement between the 
parties for finanoial purposes which was not the case. The 
parties had separated due to not being able to live with each 
other as wac clearly pointed out in court artd the the divorce wa&> 
at that time obtained. The parties continued to effect a 
divorce as the relocation and change of employment of Defendant 
shows. The court did &rr in not upholding the custodial rights 
of children as determined by the d&or&B of a foreign divorce. 
Point SS. The Court did rule on child visitation rights too 
restrictively. Due to the time, distance, and expense involved 
in Defendant meeting with his children, said Defendant can hardly 
continue a bonding relationship with his children. 
Point S3. The Court did arbitrarily, without any evidence of 
change in conditions or finances of either party abuse it&> 
discretion by increasing Defendant's monthly support payments as 
the children reach legal aqBm 
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VII 
ARGUMENT 
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF STATE CITIZENSHIP 
Point i. That the district court did take Judicial Notice of 
Defendant's Utah State citizenship <de JWB) status, based on the 
Preamble arid the Bill of Rights to the U^ S^ Consti.tuti.oti 
recognizing that Defendant was an unenfranchised Sovereign 
natural individual without any Nexus with the State; said court 
did then continue to pr^ocBBd against him with full knowing, 
information and malicious intent, to g a m jurisdiction over his 
Person causing Defendant bo dBf&na over his objection, and 
against his will, while under threat duress and coercion of not 
being able to see his children due to conspiracy and blackmail or* 
the part of Utah Legal Service, Inc., Attorneys. The court did 
not maintain impartial judicial logic but did harm D&fBndant by 
not protecting said D&fBndant'*& inalienable Constitutional rights 
which was in violation of Article 1, Sections 1, 7, 14 & £'7, Utah 
Constitution, Article 8, Section 19, Utah Const i.tuti.gn, and also 
Judge Tibb's oath of office. Article 4, Section 10, Utah 
MOTIVATION TO HARM BY ESTOPPEL 
Point £. That the evidence does not support a finding that the 
Co-Plaintiff Laura Beth McBillivray should be granted a new Utah 
State divorce, the matter having alr^Bady been decided in another 
forum. DBfBndant Michael R. Barker had obtained a Mexican 
divorce on 3 August 1984 which was aaoBptBd by Co-Plaintiff 
through notarized signature m Utah and then acted upon by hBr 
t"* 
when she carriBd out the terms of the foreign decree's stipulated 
"mutually agreed upon" property settlement ana also visitation 
rights of the parties children. Co-Plaintiff had accepted the 
foreign d&ar&e as legally binding and did not seek for estoppel 
until DBfBndant was Summoned £ January 1986, because the Co-
plaintiff, the Department, required her to do so for purpose of 
obtaining more money than that which was originally agreed upon 
between Partles. 
Co-Plaint iffs cannot assert the invalidity of the foreign 
divorce decree inasmuch as Laura Beth McGillivray has acquiesced 
in such dBcrBB and has recognized its validity by acts or conduct 
inconsistent with the position that it is invalid; nam&ly 
accepting said dBcrBB by signature and act 3 ng upon it by using 
her maidmn nam&$ and acting upon provisions of contracts between 
divorced parties as related to financial matters including but 
not limited to, custody rights of children. Brugujiere y^ 
i£MSyi££^? (1961) 17£ Cal. 199,155 P. 988. Ptnn. Cas. 1917E. 1*22; 
K ^ I l ^ V«L filler, <19£8> £03 Cal. 61,£63 P £00. Therefore the 
instant matter should be dismissed and the Mexican divorce d&ct^BB 
allowed to stand. 
Co-Plaint iffs are motivate purely by financial gain in 
trying to nullify the Mexican divorce dBcr^BB after having acted 
upon written and verbal contracts as set out m that decree; and 
ar& thus prevented from estoppel of said divorce decree. Dorn y^ 
02CD* <1953) £8£ ftpp Div 597, t£6 NYS £d 713, see also Cross y^ 
QC2^? (1963) 94 Finz £8, 381 P£d 573, and numerous other cases 
in several states. California courts have recognized another 
species of estoppel, called quasi-estoppel, which is based on the* 
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principal that one with full knowledge of the facts shall not foe 
permitted to act m a matter inconsistent with his formBr 
position or conduct to the injury of another* Hensyens Estate, 
181 P&d 89; also there exists a presumption in favor of the 
foreign decrBB*. and, unless this presumption is properly and 
effectively rebutted by the party who raises the Question of lack 
of jurisdiction in the foreign court to render the d&cr&B5 the 
courts of the forum may and will recognize it as effective. This* 
applies even when the foreign divorce d&cr&& is not entstled to 
extraterritorial recognition when the court rendering it lacked 
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the divorce because 
neither of the parties to the divorce action was domiciled in the 
divorce forum* QiiC^lQSl^ Y*L Q§£^!D§I§S k® P. 2d 997 ana 68 P.&d 
351. Addstiona]ly, in no case has the Supreme Court of the 
United States invalidated a judgement of a state court for lack 
of diiB process because it recognized as valid the divorce decree 
of a sister state although neither of the spouses had domicile 
therein in the common law meaning of the term. Therefore the 
instant matter should be dismissed and the Mexican divorce decree 
allowed to stand. 
It is well settled that when the motivating factor in 
seeking estoppel to a foreign divorce decnsB is pecuniary iri 
nature, the doctrine of estoppel can not be applied. ft number of 
courts have taken the position that while estoppel and like 
equitable doctrines be generally available to accord practical 
recognition to jurisdictionally defective divorce decrees, such 
doctrines will not be appl^Bd so as to aid a party primarily 
motivated by Financial considerations. Qhgmskyis estate, 101 NYS> 
£d 60, and Con£jtdin§ y.w B^ fcfl? £42 ^VS 2d 456. Also holding or 
recognizing that divorce decrees rendered in a foreign nation 
where neither spouse was domiciled may be acao)rded practical 
recognition by estoppel, latches, unclean hands, or a similar 
equitable doctrine under which the party asking for the decy^e^ 
may de effect 3vely barred from securing a judgement of 
invalidity. Scherer y/ Scherer, 4©5 NE2d 48. Finally, where the* 
validity of a divorce is attacked in order to assert a private 
claim for pecuniary g a m , the defense of estoppel is available, 
although it would no be permitted m cases where a judicial 
determination of the marital status is sought, with the financial 
benefits flowing from the establishment of such status being 
purely incidental. Cgns^dme VJL 8§^I? &4S NYS £'d 456. Therefore 
the instant case should be dismissed and the Mexican divorce 
decree allowed to stand. The court did err, Article 1, Section 
NONHDOMICILE NOT PROVEN 
Point 3. That, furthermore, the Co—Plamt 1 ffs aid not estop the 
Mexican divorce decree on the basis of lack of domicile, since 
they dia not prove that Defendant was not m Mexico; on the 
contrary^ for their defense they did concede that ifc was entirely 
possible that Defendant was m Mexico. Defendant* <s substantive 
right to due process of law was violated by the court assuming 
that said Defendant was not domiciled m Mexico, and then ruling, 
without proof or reason to do so, for a new Utah State divorce. 
DEFENDANT NOT AN OBLIGOR 
Point 4. That the evidence does not support a finding that the 
Defendant was an "obligor11 as defined by Utah Statutes \n the 
second cause of action. By virtue of Section 78-45-9, U-L.S-J3.S-? 
1953, as amBna&d^ the Office of the? attorney General anc/or the 
County Attorney has no jurisdiction over Defendant, moreover, 
said Office should not even be a party to divorce action, since 
said Defendant has always been timely providing support for his 
children. Section 7S-45-£:, U-LS-LS^? 1953, as armndBd clearly 
states: "Support debt" means the debt created by nonpayment of 
chi3d support under the 3aws of this state or the decree of any 
court of appropriate jurisdiction ordering a sum to be paid as 
child support." D&f&ndant has always provided more support to his 
children in an amount greater than that deter^rainBd by the 
Department as proven on the Departments' administrat3ve record. 
Defendant was prevented by the court from asking questions of the 
Department in an attempt to prove on the record his non-obligor 
status, thereby violating Defendants right to due process of law 
and h3S right to defend. Article 1, Sections 3, 3, & 7, Utah 
QSDS&l&y&lSQ- Th& court did Brr by sustaining objections to 
D&f&ndanf1 s p^off&rBd &vid&nGBm 
RIGHT TO PRIVACY VIOLATED 
Point 5. Notwithstanding, the Department did contact 
Defendant's employer and d3d obtain wage information upon which 
to base a claim of alleged monies owed m violation of Utah 
Statutes, there was no default judgement against Defendant and 
said D&fendanb had timely notified the Department as per Section 
7S-45b~5, U«LQ«LB* 9 3953, as amended. The D^partmBnt did then, in 
complete dssregard of Section 7S~45h~5, U^C^A-.* 3953, as am^ndBd,, 
proc&Bd illegally and unofficially to violate D&f&ndanf *$ right 
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to privacy, and without affording him due process of law by 
obtaining wage information from his employer. Article 1, Section 
*4, ytah Constitution, and Article 3, Section 7, Utah 
The Department demanded and obtained financial information 
from Defendant's/Appellant's employer without justification for 
doing so, citing Section 78-27-50, U-.£-L6I-? 1953, as amended^ 
thereby violating Defendant's right to privacy, but said 
Department was in violation of said statute since it was not 
conducting an official investigation as pursuant to Section 78-
45b~5, U«L£«L8«L* 1953, as amended. Legislative intent for Section 
78-27-50, y-.£-„8iL? 1953, as amended^ obviously was not to give the 
Department unlimited power to violate the Uts*b Qf2D^tl£iyfel9r* 
(Article 1, Section 14), nor the U^ S^ Consti.tjuti.on Amendments 
(Article 4). Defendant had also timely notified the 
Depart merit that he was providing a home and cash money for his 
children, but action was taken against said Defendant; anyway. An 
administrative determination is "arbitrary" when it is erroneous, 
that is, when it is unsupported by substantial evidence, av>d it 
is nunreasonable" when under the evidence presented* tnere is no 
room for difference of opinion among reasonable minds. The 
Departments attempt to justify a grossly blatant violation of 
Defendant's rights oy citing Section 78-27-50, Ui.Q^Q^, t953, as 
amended^ is unreasonable and is not within the letter nor the* 
spirit of the law, and is therefore illegal as applied to 
Defendant. 
Furthermore, merely because the Department claims that 
providing a house and paying cash monies for utilities: 
constitutes payment " m Kind11 and is not allowable for "credit" 
by Defendant Goes not make it so, since the Department ha<z no 
jurisdiction over Defendant, Defendant is not subject to what 
ca%b is or is not allowable. Simply stated, all cash money thai 
Defendant provides for support of his cmldren is support- The 
Department has no jurisdiction over Defendant to say that certain 
money spent on support is not support. The Department's 
argument, is in want of reason arid common sense, and serves only 
to a3 low the Department to "bulldoze" whomever it wants into its 
jurisdiction by denying the true facts. The law will not 
tolerate an absurdity. Co-Plaint iff, the Department was 
contributorily negligent as a matter of law. 
PARTIES ACTED UPON FOREIGN DIVORCE DECREE 
Point S. That the court did BY^ by not allowing DefenQant to 
conduct a defense against tne Department. The Department 
initiated action against Defendant ano is in Want of jurisdict ion 
over Defendant since it, has no cause of action, the matter of 
divorce having been aecioeo in another forum; and also Defendant 
35 not an obligor as defined by Utah Statues, therefore there is 
no reason why the Department should be a party to divorce action. 
The Department, as was pointed out on the reaord, required Co-
plaintiff Laura McGillivray to illegally use he)-" former married 
name$ the Department having "decided", (not Co-Plaintiff 
McGillivray), that the foreign divorce was not legal. fts wac~> 
pointed out on the reoord^ Co-Plaintiff believed that the Mexican 
divorce was valid when she accepted it by her notorized signature 
and consideration was manifest when Parties acted upon provisions 
of the mutually agreed upon property settlement ano visitation 
rights of Parties children as stipulated in the Mexican divoroe 
d®cr&&. The Department admitted to Defendant, in writing that 
the only reason for its9 action as a Co-Plaintiff was because the* 
foreign divorce was silent on propBriy settlement and visitation 
rights of the parties' children; that is not according to fact 
however, since the foreign dBcrBB indicated that those issues 
were to be by "mutual consent" of the parties. Those issues were.? 
understood by both parties and acted upon, with consideration, 
for over a yBay^m The court did e^r, in not dismissing the 
instant matter on that basis and on the basis tnat the Department 
die not serve D&fBndant with divorce papers until Co-Plaintiff 
McGillivray had been a Department funded recipient for over a 
yBar3 which DBfBndant has just recently discovered. Furthermore, 
tne Department in answer to D&fBndanfs Counterclaim states as a 
first cause of action that there is "no cause of action on which 
to base a claim", but as Defendant has pointed out there has bB&n 
a violation of UBfBndanf1 s rights in addition to the courts' 
failure to orevent estoppel of the Mexican divorce when the sole 
purpose of said estoppel is to obtain financial gain to the harm 
of another. Art3cle i, Section i, Utah Constitution. d®D!§£i§'D£> 
i^fcate, tSl P£d 69; Qar2£±.n*i& Y^ Cardinal®., &# P2a 997 ana 68 P£ri 
351. The principle involved in the above cited cases is 
one basis for Defendant's argument. Article 1, Section £7, Utah 
Constitution. Also, Article 1, Section 7, Utah Constitution. 
COURT IMPROPERLY SET 
Point 7. That Decause Defendant rescinded the former Utah 
marriage based upon constructive ft^aud9 which the court r^&fLi^&d 
to hBar^ the district court was improperly set, and DBfBndant 
ministerial ly, not judicially, when the rfiarvniage rescission issue 
should have been adjudicated by a Judicial Srancn Judge, tnus 
violating the separation of powers doctrine. Furthermore, 
Defendant's Constitutional rignts were vsolated when the State of 
Utah failed to fully inform Defendant that his Constitutional 
rights under the Preamble arid the Bill of Rights would be lost as 
pertaining to a Utah State granted marriage license and there was 
undue influence exercised over Defendant to obtasn said license. 
The court did pr-oaeeo in collusion with the Attorney Genera I' b 
Office, and the State of Utah ny refusing to hear anything but 
the Utah State divorce issue. The court did err since it did Ytot 
have jurisdiction over either the subject matter or over 
Defendant* s Person. Article 5, Section 1, Utah Consti.tuti.on. 
Also the court did refuse to hear Defendant1* s demand to hear hiSw 
argument whicn tne court dismissed on the basis of Demg 
improper. The court did violate Defendants right to defend 
which made the court a party to the deprivation of due process of 
law. Article, 1, Sections 1, & 7, Utah QSDlfelfeyfelQO-
It was stated on the record, of Defendant's Civil Case No. 90S*J 
Writ of Prohibition, by the Utah Supreme Court that the proper 
place to hear the aforementioned was m the State District Court. 
JURY TRIAL DENIED 
Point 8. That the court did refuse to grant a trixal by jury as-
demanded by Defendant pursuant to the Utah Const itution even 
after a jury fee was tendered? thereby violating Defendants 
right to due process of law. The court's denial of Defendant's 
right to trial by jury in a matter which mvoivec hundreds of 
dollars and other substantive issues of rights is an abuse of 
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discretion and patently m error. Article 1, Section 10, Utah 
CQUNSEL OF CHOICE—ABSURD COURT ACTION 
Point 9. That the court did grant DefendaYit counsel of choice, 
upon demand, at the pre-trial hearing on £' January ^987, tnen 
providing the additional statement- "you can have whoever you 
want sitting up here", but did then refuse Defendant the right to 
counsel at the trial. Defendant relied upon the judye granting 
counsel of choice for his defense, dut was denied that basic 
right to cue process and equal protection under the law at the* 
time of trial. Sucn Judicial "catch &£u logic of allowing 
counsel of choice then not allowing counsel of choice did cause* 
Defendant much time, expense, physical and mental suffering at a 
time when said Defendant was in great physical pain, as evidenced 
on the record^ and not prepared to be without advisory counsel. 
Said pain and suffering did last beyond the trial and involved 
medical expense to Defendant. Furthermore, said action on tne 
part of the court did violate Defendant^ s right to due process. 
since, it denied Defendant the right to adequately defend. 
Besides causing Defendant barm by causing him much legal expense, 
said deficient logic on the part of the court is sufficient to 
make reason stare. The law will not tolerate an absurdity. The* 
court did knowingly, willfully, and with malicious intent, harm 
Defendant's Person as aforementioned and is open to a redress of 
injury to Defendant. Article 1, Sections 1, 7, and 1J, Utah 
NO RIGHTS SUA SPONTE AS DEMANDED 
Point; 10. That the court die not advise Defendant of rights sua 
spente as demanded,. Defendant asked the court whether it was 
acting ministerially or judicially whereupon the judge beqari 
shouting tnat Defendant should not be arguing with the court when 
m fact Defendant was not arguing with the court but only trytmf 
to determine the nature of tne court 5 trie answer to Defendant;1 s 
question was not forthcoming? the court did, as aforementioned 
and as W3ll be shown hereafter^ violate Defendants substantial 
rights rather than notify said Defendant as to when rights were* 
being violated. The court, as it stated from the beginning of the 
trial, dio refuse to near any other issue before it, including 
mot 3ons before the court such as Defendant's Affidavit of 
Impecuniosity. The issue contained therein was not heard by the> 
court, thereby denying defendant right to due process and m s 
right to defends Article i, Sections i, 3, li, & £7, yt§h 
QSOStifeiition. 
DEFENDANT THREATENED WITH JAIL 
Point 11. Judge Tibbs threatened Defendant with going to jail 
if said Defendant dia not disclose financial information asked 
for on the pre-trial interrogatories by the Attorney for Co-
plaintiff as to wages5 which Defendant haa already answered Dy 
citing the protection of the 4th ana 5th Amendments to the U^iL 
£2D~itifeiyfeA2D- Judge Tibbs *$aid he could not make a decision 
without it. Obviously, wnat judge Tibbs really meant was that he 
hac already made a decision and he intended to threaten Defendant 
with jai3 in order to effect a property division. Instead of 
acting impartially co protect Defendani1* s Organic Constitutional 
2 5 
right bo privacy, Juoge TibDs was more oonoBm&Q with acting 
ministerially in assertaimng for Co-Plaint if f s Questions of 
discovery with the aad^d threat of judicially determined 
incarceration. The court did ®rr. Article 1, Section 14, Utah 
QSQS&JLtut i.on and Article 5, Section i, ytah Constitution. 
VIOLATION OP RIGHT TO DEFEND—JOINDER 
Point 12. That the court did, from Defore the completion of 
opening statements, refuse to hear any issues which aid arise 
from the divorce action that involved any other agencies or 
individuals excepting Co-Plaintiff, Laura McGillivray and Utah 
Department of Social Services. The court's reasoning was that 
several tort actions n&Bd&d to he filed and that several actions 
could not be lump&d into one action and that the parties were not 
py^opB^ I y j o i neo. 
Several causes of action are pr^op&rly joined however; wnere 
the subject-matter is for a tort arising out of certain wrongful 
continuous official acts, tne several causes of action are 
py^op&^ly joined in one action, and the complaint reaches the* 
substantial rights without resorting to a needless multiplicity 
of action. yil§20 Y«L §MiIiy§D? Ut.R., 17-341. F"undameriial 
principle is the basis for citing the above, pursuant to the 
Ut§b Q2DEi.liiyii.12D5 Article 1, Section, 27. Defendant was 
prevented from defending himself after thB court took Jud3C3al 
Notice of his right to co so. Article 1, Sections 1, and 7, Ulbah 
Q2D§S.ltyfel2D-
INVASION OF PRIVACY 
Point 13. That the court did have on the record fact*-
pertaining to the Departments* invasion of privacy of Defendant, 
even so, the court did not allow Defendant to asn questions 
pertaining to which Utah Statutes qavts the Department authority 
to iistain financial information from Defendants employer. Judge 
Tibhs said that he did not cans about that ana to "ask the next 
qaebtior,". "ne court did ^rr in preventing Defendant from 
conducting a a&f&n^B by not allowing Defendant to prove on the* 
record that the Department acted outside the scope of tne Lit an 
Cooes clearly a violation of Defendant's Constitutional right to 
defend himself. Article I, Sections 1, 3H 7, ano 14, 
£20f»felfeMi.l20«' 
JUDGE SAVE DEFENDANT LEBAL ADVISE 
Point 14. That the court aid legally advise De f ondan t at the* 
ore-trial rearing and at the trial to obcain a licensed attorney. 
Defendant did contact Utah Legal Services, Inc., for leqai 
asentation but was refused on the basis tnat there would 
exist a conflict of interest involving f&dBY^al monies, since said 
Agency was alr^&ady acting as legal counsel to D&f&naant^B former 
wife. 
Not only has equal protection under the law oeen denied 
Defendant, but Defendant later fully r&aLiz&d that the advise of 
Judge TibD«v9 if acted upon, would havB plac&d th& Person of said 
D&f&ndanb under the court's jurisdiction. 1 he court d ^c err in 
legally advssing Defendant so as to coerce the Person of said 
Defendant within jurisdiction of the court. Judge Tibbs should 
b& disqualified for tne above. Article 8, Sect ion 13, Ulan 
Q20ll.lfeMt.120* DBf&ndant was hawn&d by the aforementioned advise* 
m tnat it cost him time and some expense to obtain information 
and did take away from the limited time Defendant haa to conduct 
his defense. Article 1, Sect i , ^IgQ S2L*S£iti*tiS2-
CONSPIRACY, BLftCK^fllL.--DEFE* " S CHILDREN HELD RANSOM 
Point 15. That the court die on tne record and did receive 
exhibits proving perj „\ry on "che part of Co-Plaint i f fs as it 
related to fraua and conspiracy of Attorneys for Utah Legal 
Services aga m s t D&f&ndantm 3a io Attorneys etc aovise Co-
plaintiff ..aura I^ cOi 11 lvray to not allow BBf&ndant to see nis 
children, notwithstanding the attorneys were aware of a written 
contract st 3 oulat m y visatation righcs- between parties pursuant 
to the Mexican divorce OBOY^B^ but denied same verbally on t 'ie 
record and in written interrogatorses. The evidence was a letter 
to Defendant from Co-Plaintiff admitting that Utah Legal Service. 
Inc., Attorneys aid in fact conspire W3th Co-Plaintiff to 
withhold children from D^f^ndant. Said Attorneys were propB^ly 
not 3 o&a over a period of time to cease ana desist but failed to 
respond to said notification. The court did again proo&ed to 
pass over tie violation of Defendant's rights over nis objection 
ant against his will, ana by trying to hold Defendant to the sahie 
standards as an attorney m technically joining parties to tie 
instant matter. 1 he court d+d &w in not allowing D&f&ndant due-
process of law as a litigant in his ~ ^y- person. Said court 
did go through the process of allowing D&f&ndant to question said 
Attorneys concerning frauds and conspiracy to dBny said Defendant 
to see his children, Dut the court did then refuse to make* 
findings and then rule on said illegal activities wnen o&rjury 
and fraud were proven on the record through exhibits, artd a 
subsequent change of Co~Pla3ntiffs' testimony; the argument on 
the part of rhe court being that separate tort action would be-
^6 
necessary since a divorce action is all that the court could 
hear. Law - ty can be administered in a civil 
action* ;*Ie 8, Section IS, Ufe§i2 Constitution. ~^ 
d€i'privBd of life, liberty, property, sine d 
not rule on the facts proving perjury, conspiracy, blackmail, ana 
fraud on tr,e part of Utah Legal Service, Inc. , Attorneys. 
Article 1, Section 7, Utah Constitution. Co-Plaintiffs die not 
re: to D&f&ridanf* s sever-. d&mands. to give him the 
law or authority, tnern to withhold his 
from him. Said court anc said attorneys ana Co-
including tne Department, which did i-
action, as proven in exhibit 1 , cid violate Defendant's rights by 
il childrBn from m m , causing great nann, 
inducing great physical Distress, arising 
alienation of ^ his .. from him, arid alien,. 
affections -r from them? along with the 
,.il ant. al and c , expense of time, 
arisinc out of having to CBf&nd as best he couic 
ion in a 1, Sections 3, 7, 11, 
and 14, Utah Constitution, . , Section 19, and Article 
1, Section 87, Utah Const i*- -n ~ > Also, When a fraudulent 
conspiracy common L .at ion, the conspirators 
and all persons affBotBd by the fraud arB proper parties to a 
suit baseo uDon it. Stevens v., lf£2«L Cc^, Lit. R. 14-S3£. 
as the Stevens v. Imp., case is not a in no way lessens 
the basis in principle to the secun DBf&ndant^s individual 
rights. 1, Section 27, Utah Constitution. 
***** £7 
FREEDOM Dc M AND SPEECH VIOLATED 
Point 16. That t . did violate Defendant's right to 
exercise his religion and freedom of speech in rendering a final 
judgement that will not allow defendant to speak "a. *g 
derogatory about, or to criticize*3 Co-Plaintiff in front of said 
Defendant's children. It is Defendant^ s Boo given right to speak 
his mind to his children, and to educate them in things which are 
good. Defendant has the right to talk abouc had actions of Co-
Plaintiff \^hich the children have live?d through in order to point 
tnern away from the negative things which they should not do. The 
court has threatened ~. ~ andant with contempt of court and will 
consider a jail sentence if Defendant speaks his mind freely to 
his children. The court may nave been well ?ne,...,,.. ,^ in tnose 
general terms but has, if chat is the case, stated it's intent in 
such vague and ambiguous terms so as to render its purpose 
contray^y to Defendant being able, in accordance with his 
religion, to teach and communicate freely with his children. 
The court did err-". Said judgement should therefore be held void 
and without effect since it is a clear violation of Defendant** s 
r i gh t s as a forewent i oned Art i c 1 e i, Sect i ons 4, iah 
Fundamental to Defendant's religious oelief is the right to 
verba11y point out contrasti ng act i ons, bei i efs, and op inions of 
others, including Co-Plaintiffs', to his children^ so as to 
convey an understanding of what he believes to be a course of 
attitude and action which is righteous, good, true, and leads to 
Bod and Life. Article 1, Sections 4, and 15, Utah QSDSfeifeafeiSD-
BIAS 
17, Furth£>M,wr8, co--i': , nstant case, the 
Ross C. fail to act upon a 
•-.% of assault attery ,-v ;reat to life 
of Defendant by said Defendant's laintiff, Laura 
McGillivray. Defenc "esses, te 
County s C- '.al c-
11
 lost" 5 a .t5 again witnessed, was gain 
"lost"; a ••tified letter, thereby 
forcing action on the ai complaint which was by then over a 
ye Attorney B conflict of interest irt a 
letter to D&f^nd^nt hut ated said complaint a gave 
an :. on to not bring it to c Defendant asted the 
referred to the Attorney General but the matter was 
jn* '^©y* Ross C* Blac early b 
since he did^ in ;. .- ; _«'t, Hrule" .. . c,vor o 
ay while he was representing the State 
of Utah irt the ir matter. Defendant attempted to ask 
qu Ross C. Blackham, whom 
ti ad allowed t. witness stand? said 
court, would not
 : sk questions which pertained 
to v rights. The court did err in not 
a Organic Constitutional 
by not allowing said DBf^r^d^rit to coriduct a defense. fir „ 
i, 3, 7, ii, & £7, Utah Const i.tution. 
join all agencies arid officials wh 
a s they became parties to the action directly arising 
out of tr. -ter. 
2L? 
Ulhen a fraudulent conspiracy is the common 
litigation, the conspirators and all persons affected 
fr-aud ar-B propBn parties to t based upon it. Stevens V«L I22E&. 
QS«L? Ut. R- 14-~£:3£:. Inasmuch as the Stevens v. Imp., ease is not 
a divor-CB in no way lessens the basis in principlB to 
security of DBf&ndant's. individual rights. Article 1, Section 
£7, Utah Constitution. The SanPete County court did fail to hold 
DBf&ndant^^ rights inviolate. Furthermore, the 1 
complaint which was turned over to the Attorney General's . ,:e 
has nBVBr bBBn acted upon. DBf'Bndam ..M~ .^en dBniBd duB process 
of law in a criminal action again-:. s person based upon bias 
and pr-BjudicB^ with conspiracy between agencies by aforementioned 
agencies. Article 1, Sections i, 7, and ii, yt&h Constitution. 
COURT JURISDICT:; HNT 
Point 18. the court did rule against Defendant in division 
of property parties, which property division had already 
bBBn BffBatBd and acted upon by both parties as QBY- the prior 
Mexican divorce. Then in a blatant attempt to gain jurisdiction-
over the court did rule that said Defendant shoul 
d support payments directly to the DBpartnmnt instea 
Defendant's former wife who has shared custody of the chile4--
,.... -_3 Co-Plaintiff Laur# ay has turned over all child 
support payments to the DBP,. in the past the only reason to 
require Defendant to Pay ../,>- ^u.,^* trnent is to gain jurisdiction 
over said DefBndant' s Person. The c did Brr- by not 
protecting DBf&ndant* s Organic Constitutional v _ ;s a non-
juristic individual. The judge, in that the DBf&ndant 
pay the Department, is, in essence, activ Serially and is 
3 0 
ground for his disqual: :n» in 1B ' --r 
said ruling since Der;\i.;-w»;.; is nc; "s 
to n unreasonable attempt of the - -se bias and 
dice against the Defendant to o pay a :y 
when clearly there is no debt a :y 
Article 1, Section 1, 7, II, & £7, Utah Constitution, 1© 
6, Section 13, Utah Constitution. 
Furthermore, since Co-Plaintiff, Laura ^IcGillivray h&^ ^... .: .. .• 
the Department power of attorney and is also otherwise 
in commerce as a juristic person under Maritime equity 
in opposition to the status of Defendant, he being a de jure 
state citiz&rsi where is the jurisdiction of the court to 
that DBfendant pay any support, especially since the DBpari 
routinely performs operations on aforementioned ah' 
not notify Defendant; and moreover, the cost of c 
borne by the Department as authorized by U^S^C^ 1396-13969, Sub 
Chapter XIX, Chapter 7, Title 48, which jurisdiction D^f^ndant is 
not under. Certainly Tile 3$, Chapter 3, Un-Qs-Ba-i 1953, as 
amended piaae^B the State of Utah in a position of viol*;.-. •._., 
D&f&ndant*& rights with re: his state aitiz^n^hip status 
based upon the Preamble ,11 of Rights to the :ic U. 
S. Constitution, since said state is attempting to force 
Defendant into Maritime equity jurisdiction, even 1 
BBf&ndant has provided, and continues to provide for his 
Article 1, Sections 3, 7, & £7, Utah Constitution^ 
STRANBER TO THE RECORD 
Point 19. That the court did err in adjudica . .. /.„., upon the 
propBr-ty rights of a person not a party e case who was a 
31 
stranger to the record. ft courts judgment r&nd&r^&d against 
persons not parties to the action and over whom the court 
acquires no ''ction is absolutely void as to them. Houser 
v^ Bmith, Ut. R. 19-150; l^ osJby v^ @A§born, Ut. R„ 17-S57. 
Frequent recurrence to f unr ••' -^^ --• 1 principles is essential to the 
security of individual and t erpetuity of fr-BB 
go vernment "--nrt icle 1, Section 87, Utah Q£_^^^.^2i2!3«L 
PRIOR PROPERTY AGREEMENT 
POINT 2®. Tru court did er^r in not taking into 
consideration that the property consisting of a house with £ and 
1/4 acres in Mayfield was obtained from the proceeds of a sale 
of a home owned by BBfBndant before the parties marriage. That 
the Defendant had made available that home, as agreed and acted 
upon, for the use o -'laintiff and his children, but in an 
attempt to obtain more money than originally agreed upon between 
part ies? Co—P1 aint iff ™ • ~ :• from the home. Equity is not 
available to reinstate rights and privileges voluntarily 
contracted away simply because a party has come to regret the 
bargain made? the law 1 the continuing jurisdiction of the 
court where a property settlement agreement has h&Bn incoy^pov^ated 
into the decree* Land y^ Land, <19S9) 605 P £d 1£48« 
CUSTODV 
Point £1. That the court d iscret ion in a^ardinq custody 
of children to Co-Plaintiff, inasmuch as no recognition was given 
to an aqrBBmBnt and contract between parties that Defendant was 
2 custody of children during the entire s.. | nor did the 
court take recognition that there is no statutory presumption in 
favor of the mother haviv children, 3i£<~ Y*L 3i£^i 
3 2L 
584 P £d 305? , y.„ (1977) 564 P £d 307, 
Furthermore, Section 30-3-5, y^ Q-LB"-* 1953, as amende not 
applicable in detBr-mininq who shall " - . . _ ,^e 
a p r o c e e d i n g i s &•• .t i n U t a h .y 
made by t h e c o u r t o f a f o r : : - - 1 - s t a t e . The de , / , , : : .... . . : - - : en 
s t a t e mus t b e n and c r e d i t - l2lC0§D V«L y§-2£>2££ 
(19S5) IB U £d £ 5 8 . 
" """ *~ ~•• 1S 7 r ~ 'TT~-' "'" TT1VE 
Point ££. That t order allowing Defendant £ 
week periods during the i. „ „ r and every other weeke 
with his children :, 3 restri --•,..' * ... .•-.- •-..—--.-. "-^ t 
lives over two nunc. . . lies frc. th 
Co-Plaintiff, and his financial s>~ „,,>»„,.,.on is limited, he is 
unable to visit the s , Co-
Plaintiff originally ;racted with for 
visitation to last an entire -- - •• r^fendant should he al.....,—... 
to enjoy a more reasonable ». chi Idren 
the travel distance and result ,a waste 
expense. E'SCfegE Y^ ESEtitE? ^77 P £d 111. 
NO CHANGE OF 
Point £3. That the court c _ 
orders for support money when there was, in fact, no
 Ch-^ — of 
circumstances of fBndant or C "f. The 
awarded Co-Plaintiff *l*,,.,. *>£• p^r chi 1 d per . . :. or a total of 
*50®.80. ; then the court de ild 
increase to $158.80 p&r child or a total 
t h • -;m r&ach&d a g e I S . The oourt did a b u s e d iSw, u v . o n by 
. - s r a r i l y p e n a l i : r D e f e n d a n t ;, I d r e n 
33 
BDBu Modifications or new orders must foe based upon allegations 
of changed conditions and &vid&ncB in support thereof, Cody y... 
Cody, 47 U 456? Qsmus y^ Qsmus ) 114 U £'16. 
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WHL 
CONCL. 
12ant/I 
:udgement 
VI J I 
D RELIEF £ 
seeKS reversal o 
or as a matt . aw 
of tne 
;ne foreign divorce Decree and relief 3rfo) or from t -
in .tion arising, out of one action, anci 
of prayed for in . ./Defendant's 
adcition to damages to Defenoant by tne court. 
I« For f 
t;ie Department to 
.a 1 t r e a t ment b e i rc & 
o r o e r t n e De pa r t merit t o 
r w O - v f * « . i 
. a t e d Sy 1 
and c e s i s t i n c 
rf a n y 
t o 
j o n d a n t s / D e f e n d a n t s t o acivi s e 
t o c e a s e and d e s i s t ««^s 
£ . i : o r r t t o or 
a 1 1 p a r t i e s t o a h o v e a c ; i o n 
(:TfiGant? s e n , \~ansow
 ? wh I eh i s 
11 z t o h I s ch i l d r e r i . 
3» " o r t h e c o u r t t o o r d e r c h i l e v i s i t a t i o n r i g r i t s p u r s u a n t t o 
j e ,TJ u t a a l l y a g r e e c 
d i vorce decree. .*P 
n contract a. m the 
xiant/Defenoant shall h 
ri :;ni ;he 
cr out of 
the ch.„ , ., „.,? every 
the en i.l dr en at * 
Sunday* 
4» That the Court order that 
f r o m h o t h the 
for the 
shall *-
. - including t 
~icay a>' 
~ "' "s wner, tne 
right to take 
, to pick up 
the ch by 
« « „. * on i n w r i t i n g i s t o be 
Appe l larit/B&fm'-iCiartx o r 
3 5" 
Resporcdarifc/Plaint i ff 38 da> in are taken 
State of Utan. 
5. That &pp&llant/D&f®ndant will :-?alth, accident, 
ana dental in^uY-anaB^ if available, his employment and 
for th& court to order tnat each of the parties shall Bach be 
obligated for one-half of any deductible that has to be paid for 
meaical expenses for tne minor Qhildr-Bn* 
6. That the Court oroer Respondant/Plaintiff to live in the? 
Bayfield home as pBr t.ie parties mutual agreement pursuant to the 
foreien oi vorce aecree. 
7. Tnat the Court award to Appellant/Defendant 
Respondant/Pi^ "f equally, one-half of the mining stock or the 
equivalant purchase price of t iree dollars pBr share. 
S. That the Court aware to ftppeliant/Defendant, tually 
agreed upon, tne adult section of tne EncyclopBdia Bnitaniaa 
whicn is in his possesion, and the r& two sets to remain 
in tne possesion of Respondant/Plaintiff. 
9. That the Court aware the pencil water purifier ana the 
Triple Combination Scripture Book, or the current market f 
eacn to Respondant/Plaintiff. 
13. That tne Court award one-half of the few silver coins and 
medal ions or the current market price to Respondant/Plaint •> 
mutually a gr-&Bd u pon. 
ii, That tne court award to ftppellant/Defendant any of his 
personal belongings still r, in tne possesion of 
Respondant/PIai nt i ff. 
1£. Tnat all other ----^rty snail remain in tne possesion of 
eitner the Rppellant/Defer f» 
3C 
13. not held 
together with i r,. • ,.., ^ ~- ., .. -^on to the Department. 
14. That the court order ftppellant/Defendant is to pay 
his child support to the eustoc ?nt and not the Department? 
and that the Department cease and desist from h&rr ng 
said 1Iant/Defendant. 
15* For the court to order the SanPete County Sher 
ar$d the SanPe y to act upon a restraining order 
issued by t: o protect 
harm from his fc-/..,,:; ...-•._:• when pic ^ up h i Idren* 
15. Th-: •"; of Seventy f usand do' 
lit a .. .s Department of Social E for compensatory, 
iary, and punitive damages* 
17. dollars from John P. 
,t for cc itive damages* 
IS, The s. ;Ln of Twenty the:" r dollars from Ross C. 
Blackham for atory, c-
19. The sum c— _._._. ,, • . . f the 
John and Jane Does, ft th Z, for compensatory
 5 e : y, 
and punitive damages* 
£8* The sum certain of Seven t: 
V. 7itabs for Court costs and personal costs. 
£1- That the Court order that all ndant 
ar& to suffer the expense Bnd to assume their own court costs. 
•*•**** 
• * # • • * # • # 
p."*-fV^ h 
as 
the court deems just and proper, 
this 17th day of July, 1987. SIGNEZ -pUt 
VERIFICATION 
ThB above signator, known to us, verifies and affirms that 
ail statements mad& h^r-Bin are true and correct to the best of 
his knowledge, information and belief, and not for the purpose of 
evasion or delay, and is witnessed in the State of Utah, County 
of yashinqton. 
I; 17th day . _. _ily, 1387. 
DATED 17th day of July, 1987. 
WITNESS 
WITNESS 
Cert i Mailing 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Brief on 
Rpp&al was mailed, postage pnepaid to: 
Wai ne R iches, At t orney 
Utah Legal Services, Inc, 
455 IM. University, Suite ±\ 
Provo, Ut ah 84681 
Ross C. H 
SanPete u 
Sanpete Cc •.,•;"> 
Manti- Utah 
> Httorney 
y Courthouse 
84848 
on the BEmd day of July 1387. 
David L. Wilkenson, Atty. Se?n' 1. 
C/0 Blaine R* Ferguson 
£36 State Capitol Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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Social Services Norman H. Bangerter, Governor, State of Utah Norman G. Angus, Executive Director 
October 23, 1985 
Mr. Michael Robert Barker 
P.O. Box 142 
Santa Clara, Utah 84765 
Dear Mr. Baker: 
Since the receipt of your October 11, 1985 letter, I have reviewed your 
case with "Team 38" in Richfield. I noticed several misunderstandings of 
law in your letter and, if I may, offer some further explanation of the 
issues you raised. 
The fact that you are now a resident of Utah places you in a position of 
being subject to its laws. I'm sure you know that this office has been 
empowered by statutory law to pursue the rights of children and to 
collect support in their behalf. Since the custodial parent has deemed 
it necessary to get assistance from the state, the recovery of money 
spent by the state is our specific interest. Whether or not your 
children receive state assistance is a matter for the custodial parent 
(in this instance your former wife) to decide. This is not a decision 
making matter for the non-custodial parent. I noticed your divorce 
decree is mute regarding monthly support requirements. That being the 
case, we are empowered to set the obligation and enforce its payments. 
An investigator from our office would like to discuss this aspect with 
you in order that we may arrive at a mutually agreeable figure. I urge 
you to call or write the Richfield office to arrange that meeting. Every 
effort will be made to accommodate your needs. 
In the meantime, I have instructed the Richfield office to remove your 
name from the tax intercept list. This does not mean we intend to cease 
and desist. It is merely meant as a waiting period. Frankly, we intend 
to pursue the issues of this case and we will take every legal action 
necessary to bring it to a successful conclusion. Your assistance and 
understanding in this matter will be yjery much appreciated. 
M&T 
\lgtvft P. Abbott 
Director 
JPA/VLM/gt 
Office of Recovery Services 
John P. Abbott, Director 
Salt Lake Office, 3195 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3749 
801-486-1812 
An Equal Opportunity Employer 
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wife/herself, when informed ofi the Nevada 
decree,'acquiesced therein, and proceeded to 
act^  thereon.by he^lfj'ente^^^into'ah'otiier 
niarri^qj contract * audi JiyJ^k ;,witlii.the, uew 
husband for several years, in. accordance 
.therewith. The vital, question in this case 
is -whether she is ; estopped. by/ her, conduct 
fromi i now; questioning.^ tiie. • validity of .the 
^Nevada decree, whether/, shej has not, by her 
conduct, accepted itj.as^a satisfactory solu-
tion of the controversies-between herself 
and her husband,'.Bruguiere, and. thereby 
ratified, and affirmed the irregularities upon 
which the .decree, was, obtained,, and, waived 
aliAright...to attack it,x She.alleges.that she 
was Ignorant of the law governing such mat-
ters* , But she does not, allege, that she •. was 
not aware. p£ the decree, purporting to. dis-
.so^ve the, marriage , relaUopi and of; jthe; fa,ct 
.that; after, a
 4divorce. ^he^was free, to, jcpntract 
anotheri ^ arriage^i
 t J5hei admits, and declares 
that she was.^ ^
 rJThe:inva4Jdity jof the;Ne7ada 
decree is not due. to any- vice,apparent, upon 
the record, but to the policy of the state of 
Qallf^rniaj-whichiirefusesj faith and;, credit 
to such % decree. *,No reason suggests itself 
to. na7whjfrrthe wife,/ should cpnsider herself 
bound,by this, state^ policy*;or; why, she.could 
not waive all questipj^iOftitsefCectjupoij her 
and accept the..status,givenrtQ; her< by the 
Nevada decree><> We are- of thei opinion that, 
whether jshe. hads a,;right to, dp t^hiSiiOr not, 
having done so and having,iupon that theory, 
married, another person^ i shells now• preclud-
ed from-setting up the invalidity of the-Ne-
*990* ^ a $ 1 5 5 J B A G I F i g 
^^ad^^'decree^^and^roni^cIatotoKfih^l 
^nights a g a i r i s t ^ e i ^ f o r m e 4 h ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ F 1 J | 
yWChe authorittes^are practic^riftmanimousJ 
^Inufajorj of) theoproj^sitiQa^thiCtp^ remark 
,*rlage- estops thel party: enteringuintouit^from 
Jdenylng the validity^ol/J2iejpr£$oila divorceJ 
^In Marvin ^Fc^ter^e^Min^o^^^N^WJ 
1484&$2 AntKSfc)-Re'p;/t58ejrtherdecree ofeidiJ 
IvorceJ showed^want \ot e^urisdictiom oni! the 
cface^of • the'VrewrdJ^d^wasl^donseiiuentiy,! 
J^oidy evert on^llateratnttackj pChe husband^ 
F afterward majqrte^sjaotherjpersoitffand, livedo 
t^with£her^for^4j£e^^ that 
f<he£was estoppedito question/ the?validityL-ofj 
rthe4dlvorce.Wn1Mohler,vJ*Sharik} 93aowa,' 
^273^611 N. W4981? 34> LtfiR/'Aq 161J 57 Am.j 
' S t Rep. 274rtwheref the factalwereLessentialj 
oJy.'the same,^thelwife^afterfVIecondjmar-J 
triage; attacked the decree; J jThe jcourt said* j 
^/'Having accepted tbe^ 'dlvbrce* as ivalid,* in the 
^ya^^he did^ she should •ben&J'hiA) % estopped 
?«& t ' B ^ Z ^ ^ f f i ^ 381.; jspea^Ln^of; a siiaUar,case,a^edcourt said^j 
** "We discover, upon principle^ no sufficient rea-
son why petitioner's conduct in* the premises 
'should not produce just as effective an estoppel 
rajTif she had received; therproceeds'of a void judgment for money,* Byrber) subsequent mar-
riage,,with Israel, during. Arthur's lifetime, she 
accepted, so far as, was within' her" power* the 
'benefits or' privileges?ofJ the* divdrce" decrees, 
.The fact that she did not then know that those 
decrees were void is. a< matter of no more con 
sequence than is the ignorance in this respect of 
one ^ ho, knowingly1 in all other particulars, re-
ceives the fruits' of- an' ordinaryi void'judgment 
atlaw."># rii siA-yr Mri9V$3'i>To) bawttd \ 
fJ
 The following cases rare to tfie. same'1 effect: 
-Yorston v. Torsion;* 32 N.'J. Eq. 505?*Riche-
'son-v. Simmons,' 47^Mo.°20i,:jIWhittaker"v. 
^Whittaker, 51 DL App,'263;/Sedlalc v. Sed-
lak; 14 Or. 540, 13 Pac. 452; Richardson's 
"Estate, 132 Pa. 292, 19 AtC 82. * '- * '1 
The appellant cites Norton' v. Tufts, 19 
Utah, 470, 57 Pac. 409, and Sammons v. Pike, 
*108 Minn. 291, 120 N. W. 540, 1$2 N. W. 168, 
'23 K R. A (N. S) 1254^ 133^ Aih.1 St. Kep. 
425, in support of the opposite4'doctrine. In 
e
 Norton v. Tufts there was nof pievious di-
vorce; but only1 a so-Called* "church divorce," 
J
 under' the sanction" of thfe* Mormon Church. 
^Iri^point of law It^was^no^more than an 
*" agreement of separation, but the-parties sup-
posed' it to be a! dissolutioS*of the marriage] 
Both" of them married again. ^It was held 
"thaVshe' remained his wife &nd was not es-
topped to claim dower in'1 his7 lahd against 
^one who had taken" a mortg&ge f^rom the hus-' 
¥bandf.f Inasmuch as^there^was^nat even the 
{semblance of legal proceedings* for a divorce, 
*td hold that atf estoppel arose'from the sub4 
'sequent^marriage^would^he> thev equivalent 
wOf/ saying, that aa divorce7 could) be aecured 
/by. contractA In Sammons ^ v.i> Pike, there 
«*wasd no subsequent marriage' bjjrc the wife, 
Tnorfeven acquiescence by herein the divorce, 
Wi!jDXtT^PBICi^SlATUTB5^tJL^a,f& ^ !& 
fmspVntvrfyh -Code, 1*389$ Prpjfa}n*,i**t no 
'ai^aanmereoinactiottj oonsti.tqte^ 
altiesj^and all expenses^where theohodbetof tsale, 
puhlishedubylithebtajt^collector, Statedutba^the 
.taxes and interest duerupon the land amounted 
*tof$35.22,?while the cost of advertisin£Vais; $5, 
*a? total' of $40.22, the sale of thej proper^ for 
$3522, wa*fcnraud.fc*ft ^ ( j f # n i ( 
l6XEd^^Note.-^ Blo s^>otherTlcaB«sa s^e^aCttxatibn, 
L C ^ D i * M ^ t ^ ^ ^ e ^ D i ^ ^ ^ C T ) , ] 
ISQWNBB'&'RlQHrTO OBJECT—STATXTWotnt' 
^^Ifnder.PoLcide, ft3780.WfoAdhrthe 
,owner of lantf sold for taxes the right to redeem 
until the state has disposed of the land,' tbe'per-
f son* liable for fa' tax» may) complain''of ithe in-
validity 1 of a^sale by the, state, as>vioJative, of 
section 3897* providing that no bid,for the land 
shall be received or accepted for less than the 
amount of' all'taxes, costs and 'penalties,-* and 
expenses, since* the owner may redeem by paying 
the amount due, with expenses and interest* while 
section 3897 informs him that his right will re-
main until some purchaser at least' bids an 
equal amount. " ' A - » u h '^ Uk u 
* [Edi Note.—For other cases, see Taxation, 
Cent/iDig^ | 1580;/Dec. Dig. <3=>796<3).] > 
3 / iluiETiwo TITLE $=»35(1) -^ PLEADINC* DE-
o TENSE—ADVERSE POSSESSION. f>)i i' rr/r 
•"t In. a suit to quiet title, where defendants 
filed
 i a, cross-complaint alleging title in one of ! them as trustee, asking to have it quieted, which 
v
 cross-complaint the plaintiff answered,' going to 
trial on the issues so raised, defendants could re-
ly on adverse possession as a source of title with-
out specifically pleading it in their answer. 
*[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Quieting Ti-
tle, Cent Dig. J 73 ^  Dec. Dig. <3=>35(1).] 
4. ADVERSE POSSESSION @=>114---SUFFICIENCY jrOF EVIDENCE. 5 * - J **- j 
>ili i In suit to quiet title,' evidence held insuffi-
cient to establish actual adverse possession of the 
prQperty by defendants.;} tJ \ < ^  j [Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Adverse Pos-
session, Cent Dig. §§ 682/683, 685, 686; Dec 
T>ig.f <g=»114J i * - J i Q J - ' b " ^ J*1 
5.'fAD VERSE /P6sSESSIONfl 5fc»12^EeSIpNTIALflr 
"**r* To be adverse, possession must be under a 
continuous claim of title, hostile to that of the 
opposing party, for the period prescribed by law. 
l0 [Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Adverse Pos-
session, Cent .Dig., §§ 65, 67-76:, Dec Dig. <£=» 
1 3 IT*"*"* *Z" J i A f*M ifit±* i,ju*or ^ 4 
^ p ^ a i f j n a " A o h i ) j JI .7 3BoJ>r>Brt7 qj i i v - ' 
^j ln BwakAr Appeal; from -"Superior Court, 
Kern Countyp J , . ,^ 3fahoxv Judgeiioh 'f i i f 
ib Suit to quiet title by John Cfc Jordan against 
Truxtun, Beale, trustee, and-othersj From a 
rjudgment (fov defendants, plaintiffi appeals 
rapoa the Judgment roll and a.biii' of excep-
tions/i EeverseoVriu r t)ouj3c.n<y> aoiu bafC 
C=»For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digest* and Indexes 
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^b id shall be received 
ilejtor less than the amour 
\ upon such property^  anc 
jLfor e v e ry year delinqu 
aelinquent rolls for said yei 
locution of the deed to the 
<to the date ol* 
on^^ogether with mterc 
e0section contains,- a 
£$&i%i?esolution of the 
^3ft^/8tate^ controller u 
!)Prization direct the tax 
{for arsmaller,*t 
S^i^owever, that thii 
ite^exception. Our the 
$&&?*)^authorization, wi 
" ^ expressly-declarer thj 
•jUtofcfll bur ^l^^^it »»» t 
lMlPACIFIO-KEPORTEIl Ml t&tafi*"!; 
kntf-In* wHting lto"< a» nib^iflcation 
js -6f ^ac t^ l i c lus Ion8 , 3>£1a W; 
; withli^l5^ay^Jrafte#r^ceiVing 
remittitur,1 theHrl^l^coiiWls^di-
lt aTriew< trial ^ appellants-to re1-
xable ;costi?onHhi6i 'appeal^ 11 
X^trf a n f l i ^ J C ^ -^icoQCiir.Sh 
^ C O M V * (No.^676i);; *™'ja:4 
ourtf,of'Utai!J;^Ja^^26rji^l6.)ri) 
i <@=5ll7:LNbTicit ori)ECimoN-r 
TOE- S E R V W G ^ H ^ 4 ; ^ ! 0 ^ ^ ir-?,j:> 
e' decree! iaf divo'rce; was 'in!- favor 
id was prepare^by.-her,attorneys, 
ecision was', necessary in- order to 
the"time:for filing! and serving, a 
tv trial! by 'plaintiff because of re-
ment; alimony^ f^v;.iii'' fniril-^r/*" 
-For other cases?i see NewiTrial,' 
23S-241; i Dec;« Dig.;. <£=>m.) :•  i ;; A 
TSTi'1 EBR0B;(<g==>346—Ii^NDMEST 
KT^EFTIC,r--M0Tl6N? rOBMiNKW, 
ImenttO a decree* in^a divorce case, 
ly to carry, into.effect-the,decision 
loes not extend t ie six months pe-
notice of appeal'must be filed and 
appeal is • desired.?)?, ?'.u.J,*i,v« ••'•' 
-For otherrcases,'see 'Appeal and 
3ig. §§1891, 1894; Dec Dig, <S=* 
"
:
 ' .-jlvi-A pi'll fr;\dv/ (1 v-:::!-.•::•' 
M6%—APPEAL FORMA PAUPERIS. 
irmance of a judgment usually car-
Its will not be' awarded where ap-
'"• affidavit'of impecuniosity. • . v 
»*For other cases, see Costs, Dec 
$=>280—DECISIONS APPEALABLE. 
il will he.from,;an order of the 
nying the petition of a wife, who 
>rce, for an award of alimony, filed 
rendition of the decree.! ••>• 
For other cases," see Divorce, Cent 
D e c Dig; <S=>280.1; ; u : . ; > 
S=>245-~ALrM0NT~RlQHT TO. 
3inp. Laws 1907, § 1212,, amended 
3, c 109, declaring, that, when an 
decree of divorce is made, the court 
)h order in relation to the children, 
ties, and maintenance as; shall be 
1 subsequent changes* or new or-
nade with respect, to the disposal of 
distribution of property as shall 
, a wife, who was'granted no'ali-
m interlocutory .decree;of divorce 
, will not > thereafter » be , granted 
etition to.*;; '}- 7. ••«.,""'- ,"•*' 
-For other cases, '" see Divorce. 
M-G95 ; Dec' Dig; <£~>245.] 
triating in'parti*' ' • ^ i ; 
PlaiinJ' : i l i' ; 1>lU ™h!w >'' • 
and orc£ i c t ' C o u r t »" S a l t L a k e 
___^trong, Judge.i • 
.* J e n s e n - T / & S a l n s t J ' 1 J - Co^y-
_*Parsonj5>^ j j^^ot ion ' for new 
Custer v.; custer>aVe of • alimonv, 
^ ^ ^ ' o t o e r ^ a s M T 
'•'appeal 
°ac. 907; 
^uzzo 
I apr>elfantd<t<j.6' W 3 McKinli^Vifi'Salt^Lalfe 
City/ for1 respbnden1i f8^^ Milt* inornate* M\* 
r
 (>FRICKy X. Thls,p,roc€e^lng7was pnginally 
coinmen^ed'fn'th^ S a ^ ^ k e -
conntV^by. th explain tinVfB'^^^ 
re^^er..rjud^mentj)(f<)r^ separate) maintenance, • 
While? the/,action • Faa" pencliiig .thet: plaintiff ' 
amended lier complaint . and.{ prayed , for,. a 
divorce.V. Tne defendant 'cohtesteLplaintiff's 
pray er^ fo r •. mal n tenance,0 asL^weU., as . i o r,. dlr 
yorceJ^'Perma^enipaJimony^ was 4 prayed^ for 
iii^ the
 («>mpiain£\Oni th'e\6tii day: of; ^ovem-
berf 1913,^thfe -district court/ 'aforesaid' en-
tered ranrlnterl6cu£oryVdecree'fdif"divorce in 
favor!; of. the 'plaintiff^ -under' W ^ statute 'as "' 
amended} by Laws; of .Utah,1909, fc. 109.v In 
that; decree,' in addition to bein^; granted a 
divorce,27the. plaintiff was' also' awarded the 
custody' of, her j infant, a boy of, six years of 
age, and the defendant was required: to de- ,; 
positc,with, the
 :;clerk; of. said, court; the sum • 
of $20 a month, which, as.stated.:in the de- ; 
cree, was allowed "as permanent alimony, the 
same to/be used,by; the plaintiff,, or such por-
tion thereof as shall:.be necessary, for the 
care^and support '/olf said' minor ..child,",,.' On 
the.application, of the defendant that portion' 
of the decree quoted' above' was,' on the 20th !: 
day of December; • 1913,° amended ,l so : as to•'.' 
make the "decree conform- to the decision of 
the court as the same was contended to be by 
the defendant'1. The decree was accordingly^ 
amended, so as to, require the defendant "to j 
pay to the clerk of this court the sum of $20, V 
the same to be used for the care and support-', 
of said minor'child.*' Said'sum'of $20 w a s ! 
required to> be'paid monthly, and the record^ 
shows that, pursuant to said decree, the de^ J 
fendant paid, and the plaintiff received, thej 
monthly1 payments from and including No^ .* 
vember, 1913, and to and including Septem-jjl 
ber, 1914. Oh the 6th day of May, 1914, thf J 
plaintiff served and filed a notice of motioin 
for a new trial. On the 2Gth day of Mayg 
1914, the. defendant by his counsel, filed 
motion to strike, : or to "dismiss/' as it 
called,' the alleged notice of motion for a ne^ 
trial,, upon the grounds that the same wa^ 
not filed
 f within ' the - time • required by our 
statute.;/ !On "June1" 6th following the cour| 
granted'defendant>'.motion, but at;the.sam^ 
time, and after granting said motion, 
"overruled'' plaintiff's motion* for a ne* 
trial.1 The plaintiff, on the 19th. day, of June 
1914, served and filed her* notice of appea 
from the fhterlocut'ory decree entered on ^J 
vember 6r 1913;; as before*Vtated. \ f;i V '.^  
The defendant has inter^"SedIar:m'otion 
dismiss the appeal from that decree on. tJ 
ground.that the "same was)ndt taken w i t ^« 
the time: required'rby OBrj':statutef,, nametj 
within'^ s i r months i from-.the::entering of' 
\ decree,^ or-' within'':six < months from the 
l l / t h e i d e c p e i f r n e c b s s a ] ; ^ 1 0 ^ ^ 1 ^ n 
i s t h e ^ l i ^ ; ^ ^ . ^ motion did 
1 - e ^ C o ^ S w , I t e n d l D g ; t h e time ' 
r vorce : \ ^ ! P I ! S s e h i I e ' as we have see 
^ ' ^ S S w ' 1 ' the' notice c 
^ i n s l s t s . t h ^ S ' ^ t h e notice of appe, 
f W l t h l t t - p r S ! . ' ^ b t * * - t i m e . t o r . t w o rea, 
? cause no )'£??£??** ot «»«: original! 
# ^ r v e d / o n ' ^ 0 ^ 6 ( toe Pont i f f ; ; and (2 
I S H * d e c r e e waS: the s a m i 
# c o u l d l e S f T 0 r e l , , y b e t a k e n " a»y 
#six LJ^ZnZlBt/om that date- a 4 
fee noticed t e b e t o i ° ' ' ;«PPeal -wi8 servef 
f ^ t h S < ^ - S f t e t t V U ^ 
f l a t the fc , n ; e C O r d 1S C ° D d u s h e ** 
W&a enterer- e l w a s e n « r e l y in faror 
^ ^ and i ! 1 0 ^ ^ ^ t h e s»™ wa5 prq 
$ce of a , S e r l ° U S , d e C l s l o n to-order to « 
'the.Ume l 0 w a i ; C f f o r B e " t o s a n d nuDg 
' w o t t o a . f c f ^ f n e w t r l ^ - a s not 
ipply to , i g 0 l n g • Uhe p a r t ^ l n - h o s e far 
SnoVis gih,"" h^n ' 'V^6*1 t b a t part^ ^ 
-the flBdinhln W h l f o r f a c t and conclusi^ 
Spurt .to ^ C e S m f f i J f ' T h e p a r t y - h o . p 
Smdin'gs
 a
a o i £ a n ; n d conclusions, and d e a . 
Necessity,- W e ' , a s p o , n t e d out-by uTb 
t u c h t e n s f e ~ e n ! t o ' ' f 1 « P«c- 1036.: be ] 
jhave n o t i ' ° d i t l o n P e / f t h e d e c ' s lon, and ^ 
Entit led t / f v t b e W / U r t b e r n o t l c e thereof.-] 
^Oft ther f f c h a n s e ^ 0 r t Y,aS DOt e n t i t l e d -ti 
| ,hence h e . d e ' , w l t r f l l n ° t i c e o f motion for J 
S v a s ' n o t r P v e ^ t f l l e d Within the time r, 
-four' statu e 3 ? s t l l U e ' a n d it therefore <,« 
*ftised as
 f
e d 0 n t ' D e a n s t 0 ^ t e n d the ti 
VgShtch to , a t t h e t a k e a n appeal..-;' , 
I $ . m Plai8 m a d < n " f f ' 8 counsel,.however, 1; 
•ffieven
 thoroceedi)Ugh that be conceded, t 
l i i d not b/' w h e i e c o m e fiQal until Decembe 
^ h e A lt:en;*tt?ja amended In the pari 
v i
 • • . s ta / , . d , t , ?°*?- ' > ' ' W e a r e o* the-oplr 
UMBER in all Key-Numbered DigeaU and Indexes -M 
^.ave- s tar ^^^h i n view of the record in; 
fever, tha:^n UJdment in question did not 
,_4the amen^ ^ o t e n d e d for by plaintiff's 
W 'rS^ i,CO'T new e d amendment, or change, • 
g^The, aIleg.U m o n j Ce the. decree, reflect the or 
i # * # . m a l b e <jis made by the ,court Th 
t$ 0 n - ' a s l i s s a t i r e f 0 r e , related, back to the t 
B e ^i , the i s t r i b T , e w a s originaUy; entered, 
| ^ ; 4 e c r C t h e c ) the effect, contended for b> 
l | £ f c > a v e _ e a l l that it : .was the same as : 
g a m e l y , ; ^ i n t a d ; been,,entered:as of , t l 
: % ^ r ^ J htv'nii>tiff, tierefore, wag required 
S ^ V ^ u p o n notice ^ a p p e a l : within sU 
^ - - • ' itions^htertngjOf the interlocutor 
&tc:' e ated, 
CODY v; CODY. 
ttii Alio' 
Dunsel.co_ 
new t r i a 6 0 ^ 1 1 * t h a ^ ^ n o t l c e o f motion /or 
came final ^upon tLe ov<..;•»;ua. g 
for a new i trial Defendant's 
"tbork: 
tL-.- ft 
>d b M ^ i l s 
•>ed 
>t filed within the time au-
ntef.andTfor that reason 
jo t londid not hnv *:he 
; the time for taking an 
. uterioctitpry decree of di~ 
a, we have'seen, that decree 
a? November' 6, 1913,> or more 
ths})pri6r*t6 the 19th i s y ' o f 
iieiiwthe notice1 of appeal was 
yet counsellor ue, plaintiff 
notice of appeal wws K r^vc-d 
^per time.for two reasons: -0),Bc-
wnotlce of the! original dedftic-: Vr « 
J r<v, plaintiff';; and (2) becatts*- the 
con^waiBu the same as if entered 
i^uM^\rg{j^ r!^ ^ i s» .and neDee afi *ppeai 
r " • 
, a , , 
Lvorct. 
Iwas e n u 
Kchan six 
£june, 191 
Jaerved an 
Jinsists th; 
jxwithin pK 
jcause no 
^served on 
^original- d' 
&on Decern 
3 t t.ha ; 
fkx month 
ie notice 
An i W .takenVat- any time * within 
•-wthat date, an ' inasmuch as 
M«v nf Tn7"u-T nppealiwaa serT- .,,,* tbo.IOfti 
• e date the judgment or secret 
d is -ccadnalve that the decree, ]<*&*-. 
fcJbecame a i P m 
l^that the tfc 
£as enterec7e , . 
{{tiff, and JH was^eutorely to favor < 
ta t torneys .P a t t ^ € a m * * w . p r * v . 
S i c e of a • ^ • . , / . t h e : i U t u t e 
foe timJf*^,1* >rdfft* b Fmotion
 f c
,)tor,^-<iDg and filing a 
DPlv to *r * * ^ ^ 'Hal-was-not Uo.ei wi-*d 
ion is gi/ -*• • • tfl whose favor *he a. 
e findin 
c 
if. sne intended to appeal from that decree, 
as pointed ^Jt in. Parsons v. FAMOUS, 40 
Utah, &)2, li!2 Tac 907, and Caster v. Custer, 
41 Utah, 575, 126 Pac. 880.-j .Tbat.lt U man-
ifest she ha* not done, ,,The WioUc: to dis-
miss the appeal from, the interlocutory de-
cree must therefore* prevail. ' 
Tiiere, 1&, however,., another phajse of the 
case .which require*.consideration, A.a -Si-
ready stated^ the ; action < was originu,y «?. v 
menced. for separate maintenance.,, Notwith-
standing that fact, however,, the . plaint<ff 
asked for perm* : enfc alimony la her or^'.n.Y) 
complaint in thn fallowing word? 
..."That the cou? resign and set apau wid de-
cree' to her, a a alimony foi\tht pettti^ vnera sup-
port of hersvlf and her'said mine* VMld, such 
amount^ of the earnings of th*>defoliant as the 
court in itf 'l; ,oretion^.mayj.^^?^4'j^«^^ --'- ' 
table.";
 ; . . ..;, c., ir.,-,.. n ... ,.,-. 
When;^ne complaint waa amended by ask-
ing, for a divorce, the,prayer for.pt?- ^anent 
alimony as jHvon abov^^pfv^* ^j_..^.;--.*;•.;«»..«• 
The court, jr r lDtei*lfiCn*sry..xitv^i? ,^ .Jb«-^ "-
even"4ld /y \ ... . ^ ' W r'-^.v:V ^ V ; ;""••** 
As we have before state v. 
tb^ 
d-
^urt to J' 
^findings uf 
aecessity. 
tLichten^..', 
lve not • [ 
gentitied U 
there 
,Y ihr.t party has prep' 
igs i' ^",., and "onclusioi;:t tor 
ic~: - ^^^aariy* Wm> pr^ pav^ *-* 
•'., '-onelusloiis, e&d.decree, icuyt o^  
i ;'. ' u ¥.d VJ^%4T S ua la J e n a e n . v. 
| t l f f , 
Kthe decis 
hhence he) n 
fiu,0o ^ ^ r oof 
I.Q. :';.><J*ac,.l{jScv;;.4»e ileeiaifid•,to 
e he d<*?tei'>ar-. f?rd *»r^ nce la not 
D./uri::.'i* notice thereof. The plain-
t«for« • • s.s not entitled to notice of 
he; divorce pnxx^ings^ and 
"was n o t * "«•• ice. of motion'ilor a new, ti lal 
^nsecf «rj-" " iV * ^' " " •*-* ' 
Vwhich to * l n t f i a s t 0 extend the, time.vwithin 
| r 2 ] r i a f tHi^; t n apx>eaI/;j}Vu,,' . .^iv;;-. 
^even tho n t i f T s counsel,.however, insists t h a t 
^!did not b . u c ^ . - ' ^ t * ^ concie^^if^ the cieoroe 
'Crhen it e c o r a e fiDal until":D^ember >v , % 
f i a v e statw^8 f e n d e d 1 ^ , ^ partJ ,:; . -
'ever tha^ "' ' a r e °^ the :opln -• -• 
f the amen1 i n v i e w o t t h e ^9^ ta T ^ - u 5 6 
^effect
 a;^lmeui in question did not have (lie 
rThe alle^ l tG11 : d r ° * ^ ; plaintiff's counsel. 
\ y to mai e d " P U ' n d m e n t v O r ch^i.e- —\s mere-
vision asfe t l j t: ^ * ^ r . , ^ t r oal.de-
;ment the m a d t J : ^ - . * * cWft amend-
fc'tbe ' - ( x c f o r e » relat^dl^efc ti» * '«< • ne when 
ifiot have1'" - q s - O ^ M ^ t e n ;, and. did 
fnamely, t h e ?tf^*-; ^ n , tc^d0d for by counsel, 
decree ' h t h a t i t ^ w * s - ^ e , sioaf as if a ; new 
IvThe plaii j a d b e e a ° ^nWredy! a s of U - 4 - ' dare 
S a n d file l t i f l^ ^dJ^0Tfii w a B required to » 
foorn the n o t i c evOfi appeal: within eix * 
fe
^ ent^rUi^oJtiiie lntoi>vcut ."v ^ ^ . 
nothing ta< itiade 
,^«jb. or--OOTU:?'*#?«/.,-A«:.-'o* ?-•'•'>' .*vl;y ^^ 
,5 i ^ ) ^ l « e i t alimony wa? allowed., Tn,vi; 
•rf;ti>g ^ J fa<^ajtbat no perm^oent alimot^' hfi->'. 
in T7» cation ! '' ^^byV'tha co-- c j a the/l»t*'-.:f':--:v 
n^:;re-;of I ' X i t> :^;f^«t^>.^ll£>**anji. o: -^iy- ir:.K> :r-.--
^ " ^ ^ been luade therein tor th^ -W-
^on the^Sth.day^of,»•. - r^ . , 
And filed, her.notice, of .motio ; 
•^a^e i^;her ^ r p e c ^ ^ e i i t n?,* 
ilso aske^for/aiiflncrease^ In thi. 
1. v t h e ' . ih l^ \^ ' ; j ^ r e ^ l d ^ .'^be 
defendant; on t W lOt^lMayj (< .Septeru 
1914,] filed a mot^^gi^ii >Wteb he moveS the 
court "to dismiss ^aid -'modioli, for alimony 
up-on the'ground thaKtl^e matter of alimony 
had been adjudicated.1',. Twodaya thereaft-
er the court granted defendant's motio rfl 
dis jissed D!.lintiff's nxotio., -r>>V*> 
V»JL ClA.'CUlfO. ' ';€ 
plaintiff, ivi her application, In. sitisatance »t 
leged that «ince the interlocutor d ^ t t e % 
a divorce was entered her phy/ioal c '^tlo!'. 
hy rens 
that el. 
A0t» Pb' 
that th< 
anee of * 
an incn : 
snpport < the 
••.lily injuries.. 
time and ro j.U: 
• -Mt'heisd'iV -'•'.' 
•J i f s earnings 
•r ;7« tJie CiUvir..-
for her, and 
the allowance 
ch*ld. All tb 
m 
and avernuMits were eonta* 
afl 'daviu; <^ .a tile in th** ' 
d a i l y ref^vred to in i.\\* n 
i t s eems , did not cons'.-.icr 
a v e r m e n t s , or changed p* 
t h e plaintiff, it:!: mit^r^ 
ment d ismlso in^ tht J 
around tlu.i ^«-» nvitt-*- ^ 
t h e inr^r " ' u ' ' / •'
 t •,:•• -.v. > 
• 'CL a ) s o ; juttrd 
• . .. . j j , : ..••.-<> 
ere ^nen suf-
allow-
ermit 
>?' 'b.-' 
r» a ; > ; ttl" • 
capers, taid 
were spe-
f b ; court 
. tiona a 
:JUditl0):: , 
Jer vU4 In 
i on the- ^ 
>idjudiea 
«rpe,
 # %T 
separate-A r*-
'954 
pea l rfrom that" orderl or Judgment, and now> 
' insists tha t the court erred in tha t , regard. 
y Defendant's counsel contend t ha t plaintiff's 
appeal must ' fa i l^for two c r easons : ' 4 J ( l ) Be-
cause the bill of r exceptions in which the pro^ 
ceedings are* recorded 0 was not set t led1 ' in 
t ime; and (2) because the mat ter of alimony 
was* adjudicated in the interlocutory decree. 
And they further assert that , because "the 
appeal fronv tha t decree failed for the rea-
sons1 before stated,1 we are powerless to re-
view the quest ion/ 7 0 ( 1 r - l J u " l 
The contention t h a t the bill of exceptions 
which contains the matters relat ing to the 
second appeal was not settled in time cannot 
prevail. As to those mat ters the bill was 
settled in accordance with the requirements 
of our statute, and hence we are required to 
consider the matters^ therein contained^ in 
so far as they have any bearing on the sec-
ond appeal. The question of whether the 
mat ters covered h j the second appeal have 
been adjudicated in the interlocutory decree, 
and should have been1 reviewed on the ap-
peal from tha t decree, if reviewed a t all, 
remains to be considered I t is doubtless 
true, as contended by defendant 's counsel, 
t h a t where the court allows, or disallows, 
alimony in the interlocutory decree by which 
a divorce is granted, the par ty aggrieved, in 
the absence of fraud, must review the ques-
tion on an appeal from tha t dearee, and, in 
case no appeal is prosecuted from tha t de-
cree within the time prescribed by our stat-
ute, the matter of alimony, like all other 
mat ters included in the divorce proceedings, 
is concluded by tha t decree While i t is t rue 
t h a t in attempting to appeal fiom the inter-
locutory decree the plaintiff sought to have 
reviewed the court 's refusal to allow her 
permanent alimony, yet tha t fact, s tanding 
alone, is not necessarily fatal to her second 
appeal Her second appeal is based upon 
Comp Laws 1907, § 1212 as amended by 
chapter 109 Taws Utah 1909 Tha t section 
reads as follows: 
When an interlocutory decree of divorce is 
made, the court may make such order in rela 
tion to the children, property, parties, and the 
maintenance of the parties and children as shall 
be equitable Provided, that if au> of the chil 
dren have attained the age of ten vcars and 
are of sound mind, such children shall have the 
privilege of selecting to which of the parents 
thev will attach themselves 
"Subsequent changes, or new orders, may be 
made bv the court in respect to the disposal of 
the children or the distribution of property, as 
shall be reasonable and proper ' 
Her counsel contends that , inasmuch as 
it was made to appear in plaintiff's applica-
tion tha t after the interlocutorv decree was 
entered her physical condition had changed 
by reason of the alleged injuries, and t h a t 
the defendant, when the application was 
made, was earning sufficient money to author 
ize an allowance for alimonv and an increase 
in the allowance originallv made for the 
child ^he was a t all events entitled to have 
the court consider her application and make 
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findingrof fact and conclusions 'oiJa^thTere-
on.1 i T h a t / counsel contends? is w h a t f l s c ° u " 
temphked by the s ta tute 1 'we ^ hr*ve ^ u o * ? d 
above." The ' contention1 'seems f ^ ? , * ? ? 
Th6 s ta tu te In terms provides t h a t ; ^,->
 0> 
'CCS ,L-£r"* «wTer_8 m a y . D * 
~ 1 ? " K 8 ^ disposal of 
~« w * « „*„*. ,« **»»<>* roperty as 
oru. , 
made by the court in respect t6 the!" 
the children, or the disposition^ of P 
shall be reasonable." rf «j/, y, <J5j ) ^ J*I( 
x Defendant's counsel, however), c?ntei*d * ? d 
cite authori t ies to the effects ttfat> i f t e 
court had in the interlocutory def r e e g r a n t 
ed the plaintiff some amount as Permanent 
alimony, then the court could, upcP a J r o p e * 
application and showing, have c h ( n g e d S 1 ? c h 
a n al lowance; but they insist, in v l e w , t 
tpvpr that 
the court made no allowance w h a r c c * v 
therefore there is nothing to clf a n g e t a n d 
hence the only way tha t a m o d J f i c a ^ o n o r 
change in the interlocutory decree f £ 1 , e 
been effected in tha t regard was b y timely 
appeal to this court, and upon at r e ^ e w 
the evidence produced before the frial c o u ^ 
We think the Legislature in a d £ p t m g * h e 
s ta tute intended .to, and did, e i F a r g e t h e 
common-law powers of our courts J original 
jurisdiction in divorce proceedings]* e a so 
think tha t the Legislature pos se s r e d a m p l e power to pass such a s tatute . T P 6 * 1 * * 1 1 1 * liable eon-
must therefore be given a r easoy ^ 
struction and application Al tW 0 U g l 1
 t
t h e 
language is general in permittir-f0 \ 
quent changes and new orders" tcf , f m a f * J 
yet we think it was not thereby^ i n t e n d e d 
t ha t the courts could a t any tirfe r e v i e ^ 
their own former orders or decretr8 r e s P e c " 
ing the allowance of alimony, etcr1 a a™ 
of the opinion tha t what was c o i f t e m p . * } 
by the s ta tu te was tha t where a 1 ° , „ 
granted a decree of divorce and r ? a d a l l o w * 
ed alimonv, or had made d i s t r r T u t l 0 ° . 0 I 
property and disposal of childnfn* f I 
party could thereafter come into ^ o u r t ana 
allege tha t since the entry of th l f o n s l " * , 
"Tinges hao decree material and permanent ch?r & ^ 
taken place, by reason of which if a ° q 
ance of alimony, as made, was e i t y e r e 
s n e or insufficient under the cha D g e . . 
ditions, and tha t for tha t reason 1 e *] 
ing allowance should either be \ l n C i e ^ 
or decreased, as the case may bcr* °J , ^ ' 
the distribution of the propertv, o r *?, ^ 
posal of the children, as made T n o u .* j 
changed ^o as to reflect justice be' 
part ies 
To i l lustrate Suppose tha t after 
inal decree was entered, in whid 
sum as permanent alimony was o 
the wife, she, while still unmarn^ j 
suffer serious personal injuries, 
lose her propeity, if she had an " L ^ a n c S 
reason of tha t fact the prev ious ^ ^ ..^ ^ 
• the or i£j 
:i a flxed| 
llowed 
,d shoujj 
and fer 
should be insufficient! to supply her' 
necessaries of life, and it s"hould f 1 ^ ] 
made to appear tha t her former hu< \ ^H 
ample means to supply her wan1! ^ 
should not the court change or m j
 I (jer J 
former allowance or make a new 
urtner >• 
{ tha t regard, If necessary, in^ < 
* the divorced!'wife from bee 
charge?' 'Again, suppose tha 
•the^ time I a ' divorce is grar 
riieans, and the court makes 
'ance to r t he wife as alimony, 
odically tor f otherwise for a 
y
otrtime/ and suppose, furthc 
accuse the husband, after the 
te d p a n d after the t ime for elapsed, suffers financial rev 
t^he* most, if not all, of his pr 
injured physically, or loses 
*thef allowance theretofore m 
forced wife is no longer jus t 
twhy should not the court, upc 
ment of facts being shown, 
kree by decreasing or settini 
[i&wance theretofore made. 1 
'such circumstances was pern 
[der the s ta tu te before it was 
Buzzo v. Buzzo, 148 Pac, 3 
'hy should not a divorced 
JSjulred to increase the allow 
£he maintenance of his minor 
Jdy of which was awarded 1 
Trife, in case i t was made 1 
T the allowance was made 
fered permanent physical h 
ison of serious illness, or 
Lai allowance is no longe 
t for i ts maintenance and 
'he foregoing, however, are 
[ons, and a re not intended 
ilts within which modifica 
lg allowances may be made 
^applications and proof and 
IKtaditions We have set th 
IJor the purpose of showing 
^various conditions tha t may i 
^granting of the original decre< 
^[uire the changes or newT ore 
uV the s ta tu te respecting the 
.Saces made, without giving t 
i-Jpwer to review their own all 
' the facts existing a t the tit 
j ^jfade We do not think the 3 
|
$nded tha t the courts shoul 
^jUlowances made by them fc 
^divorce proceedings, but what 
5 a s that , where material n< 
five arisen after the decree 
5hich conditions were not, a *\e been, considered or pasb 
I ptirts, tlien, upon proper ap 
MTcof, the courts may make 
' ? a n g e s or new orders" respect 
§ee of alimony or the distribi 
Sty or the disposal of childr< 
| gf ty is dissatisfied with the o 
t *pce or distribution of propeit 
| J?^l of the children, he musj 
Ijj&ely appei l to review the /c 
iStdecrees m tha t regard, and 
jjH^ review must be had upon 
IJadueed upon the original hei 
|?& conditions h ive changed, 
j t ° r e bt-ate(^» t l i e changes or 
'(Utah m 
V 
, n d s , ' i s ^ f i h f l t l s « » u - § 
,te we h R v e q u o t e d 
i seems 
pect 
)sition 
treasonable. 
vides t h a i * * "•••. . • 3 ? 
_
 rt^r era m a y b e m 
• °
eT« t v i i f - d « p ° s a l < * H 
ct to tne[ •.-^Jl,.*.- oo If* o f {>dProperty as 1 
• .fi ' - w I 
effect t r j * a t ' i f t h * 4 r 
>cutory d e V e e ^ r a n t ; ? | 
^permanent * 
/n a proper 
pinged such } 
view that! 
jjjtever, that 
lange, and V 
jfication or > | 
ccould have 
by timely 
review of-
i r ia l court. 
mount as 
could, upoj 
Sf have ch; 
r insist, in] 
vance wha) 
hing to el] 
at a modi 
ory decree 
egard was 
nd upon a 
Defore the i 
:ure In a d W " 1 ^ * h e J 
ind did, e f 1 " 6 ? , . , ! f 
our courts W 1 ^ 1 J 
proceedings1' We also f 
ture p o s s e s f f d ***e> 
statute.
 T f i e h f , t a t u t e i 
en a r e a s b F a b l « ~ ° - | 
tion. A l t l f o u ^ ^ 1 
n permitt ing„' s u b f - | 
- orders" t 3 ' * " " ^ l 
^ot t h e r e o f 'totendedj 
at any t i > e / r e v l e 7 J 
rs or d e c r e K ™ ? * ^ 
illmony. e t c 1 / * 1 1 * **]! 
bat was
 C o r »
t e m P l a t e f ] 
at where a ! « c ° u r t „ h a a J 
ivorce and & V < £ » 
1 of cblldrf611' j f ^ I 
come i n t o f ^ J ^ l 
entry of th*e ^ ^ 
> r m a n e n t c h l * n e e s , h a $ 
, ot which ! P e : a l I ^ | 
ade, was e l t P e r ' f f ^ 
,der the c h a ^ f d'«>fL 
that r e a s o u > l ^ | 
either • be V" 
case may br' ._ .
 bi*j 
i property, o ^ ^ j 
, as m a d e , i S D 0 u l d 3 
ct Justice b e ™ n J a S 
1 , v.OlT CI £* ^ ^ L 
5se that "aftefj ^ e® rJS?a 
red, I n w h l i ^ S a 
Imony l w a s ' , a [ ^ ® ? S i 
till u n m a r r i ^ ^ ^ J 
al i n j u r i e s ; ' k . 8 ? ^ 
she h a d < a n f * a n d '$£ 
he p r e v l o n s > > n W S 
to supply hex! ^ H . 
d i t s l i d u l d ^ r t h ^ l 
erfwji^gjj^ 
^ n W o ^ o d i f y ^ 
. b a n g e ^ o r n i , . ^ 
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that regard, If necessary,-in'order to prevent i must: ho hnsed iipon the allegations of the 
lnake : .a Jnew J: 'order?? 
the divorced wife from >becoming a public 
charge? AgainV suppose that a husband »at 
the time a divorce is granted has ample 
means, and the court makes a liberal allow-
ance to the wife as alimony, to be paid peri-
odically *or! otherwise tor ia definite period 
of time, and suppose,''further, that in such 
a case the husband, after the decree is enter-
ed, and after the - time • for an appeal has 
elapsed, suffers financial reverses and loses 
the most, if not all, of his property, or he is 
injured physically, ior :loses his health, and 
the allowance theretofore made for the di-
vorced wife is no-longer Just and equitable; 
why should not the court,' upon such a state-: 
ment of facts being shown, modify the de-
cree by decreasing or: setting aside the al-
lowance theretofore made.;. A change under* 
such circumstances was-permitted, even un-
der the statute before it was amended.. See 
Buzzo v. Buzzo, 148'Pac, 362. .Moreover, 
why should not a divorced husband be re-
quired to increase the allowance made for 
the maintenance of his minor child, the cus-
tody of which was awarded to the divorced 
wife, in case it was * made to' appear that 
after the allowance was made the child suf-
fered permanent: physical injuries, .or «by 
reason of serious illness, ,or otherwise^ the 
original allowance i s no longer Just or suffi-
cient for its maintenance and support?. •>::•-
The foregoing, however, are mere illustra-
tions, and are not intended as fixing-: the 
limits within which modifications of exist-
ing allowances may be made upon the prop-
er applications and proof and under changed 
conditions. ; We 'have set ithem forth only 
for the purpose'of showing that there are 
various conditions that'"may arise after the 
granting of the original decree thtft may re-
quire the changes^ o r n e w i iorders spoken of 
in tiie statute ^respecting-the original allow-
ances made,- without, giving the .courts.]the 
power to review itheir rown allowances upon' 
the facts existing jat'i.the time theyb were 
made.!"* We1 do^ot'ithink <the Legislature in-, 
tended ^that the'^cYmrts ".should reviews the 
allowances made/by i;them <for al imony\in 
divorce proceedings,* but what was intended 
was that,U where material new conditions 
have : arisen"after the (decrees were1' made, 
which conditions''were not, 'and * could i not 
have beeni /considered or passed on ;by the 
courts, -then,*'/upon "proper; 'applicationMnd' 
proof,:* the 'courts 'imay 11 make ''•'subsequent 
changes'or 'newf'orders"-! respecting the allow-, 
ance of alimony^ or the distribution of i prop-
erty or the disposal- of children, / ; 'w^reaf ' 
party is'dissatisfied withithe originin allow-, 
ance or distribxition^of^prbperty; nt thes i s - , 
posal Tof the* children,, helmus^prbseeuie ?a 
timely appealI'toT review f the/court's iOrders 
or decrees In thatf regard,'&nd in such "cases 
the review jinustibe^had; ;upon the evidence 
adduced- u ^ V the Original;shearing.^3Vhen' 
the conditions / h a v e Jclianged, -»liovfever;^as 
before 'statexjt the^clianges ioriinc'Wi orders 
changed conditions and the evidence in sup-
port thereof. ?••: -j.!i-«>3 v.J^iilx *«;>.'::, . - n* 
- W e : think, therefore, ^the district court 
should • have heard the Evidence' in support 
of "plaintiff's application, and should have 
made* findings ; of: fact and • conclusions of 
law iupon the.' evidence,; and 'entered Judg-
ment accordingly.••< By what wevhave said 
we do J not mean to*.be^understood as hold-
ing that the court should have made an ad-
ditional, allowance in this case for the child, 
or should have made an allowance of ali-
mony "In favor of the plaintiff. .Applications 
that are made for.a change o£.allowance, or 
which require new orders,:must first be sub-
mitted, ^considered/ end • passed f.on by the 
trial > courts/ and those courts must make 
findings of fact and conclusions of law there-
on and. enter their Judgments accordingly. 
In-that'regard much-must be left to their 
'discretion, and all we have the power to do 
Is to* review their Judgments; the same as in 
other cases. ; •-.' • . ; . i : ,rr ; 
In conclusion, we remark that the record 
presented to us is very incomplete, imper-
fect/ and unsatisfactory.: This condition, we 
think,Mvas brought nabout' by two causes: 
(1) For the reason that ' different • counsel 
represented plaintiff from time to ^time pend-
ing 'the proceedings; ^and' (2) ithat because 
of appellant's poverty she was.unable to ad-
vance any money to counsel for costs and 
expenses, either to prosecute her case or in 
preparing it on appeal, all of which is made 
to "appear from her affidavit > of Impecuni-
osity• filed- in this court-HNotwithstanding 
the f condition of - the Tecord,'.:however, we 
have given it full force and effect/except 
where the defects were 'jurisdictional. In 
view that neither party advanced any money 
for printing, nor for other purposes in this 
court, we make no allowance for costs. The 
district;court may, fhowever, > make such al-
lowalpe; to . the plaintiff in? presenting her 
appiiiation as to it may «eem: Just and equjsx 
i t Since 'writing the rforegoing th^yg? i e f j u s . 
tice ,has h a n d e d > i n e ^ h i s ^ P j ^ ^ i n 'which 
T.fniiv considered 
what is said by the Chief J f ^ T ^ „„,* h«ve 
he,Sin .tpart, dissents ? from r - ^ c o n c l u s i o n s 
reached herein, j I have caref'^ 
,<n«tice-and have 
also again carefully r e v i e ^ r ^ ^ ^^^ 
sions/and, while I agree w i F ^ _ u c h t h a t h e 
says, a yet I m usti confess c V- ..inability to 
yield to the conclusions •reaqf^^J ^v h i m / ; I 
can see no way to escape 
Led by him.! 
e positive pro-: 
visions of our statute, ^ i T h e f r ' ^ ^ j u b t i c e , 
in {effect at least, concedes :th/T ^ ^e court,* 
in ti5e decree, reserves'> t h e / T b t t 0 m a k e 
changes in the matters i c o n t ^ iated by the 
statute, then perhaps such leaf™?. ^
 m a d e in 
the same action upon filing - a / ? ^
 e r u p p i i -: 
cation therefor., J n my JudgmrN ^ t u n d e r 0ur. 
statute,' the reservation/existslV. ' ^ e s a m e , 
extent as though i t were •jwrittS^?"^
 l n t 0 eyevy 
decree.iiiTrue, a^'proper. a p p U ^ ^ U o i l . s h o u l d 
ed out in niyj f be made, and, as I chave po 
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; STRAUP, C. X (dissenting): ?' :The i ?plaii^ 
tiff, f in her amended complaint, msked tat 1 
a ..divorce,.on the grounds; of: ^raelty^pejgf 
, manent alimony, custody of •? the fdillc^t a i (P 
an award for its supports The Idefendantr* 
denied the allegations of cruelty, iahd) allege 
ed that the plaintiff was addicted .ta the:ii^_ 
of opiates and in toxica ting 5 Uquore^ancL & i l l 
guilty of adultery and, licentiouso^oudnctiS 
The court foun d the issues; 'in 1 favortjifi s t $ 0 
plaintiff, granted her a divorce, a warded ieSrJ 
the custody of the child and $20 ainonth:foa 
its support, but awarded her nothing fonalW 
mony or counsel fees. Neither a motibrTfo£ 
a new trial nor an appeal. from -.that fjj'uiSJgS 
ment was made or taken in: time ;i> hence tti&f 
proceedings: resultingi in-ithe jnd^mentfjar*! 
not properly before us for-reviewh^Nearl^ 
a year after the judgment became! finalsJanaTi 
irreversible, tfre plaintiff served andiifile&t&J 
|i notice that she, on a day named; jvould/asO 
should exercise the powers/conferred^upoa,]; the/court for-an allowance of $50 a; month 
opinion, the court should not attemP* a re* 
view of his former decree, but should-limit 
any change strictly to the new conditions a s . 
they are alleged in the application ana" es-
tablished by the evidence. ; It is often the 
case that courts deem themselves better 
qualified to determine what the l^w.should 
be upon a given subject than the Legislature,' 
and for that reason, by strict construction,: 
practically fritter: away) the substance of 
a statute governing that subject . • l ;;&* 
j;As stated.in the .original opinio, in my 
judgment, our statute dearly confers powers 
upon .the J courts,; of. j original jurisdiction 
which tkey.,did not.possess; before it was 
adopted.ir These powers(Should not be minlr 
mized or .construed^ away Jxy,the.coiJrt of last 
resort, simply because that! court m a v tie®** 
the power conferred., unwise, 1 or 0 a t by a 
careless court it may be itoo*liberty appli-
ed, or even at times 1 abused. >H i courts 
them carefully, prudently/,and eon^cientiaus-i 
ly, and the presumption is that th^y.wlll do> 
so until the contrary is shown. B^t.in view 
that the Legislature has conferred t^e powerA 
it Is the exclusive prerogative of that;b.ody. 
ta-^V&&wH it, ^t to.-BM&l? At, VL.As&a&L 
wise* to do so. I also concur with tha Chief 
Justice that an application should be made 
in a formal manner, and, that it ahoald :be 
stated therein, in clear and concise terms,, 
just what the applicant complains j of and 
what he desires to prove.•..;While the appuS 
cation in this case is far from a jnodel, yet, 
under the facts and circumstances, it:.was 
sufficient to apprise the court and-tte/opn 
posite party just ^what the applicant, claimed; 
Nor did the court disregard the application 
because it was insufficient either, iQ focmnOr 
a*: permanent alimony, and a^n Increise^bfl 
$20 a month for the support ot the fchildrvf 
The notice, of course, .was not verified^ and J 
was signed only by plaintHTs coun^el.;fett| 
stated that* the motion would bejbasedH^Sj 
tlift« tacit that &ince. tha d-^ cxee. th& i \ s iT 
tufa Sustained personal injuries -by: caccidenf 
which 'Incapacitated her fron>i3eanh$n£ 
Hfelihood, and that it would ,be;>m^&£ulfi 
I "the records and files a*nd: ininutesit&t 
court in said cause and upon itestijicf" 
witnesses tp be produced at the hear 
this7 motion." Nothing else was (filed f|$f| 
yoke action to modify the decree;ori 
b The 'defendant served: and flle&xafl 
of motion ^ that on a specified May ;J^^ 
ask the <'court • to dismiss" plaint^s^mS 
[ on the ground that "the;question,ijo&a 
substance.. For these:reasons: I >&*&> fltilloof {has .heretofore been :decided^ando^ 
by this COIL. ^ Ky Its decree,herein^byf 
decree the said plaintiff >ia deniedf# 
Both^these: motions camerlon/^oiJi 
The JConrt,rfirst, hearing j arguineAi^ 
defendant's motion, granted,it*f_auda£ 
ed» plaintiff's >. motion to: .'modify 1 
Theny the'plaintiff, as :stated)by-he^ 
'too ;make f a record," 1 statedolthat1* 
tSDiishowi that- the defendant? then^RfiS 
the opinion that: /the former Jc^ochiqlona 
should prevail. •• >in:'/ru>Ui on 'oilier! vf/jjinoy 
--For the reasons stated, the i first appeal la 
dismissed/and the second isv&atfineiin'&o 
far j we are all agreed, i but tbeyovt& 'thiff «i«ie 
are divided. For the reasons Istated iniiny 
opinion .IJstill think)the ordec/iif ''the. talal 
court •-dismisslc^.''the lapplicatfen•:<&> modiffy 
the decree should be'reversed and the case'
 r 
remanded,) with! directions: toarei^tatc the|during the course of these proqeeding^ 
application ) and;' to; proceed vlh ^  accordance | tale: tactions was brought; had ifr^wtf 
with' the views expressed \"by/mc '^0 thlsBtai^ie/iieighborhood of -$200 .ai'mof l^iy ^ 
my )Associates, Aior >the 1 reasbns staged.i"b> JttiBtt;s^nce^ the decree ^e«p^a^nVn^^| 
them in their separate opinions; do not,agreev|i talned; personaLiinjurieSj^ASOitha^^' '-' 
and .J -their i judgments in? that >:Tegard^ mast 
therefore prevail. The ^  orders, of <• the eourt 
below dismissing the application to modify 
the decree^ therefore, should; he, &D<i it Jtc4 
cordingly is,r"aflirmed.^ '^ p^V*V»,;•.*''•"M' '^hP-l 
';; [3]-.Ordinarily,1 under j the'pstatute, the at* 
flrmance of the judgment carries^ costs. ?It* 
thisicase.^how^ever^the'appellant,' w^o wast 
the former, wi^ 'e of respondent, flies an affi-
davit of impec'uniosity, and the app ta l . there-
fore, is one'in forma pauperisv>t We ;shall 
therefore'maKje no order(jfor.costs'in favor 
of-respondent^against his tformerit^lfe.^«4i ^ 
ablei|)o-do-work:which she could vdoipr|! 
that^iime jmd.had.beenbdoing/f$a 
"ahfall^notiable to earnoy^gealii^f^ 
|W)\weTPrark to rany great :exteu^l'^ndi^^S 
|atk[Ito^»rn a living by reason;lof^t^spj 
J«iie8^Muio>\by -reason offinjurAe^^hictfl 
had^o^Tedudurihg .thehmarr|age^^ 
paititlljslncapacitated her from*j^o|n^'^ 
wbrk^  ^?biclil is .\he only i kind of &6rk)\} 
teicajiahleodf, doing; that, thosetinjuri.es'il 
beea/4reatW««&ravated by this.fajl/a^:f 
p^rttprttxlritBiliceMthat ttime"iflhe:^a^ 
unable.tm eaxnLanything, more than. i>ropefih 
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her board and room; and we"ask lor an al-
lowance of alimony, both on the ground that 
It should have been originally aw aided, and 
on the ground of the change of the condi-
tion of the plaintiff since the divorce, that 
she should have alimony awarded, and that 
the defendant is amply able to pay a rea-
sonable allowance of alimony." i It is thus 
seen that the modification of the decree was 
asked on error, and matters adjudicated in 
ther original decree, and on the only new 
matter or changed conditions, that the plain-
tiff, since the decree, had by accident sus-
tained personal Injuries. ' t - > [ ' 
[4, 5] Now, I think ithe-ruling an appeal-
able order; but I think the motion to modify 
the decree was properly dismissed^ I have no 
doubt that, under the statute, when judicial 
action is properly invoked, the court, as tol 
orders which relate to alimony, custody ofl 
children, fend awards for their support, when 
they are continuing and over which the court 
retains a continuing jurisdiction, is author-
ized on a proper showing to modify the de-
cree in such particulars. But a further es-
sential to such relief and which is universal-ll 
ly agreed upon, is that there must be aver-i| 
ments and proof of a change of circumstances 
or conditions of the parties. "Thus I think 
the order awarding $20 a month for the sup-
port of the child was, on such averments and 
proof, i subject to modification. Such an or-
der by its^very nature is continuing. So also 
was the order awarding the custody of the 
child continuing and subject to modification 
according to changed conditions, circumstanc-
es, -habits, 'and conduct of ^the parties. So 
also would be an order allowing alimony for 
a designated amount per month or other 
stated iperiod, or until the •happening of A; 
contingency or contingencies. But where, u. 
on issues' and "evidence", 'the Question of ali-
mony »is set at rest, either l by awarding 
gross ^ um in lieu of all rights In and to th< 
husband's^'property/or where, in lieu" of al 
such rights specific property is in .fee award 
ed to^the wife, or 'where,^upon issues an 
e\ idence ^adduced, no alimony whatever is 
awarded, then I think such'an order is final 
and constitutes a
 Tf ull discharge, iunless thej 
order^ awarding no ^limony^ is ^based upon' 
£rounds that,the husband jthen^ad no prop-
erty and^np, means with wj^ic^ to "support the 
wife^  andiphysically was'unable t o ^ a m sup-
port ^or; Jier, ,and that Joe ^ thereafter acquired 1 
property
 0pro otherwise became able to supT^ 
Port h e r . ^ , ^ . , , w ,*•„*" ' v -^V 'Vf 
f I knowltthere are authorities, which hold 
Jhat a,final judgmen^for^lmony^in^ gross 
is, everuafter the judgment^ ^becomes Irre-
versible, jubject to modlficaUojaon averments 
P&d p^oo^c^ changed coua}tiqns/and circum-
stances.
 m But rJ believe ^ the^better 'rule and 
height of authority to,pedagainst such a 
holding. ^ £ h e cases Rearing on, the Question 
£ y ^ 4 # to ^ ^ ^ A ^ n g ^ o f Pro-
cedure,, 84S; „17 Qgntury Digest,,jjliQrce, 
» 602;-7 D e c e n n i a l l y * pivorceT? 24o; 
2 Nelson on Divorce, §§ 933a and 934. r Except 
dicta stated in them, there is nothing in Read 
v. Read, 28 Utah, 297, 78 Pac. 675, or Buzzo 
v. Buzzo, 1^8 Pac 362, to make against, this 
If an j order allowing alimony in gross, of 
specific (property in lieu of all rights in and 
to the^husb^nd's property, is final and 'res 
adjudicata^andj not open to modification, 
except upon averments and proof of fraud, 
dece.itjj or ^ misrepresentation in procuring the 
order, for just as cogent reasons do J. think 
an adjudication upon issues and evidence 
awarding no alimony is likewise final and 
set at rest, and not subject to modification, 
except on averments and proof of fraud, de-
ceit, or misrepresentation in procuring i t , / 
Though it should be assumed that the or-
der was continuing, both as to the disallow-
ance of alimony and the award for the sup-
port of the child, still, I am of the opinion 
that the motion
 tfor a modification of the 
decree was properly dismissed, on the ground 
that judicial action for a modification was 
not properly Invoked To invoke such action 
it, of course, was not essential to bring a new 
action, j The plaintiff could move for a modi-
fication in
 i the main cause. But to do that 
it nevertheless was requisite to file a
 (verified 
petition, or affidavit, or some pleading, set-
ting forth the new matter, or facts constitut-
ing the changed conditions or circumstances 
of the
 i parties. }7 standard Eney.^of Pro-
cedure, 844; ; 14 Cyc, 787. Nothing of that 
kind was filed, and until something of that 
kind was filed judicial action for a modifica-
tion was^not^properly invoked. > All^  that the 
plaintiff
 0di$i ^ was ,$o serve and file a notice 
that she
 {at a i specified time would apply to 
the qiur^/ojca modification of the decree in 
the particulars stated in the notice
 (lSuch 
a notice but.served the purpose of a summons 
or citatton^/pr process to appear. It}was,no 
more,traversablelihan is a summons or, cita-
tion. l £suwell,could it be sought to take a judgment pn ta summons without a 'complaint 
as a modification qt(£he judgment on a mere 
notice, |wdiiout;{a petition or affidavit or some 
pleading ^alcutatjed^to invoke action and con-
fer^pow^T <p$ sanction the latter, requires 
but^a^furtier^step^to permit the former. „lf 
a party^'esires^'a modification^, of a decree 
wh^chff has i become^ final and ° irreversible, 
there is^np^Jiardshlp in requiring the filing of 
a petition, affidavit" or some pleading set-
ting^ forth pe w jactsr relied on, to Invoke ac-
tion 'anci, secure relief. I do nop well see now 
such^cUony may'otherwise ber invoked. 1tTo 
look j at ' ' foe, notice
 r itself for averments of 
facts/is to^confuse^process with 'pleaclings 
andj to fdcj violence l o well recognized princi-
ples tha t 'p lead ing pot process, are'Uie jurid-
ical
 v:means pi ^vest ing a courtMwith Juris-
dicuon^o,abjudicate;' that the jurisdictional 
facts mus^ aprmatively appear^ and be stat-
ed injthe^Vi^ht^pieaoling, that'fundamental 
princlplesk6f fproc^dure arise, not fromuprd>-
rganic law; and that the'ju-
M
 the right' record/^ an<i rlidfctional record, 
Sustain'tfigWd-
rftF6c*dlnL _ 
*jt&cd&KBUai 
fcga&idsiS 
, ISuaPriJeaiionf 
£tothbiu(^l^^ 
l / ' d l s i n l s ^ ^ e f e ^ n ^ W l ^ 
^ T b o t f g H « ^ ^ 
t W ^ j u A d l M ^ ^ ^ ^ l n T e s t tii^tcbu' 
: Jurlsilcti<fi5€^nb^^etfe wh&£?i{!j" 
ed^toi'lfc *£a1li|ltt^b8taSc^ So/far? 
: l f c t e s S t ^ t ^ t J j ^ 
chariged[$Kra^ 
only' nfe^ffia6«^^aitb^mo1lif7, ^ *"*"'-* 
of disalldtSn^.o^allinSny^ tbar 
' tiff, s ln^.A^e5fe^8usklned } p^ 
Juries^ Bfit#is%otinade tb'appeaj*iS> 
1
 findings :nc 
fthe' o* l i^ /Sus^8h6Vmfe? 
! 6fi' wMcnYtitf^rl'Senied? th# alfc 
•
?
 aUmon^i^^%rb^eedlhg' it mus^&M* 
; sumed 'tHaitfi^lB^owance wa«"bfts^u&ft 
f some . ^ W 
on the lssd« aid Vrlden^ erred l r f & d i W 
by a i n ^ t t o S ^ a T n e w ^ ^ o r - b ^ i ^ 
which; a¥'h^i Been^seen^Were not InVdked l^ii 
€reymaa^TOtis^iniK f ^ 
presumed tKaf tt^ V ^ n o errora'and^at 
the *m&}jjmnti^ 
allowed- al lmonyTiThe grounds ^dpoff; which 
t h e d i s a l f e w f t ^ 
we. ^hM^mmi£^m m$mm 
that the p j t o t ^ W ^ 
other means'] b?%pport; 'for thV uudenfed 
averments ^^^^^tl^^m^^fi^^St 
had no 6r<rae^or;ott6r;^ 
N e i t h e r ^ w s F ^ f d i s a U b ^ 
the grouTbd^'an^'dlsabmty of the defendant, 
for by l^^answ 
was admit^thathe was a railroad en to^r 
in the'employ of. a^  railroad ^ company" ana 
that 4 ^ i i v e r a % earnings are, ftboutc!*lJ50 
per mbntfc^^^ifc'^ would se^^i^af i h e | 
court disallowed ^  alimony "upon the, 'grojnni 
of misconduct'or mlstiehavlor of the plaintitf. 
'True, W e W & W & ^ / t e r ^ J o m d i 
the a r ^ & y * £ r ^ ^ ^ 
and ttu&Spf tSe answer to be u n K ^ f i o S 
which itJcan fee' ar^iied that the court*iamad 
that the; p ^ l n ^ ' w a s not guilty' of 'the1alp 
leged n^conduct In" the answer.^ ^ t * the 
fact ne^wtheless^ remains that the courf ML 
allpw^a^iiSb^l^iud It may be. ^aC^fu i 
the' co^^tfunb? t&V averments lii^ d ie cw?-
plalnt to^Ttru,? and those In the'aiswe^ib.] be un^e lt^mdst griev usly eri^'W disal-
lowing | a^m:ony^vT3ut^:tas before ob^rved^'lf 
so, thaV .pughrjo^ have. been corirecie<i rby *a 
motion for^a new,trial, or 
cannot be4 correct ion an 
by an appeal 
application1 _ 
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:oolficatibn!60f^thegd^r^^ 
*'""" awptythtk theory^ i fop!^^ 
pwhifchl have |ar i s^ |^ i i^ thfdecree 
Ol^iipotr^acts fraudul^nUjt^w^beldi^.So un-
J^J£jk;ifodei,to^ and 
'^ ^th$^dUsayQjjane^gjallmony, was 
" ' " "__ afcttlf had* 
r « ^ | h e ^ ^ ^ p [ ^ a 5 ^ d j iiveli-
jjg^tntpdecxett^ 
thesfacblthat the pla^tj^^nce^ther decree, 
s^tjdned^personal Injury^ag^t^Dgjher-abllr 
" 2 $ W P l * r t ^ '*J 
fofiis intl ff> alncesJthgj, je^e^instalned per- Jr 
«ma^in^ry) iaffords\^ ,r<e^  
[ id^^tornl lng jo f [^t%/C^^^^Uow. in^ i 
dtoonyjfiai^ jCoulo>J 
hay^Ldoner on. a , motion j ^ ^ a , pew trial,;orJ 
* h s i ^ ^ ^ 
ffj^fthe^error,^^ * 
1waranade, audi mixAJ^^ 
^bJSifriho t^i novd^ w^jo^ier^r^i^ri review;> bp^ 
methbdj to restore/s?nlo^lalpne8JL^or ,motion| 
forTa\new *trlaLdvIft>ionlthfe.potixer hand, the*" 
court disallowed lallmony^n^th^i ground of 
misconduct: of:they plaintiff^then,: of cours* 
the'Jfact that she,: slnc^ t^deciee^ austaine 
p^rapnal ^IhJury^^ould^^T^ 
the; modification o? suckTan Jofder.. So I-.dq 
not see how, on aniappllcationjfor.a mo 
catlon-:of ;the decree<ltheimexlts/of a ruU 
made in the malnltaus^^ax be reviewed, J 
the)Question of alimony; throwti. at large,f!d 
it seems was attempted by^plaintiff's offer, c 
p^f,^ because she, :slfice^ttei decree,-sj 
tamed personalinjuriea^jq/jab $6 :*rj'*%3% 
i^I4; therefore cthinfc the^rplalntiirs motioal 
modify the decree twa^ properly dismis 
!cOARTYf X^Comfl 
sb'iar as materia^ h&^J^pyi^s} 
4n*^hen a divorce * is JdecreecL ?*the court' 
make such order; in relatip^ to the child: 
property, parties,1 and the • maintenanceror 
parties and children as shall be equitable.- * 
subsequent changes nmy-6s<made by,the 
«* retpect to the disposal of children or [Mi f 
tribvtwn of property, as'shall be reasonable * 
proper^; * >f:; &"& ^ W - > •'; • - * • •• " ^ R 
^ W h l i r the s ^ i ^ a n t f l i & n ^ of tmtr 
of the1 section which] I'iiave italicized Up, 
fijeb from' doubt,* I amd6f "the opinion; thi 
can \>nly be invoiced »r'tne' purpose^ of 
~£xfcg\"<^nge8":W$ie aist i ibutlb^o^P 
« r ^ in^cases where^an7 orderTespecon^ 
tiibution has been1 madfel^^in" other^| 
the phraseology,, "subsequent change* * 
b / Jfte dirtri6tttibiidb/ propertytn p r e s - ^ 
tliat «bme order r l ^ p ^ H i ^ d i ^ 
fieen made. In t ^ * case n<i order res^f 
idimony' or dis^lmitioii11 waij' made ;^ bj 
c ^ u i t r hence I am!'bf ':fEg bpiidon' tW 
court was without Jurisdiction1 to maxi 
order of dlstributlbn:^; Jip™M ;,r,^ J 
^ I ' therefore wnraFwit l i ; the reason^' 
and IrLthe concfix^ons'reached byjythJI 
tfeMILLAIf' 
ISRSM 
toce heard: evide»«*t «^S!i!?J2 
Jaccondaiiceci 
l*w» 1007,. 
'« TO filed taffiffiSK^* 
'm^x.: A* m r 
. j him, „, 
r without 
« * was filea in hl«JBi8c*a 
I S i * • P.Bht *•. assume that. thA 
ftSrform lus s t a t y t o ^ G ^ t o n ^ 
aVtXSTlCEs OP THE PKACK ifcJpM 
iQom. F A v o R m H u n ^ S ^ 5 1 
^ o conclusive presnmSoSfnri 
J£ ^Note^For i other*caseCt ^ 
|;Peace, C e n t . v D i « f | i ^ K 
gWuSTICE8 O* THE PEACV «=»128 
EtJUGMFNT-EviDENCE., I£M^ 
^ I n ^ a n action- to Vacate.a juiti< 
g^as proper for the plaintiff to • 
Lets respecting the ^conduct- of th< 
«=»For other cate^ M„ m ^ t ^ 
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exempt under the laws o f \ , 
or under this constituf}<ftj| 
n proportion to its value, tofff 
provided by law. The yfnS 
sed In this article, is hereS 
lude moneys, credits, bond* 
es, and all matters and thing 
md mixed, capable of prhra 
hese notes and accounts^ 
rty, owned by the plaintiff! 
exempt either under the lav 
>tates or the constitution/ 
ion. Section 3, art 13, of tii§ 
vides: "The legislature sna 
a uniform and equal rate"6^ 
taxation on all propertyVfn 
ing to its value in money, i ^" 
by general law such legula^j 
<jure a just valuation fur tax 
iperty; so th"at every person*! 
shall pay a tax in proportion 
his, her or its property." ^ijj 
lis authority, the legislarun 
11 taxable property must 
full cash value" Rev. S t # 
516, Rev. St., provides tha*f 
2ust before the first Monday 
year, ascertain the names 05 
ibitants and all property^ 
ect to taxation, except sucfi 
to be assessed by the sta$ 
atiou, and must assess sue! 
erson by whom it was cla 
in whose possession or conf 
velve o'clock m., of the fir 
uary, next preceding, and lfj 
te." Said notes and accouc 
property belonging to thu| 
)t exempt from taxation,^ 
the assessor, under the cog 
e provisions of the statu? 
assess such property a t^u 
the absence of fraud, or 
alth upon the part of the "a. 
ment of the value of safcy 
Qclusive, unless c h a n g e d , ^ 
•f the plaintiff, by the boar£ 
Application was madef^by 
Id board. They had the an 
ction 2576, Rev. St , to co^ 
ment, but, upon the shov 
utiff, refused to do so. I t l 
ture, by the constitution^ 
ssessment and valuation, to 
ixable property in the sta|" 
as provided the method fof 
a s also provided a mode' o? 
'ervaluation by the assessor 
he correction of assessment] 
not subject to review' $$ 
the facts presented in* tfiii 
Jection presents a question 
xity. Section 2518, Rev. 
making up the amount "6l 
y person is required to lisC 
d to deduct from the gross 
edits the amount of all bon 
fide debts owing by him." The plaintiff, un-
der this provision, was entitled to a deduction 
of all bona fide debts owing by him. But, 
In the case at bar, the plaintiff, at the date of 
the assessment, was not indebted to the In-
sured. An Indebtedness could only arise up-
on the happening of the contingency on 
which the liability of the plaintiff depended. 
The deduction claimed by plaintiff Is not such 
as the constitution and the statute allow. 
Insurance Co. v. Cappellar, 38 Ohio S t 561-
570; State v. Board (La.) 18 South 462; In-
surance Co. v. Follak, 75 I1L 292-300; Asso-
ciation v. Hill, 51 Kan. 636-649, 33 Pac. 300, 
and cases cited; People v. Davenport 91 N. 
y. 574. The contingency did not deprive said 
notes and accounts of their character as per-
sonal property, but it materially affected both 
their intrinsic and marketable value, and In 
the assessment that fact should be consider-
ed. But, if the assessor fails to do so, and 
the board of equalization refuses to reduce 
the assessed valuation, the courts are power-
less, in an action like the present one, to 
grant any relief. We are of the opinion that 
the demurrer was properly sustained. The 
judgment of the court below is affirmed, 
with costs. 
BARTCH, C. J., and MINER, J., concur. 
'09 Utah. 1&0) 
HOUSER T. SMITH et al. 
(Supreme Court of Utah. March 28, 1899) 
FRAUD — EVIDENXK — COMPETENCY — PERSONS NOT 
PARTIES — PROPERTY RIGHTS — JURISDICTION— 
Err ECT OF JUDGMENT—NECESS AH Y PARTIES. 
1. Where no fraud Is pleaded, evidence tend-
ing to show it Is improper. 
2. Courts hare no right to dispose of and ad-judicate upon property rights of persons not 
parties to the case and strangers to the record, 
and a judgment rendered against persons not 
parties to the action, and over whom the court 
acquired no jurisdiction, is absolutely void as 
to them. * 
3. When a complete determination of a con-
troversy requires the presence of persons not al-
ready parties, section 3192, Comp. Laws Utah 
1888, prescribes the procedure. 
(Syllabus by the Court) 
Appeal from district court, Salt Lake coun-
ty; Ogden Hiles, Judge. 
Action by Maggie S. Houser against Charles 
Smith and others. Judgment for defendants, 
and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed, 
i • r i J » 
This Is an action to quiet title and to re-
cover possession of certain real estate de-
scribed In the complaint The record'shows, in 
substance, that on February 19, 1889, the de-' 
fendant Charles Smith was the owner of the 
premises described in, the complaint, and on 
that day, In consideration of the sura of ^3,-f 
000, then paid to him In cash, he conveyed 
said premises to the purchaser, Joseph R. 
Morgan, by
 twarranty deed, and that such 
deed was duly recorded on that day. . The 
plaintiff, Maggie Smith Houser, was married 
to the defendant .Charles, Smith on June 4, 
1S90. This was over one year after such con-
veyance by Smith to Morgan.. The defendant 
Smith first became acquainted with plaintiff 
in April, 1890, which was some time after such 
conveyance. On August 26, 1891, plaintiff 
brought suit against defendant Smith in Salt 
Lake county to procure a divorce, and a de-
cree of divorce was granted to her December 
23, 1S92, and thereafter she married one a 
A. Houser. Neither the defendants Joseph 
R. Morgan nor August W. Carlson were made 
parties to the said action, nor did either of 
them appear therein. On the same date an in-
junction was issued against defendants Smith 
and Morgan enjoining them from transferring 
or incumbering said real estate previously con-
veyed to Morgan. On the same day a sum-
mons was issued In said action, and served on 
Charles Smith April 20, 1891, but Morgan and 
Caflson~were notnamedT therein as" defendant* 
to the action. On the 2d day of September, 
1891, Smith answered said complaint On 
November 11, 1892, an order was Issued, re-
quiring Smith alone to show cause why Smith 
should not be required to pay alimony and 
expenses of the suit. This paper included a 
restraining order against defendant* Smith 
and Morgan, forbidding the sale or incum-
brance of the said land. This was served on 
Smith and Morgan November 15, 1892. On 
the 28th day of December, 1891, an amended 
supplemental complaint was filed by the plain-
tiff against the defendant Smith, but not 
served. This complaint charged that on the 
12th day of November, 1891, Morgan, by in-
stigation of Smithy had executed and delivered 
to the defendant Carlson, herein named, a 
mortgage of $2,000 on said land, In violation 
of the order of the court, and charging the 
mortgage to have been fraudulenly executed, 
and void, and asking to have the same can-
celed. Neither Morgan nor Carlson were made 
parties to this complaint, nor was summons 
issued or served upon them. f,(On ;the 20th 
day of December, 1892, an order was made 
by the district court, requiring
 t Smith and 
Morgan to show cause why
 sthey, should not 
be punished for contempt In violating the or-
der of Injunction Issued .November 12, 1891, 
but in the meantime the parties plaintiff and 
defendant had compromised their difficulties, 
and had been living together ^ for several 
months prior to the order. *• This order to show 
cause was served on Smith and Morgan De-
cember ,20, 1892, but it does noit appear that 
any hearing was ever had upon the order, and 
no action was taken thereunder. On the 11th 
day of November, 1892, Maggie Smith, the 
plaintiff herein, filed a second supplemental 
complaint against the defendant Smith". In 
this supplemental complaint it appears that, 
.after filing the first complaint for divorce, the 
plaintiff and defendant >had been reunited, 
and had been living together as husband and 
wife frpm November, 1S91, to the 30th day of 
• September, 1892, It Is not charged, and does 
not appear Tom either complaint, that Joseph 
R. £1 organ had been guilty of any fraud In 
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the transaction, except that he'made the mor£ 
jg^ ge to Carlson on!. the land :previousIy^ con-
veyed to him.^It'does'notrappear thatUhis 
complaint was^served upon any one. Neither 
Morgan nor Carlson were made parties to this 
complaint, and' th'eyf did not < appear In'- the 
action. On December 20, 1892, another order 
to show cause was'Issued against Smithy Mor^  
gan, and Carlson*'to? show'cause why'.'they 
should not be' punished . for ^ contemptv»,f This 
was personally( servedy but'no hearing t was 
ever had upon It.; All papers In the case were 
entitled "Magfte'Smith vs.r Charles. Smith.'?; 
After trial a decree'of divorce was entered In 
the case on December 30,*-1892.v The'decree 
granted the divorce prayed for In the' com-
plaint, and purported to'adjudicate the rights 
of property, and to decree the deed from Smith 
to Morgan fraudulent and void, and the mort-
gage from Morgan to Carlson void, and to 
decree the plaintiff-judgment for alimony, 
which was declared to be a lien upon said 
reai estate, although neither Morgan nor Carl-
eon were ever made parties to said action. 
After such decree, saJe was made of said land 
to pay the alimony decreed to the plaintiff, 
and Carlson became the purchaser on the first 
sale to pay the first Installment of alimony, 
and plaintiff became the purchaser under her 
decree at the second sale to pay the second 
Installment of alimony.' In this present action 
the plaintiff seeks to have her title quieted to 
said land under said decree and sale to her. 
In the present case before ns the defendant 
Morgan-answered, denying all .the allegations 
in the complaint, and claims title to the land 
under his deed from Smith, made prior to his 
marriage, and asking to have the title quiet-
ed. Upon the trial the plaintiff endeavored 
to show the transaction fraudulent between 
Smith, Morgan, and Carlson, and the decree 
In the former action was Introduced In evi-
dence. Upon this hearing the court found, 
adjudged, and decreed the title to said land 
In Morgan, and also found that Smith con-
veyed the land to Morgan in good faith, for 
"the sum of $3,000, paid In cash, without any 
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the plain-
tiff; that said consideration was paid, and the 
deed made to Morgan, before said Smith be-
came acquainted with the plaintiff; that said 
Smith had no interest In said land since the 
sale to Morgan; that the said decree of the 
district court, declaring said deed to Morgan 
and the mortgage to Carlson void and fraudu-
lent as to the plaintiff, was made in a case 
"where neither said Morgan nor Carlson were 
parties defendant; that no summons or pro-
cess was ever served upon them In the case 
as defendants, and that they never appeared 
therein as parties thereto; that their rights 
could not be adjudicated therein; that the 
court had no Jurisdiction to make or cause to 
be entered any decree In the said action ad-
judicating their rights In or to said premises, 
and that said decree was of no force or effect 
as to the said defendants Morgan and Carlson, 
who were not made parties thereto; that the 
"sale of'said; property undetf saId<;YOld decree 
was irregular and vold,Mand^ carried no title 
; t6;,the purchasers as against said/Morgan or 
Carlson.^ *' The plaintiff.v appealed * from thl? 
decree,?, and claims that the findings of fact 
and decree are contrary to the evidence. 
^O^S.1v?att€lr?on» o^r^  appellant, |^  Bootb» Lee 
'&;BUchjel for respon^ent&^^;;^^^r'' 
-jTAfter stating the facts,' MINER; J* deliver-
ed the" opinion of the court an;i;,Y -ij _r-".; 
*<? It'appeare from this decree that In the case 
of Maggie Smith against; Charles' Smith no 
complaint was ever filed' against Joseph R. 
Morgan or August W. Carlson,-and no sum-
mons, was ever served upon them In that ac-
tion, nor did either of said parties ever ap-
pear, nor were they ordered to appear, there-
in.1. Writs of injunction were served, forbid-
ding, them from transferring or disposing of 
the' property. No default was ever entered 
against them, or either of them, and there is 
no record in the decree that they were ever 
made parties; but It does appear that they 
testified as witnesses. It does appear from 
the testimony that the conveyance was made 
by Smith to Morgan more than a year before 
Smith knew, or was married to, the plaintiff. 
There Is no fraud charged against Morgan or 
Carlson In the complaint as in any manner 
affecting the plaintiff. No effort was made to 
have Morgan or Carlson brought In as defend-
ants in the case of Smith against Smith. Sec-
tion 3192, Comp. Laws 1SSS, provides that 
"the court may determine any controversy be-
tween parties before it, when It can be done 
without prejudice to the rights of others, or 
by saving their rights; but when a complete 
determination of the controversy cannot be 
had without the presence of other parties, 
the court must then order them to be brought 
In, and thereupon the party directed by the 
court must serve a copy of the summons In 
the action, and the order aforesaid in like 
manner of service of the original summons, 
upon each of. the parties ordered to be brought 
In, who shall have ten days, or such time as, 
the court may order, after service in which 
to appear and plead; and in case such party ^  
fail to appear and plead within the time^  
aforesaid, the court may cause his default to^  
be entered," etc. Appellant claims to, rely^  
upon section 3301, Comp. Laws 1SSS, andl 
claims to have proceeded under that section;^  
but this section was repealed in 1890. See-
Sess. Laws 1890, p. 17. If this section was In, 
force, it would not be applicable to this cased 
On the trial of the case some evidence wajj 
offered tending to show fraud, but, as fr*1*^ 
was not pleaded, the evidence tending^~ 
show it was improper. Wilson v. Sulllvi 
53 Pac. 994, 17 Utah, — . The plaintiff pla< 
In Issue her rights to the laud in question^ 
der the decree and deed from the maJ£ 
The defendants Morgan and Carlson "f* 
strangers to the proceedings under wbicfl, 
decree was obtained. This propert/V 
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'^wrongfully and illegally decreed to belong to, 
another party, without the, owners being 
• made parties to the action, or having any opi 
portunity to be heard in court to defend the 
title thereto. After their rights to the prop-
e r t y were made known to the court, no pro-
ceedings were taken, as provided by statute, 
t^CMmake either Morgan or Carlson parties, so 
Lthat the title to the land could legally be de-
termined. The defendants Morgan and Carl-
s o n alleged in their answer, and the proofs 
&bow, that they were not parties to the pro-
S*ceeding wherein Maggie Smith was plaintiff 
|and4 Charles Smith was defendant, in which a 
[decree was rendered declaring said deed from 
iJSmith to Morgan fraudulent and void. On 
£Jhe face of the record as shown, the decree in 
e case of Smith against Smith, in so far as 
[tideclares said deed and mortgage void, is 
}xoUy and absolutely void, and was render-
ed without jurisdiction over the persons or 
i^operty of said Morgan and Carlson. It is 
#t a question of collateral attack upon the 
udgment The record presents a case where 
be judgment is shown to be absolutely void, 
nd rendered against persons who were not 
fore the court, and over whom the court 
ad no jurisdiction. Courts have no right to 
jjJJspose of and adjudicate upon the property 
ghts of persons who are not parties to the 
Egase, and who are total strangers to the rec-
Igrdj Van Fleet, Coll. Attack, §§ 16, 494; Mos-
Eftv. Gisborn, 54 Pac. 121, 17 Utah, — . We 
lare'of the opinion that the findings of fact 
End the decree are sustained by the evidence. 
Bfi(e find no reversible error in the record. 
fehe findings and judgment of the district 
~ >urt are affirmed, with costs. 
JBARTCH, C. J., and BASKIN, J., concur. 
Ka,Mont 391) 
pTATE ex rel. KNIGHT et al. v. HELENA 
U ; , POWER & LIGHT CO. 
^Supreme Court of Montana. March 31, 1809.) 
JOTBEBT R A J L K O A J ) S — D U T T TO OPERATE—ORDINANCE 
,&?*• —MANDAMUS. 
f Sp^An ordinance granting a street-railway 
<JO.inpany the right to construct and operate 
Jftnes in certain streets, and providing that, if 
gne company shall not construct and operate a |$ertain portion of the line within a certain 
t&hie, the right shall be forfeited, as to the 
•arts where the failure occurs, does not impose 
>n the company the duty to continue the oper-
ation of anv portion of the line, and man-
^J-mus cannot issue to compel it to do so. 
sAppeal from district court, Lewis and 
•ke county; Henry C. Smith, Judge, 
pplioation by the state, on the relation of 
j |W. Knight, Jr., and another, against the 
[elena Power & Light Company, for man-
*UpU8 to compel respondent to operate a por-
l°J of its line of street railway in- the city 
.Helena. From a judgment sustaining a 
^urrer to the application, relators appeal. 
tonned. 
Clayberg, Corbett & Gunn, for appellants. 
Toole, Bach & Toole and M. Bullard, for re-
spondent 
. PER CURIAM. Relators applied to the 
district court of Lewis and Clarke county for 
a peremptory writ of mandate requiring the 
respondent, a street-railway company, to op-
erate a portion of its system.. The affidavit 
In support of the petition or application dis-
closes the following facts: That respondent 
Is a corporation under the laws of Montana, 
and for several years last past has been, and 
now is, engaged in the business of operating 
street railways in the city of Helena; that on 
July 13, 1S89, and on October 8, 1890, by two 
several ordinances of the said city there were 
granted to the predecessors, in interest of the 
respondent the right, license, franchise, and 
easement of laying down and maintaining in 
certain streets of Helena a street-railway 
track, and of operating a line of street cars 
thereon, by which ordinances It was, among 
other things, substantially provided that un-
less the grantees, or their successor or as-
signs, should within a certain period of time 
construct and operate a designated portion of 
the line of railway, the right and privilege so 
granted would be forfeited as to the parts 
of the line where the failure occurred; that 
by section 12 of article 8 of chapter 19 of the 
Revised Ordinances of the City of Helena of 
1890 it is provided: "On all routes the cars 
shall be run for such number of hours each 
day, and at such intervals, and allowed to 
6tand for such length of time at either ter-
minus of the road, as the city council may 
from time to time direct by resolution or or-
der;" that in 1894 respondent succeeded to 
the rights of the original grantees named in 
the ordinances; that the respondent, after 
acquiring the rights granted by the ordi-
nances, operated the railways from 1894 un-
til June 30, 1898, and that on or about the 
date last mentioned it refused to run its cars on 
its line known as the "Lenox Addition Line," 
or to operate the same, although requested so 
to do, and has abandoned the same, and 
threatens to, and will, unless otherwise di-
rected, take up and destroy the track built 
to and through the Lenox addition; and 
that the railway company is fully equipped 
with apparatus necessary for its operation. 
Respondent demurred for insufficiency. The 
demurrer was sustained, and a judgment en-
tered dismissing the application. Relators 
appeal. 
The writ of mandate may be issued to com-
pel the performance of an act which the law 
specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an 
office, trust, or station. Code Civ. Proc. § 
1961. Is the operation of the line of street 
railway which respondent has abandoned an 
act specially enjoined as a legal duty? , We 
think it is not It does not appear that the 
charter of respondent, or the statute under 
which it was organized, requires it to main-
tain or operate a line of railway; nor is it 
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KELSEY V. MILLER.p (L. A. 8 5 3 9 . ) ^ 
Supreme Court of California. Jan. 5, 1928., 
1. Husband and wife <£»I4(3X—That wife aid-
ed husband's divorcement from, former wife 
did not'per se work forfeiture of her right 
to procure Joint, tenancy-deed, oft property 
purchased with her funds. «£^" ^ J?^
 u^< » 
That^wife, before marriage, counseled, aid-
ed, assisted, and abetted husband's divorcement 
from former wife did not per se work a forfei-
'ture of her right to dispose ofher property on 
same terms as others," as by procuring execu-
tion of joint tenancy deed to property paid for 
with her funds. VJ / ^ ' t i* r> ^ V ^ ^ ^ 
2. Deeds <§=>I96(3)—Evidence In suit to annul 
l~ joint tenancy deed held to rebut presumption 
jf
" of husband's undue influence over wife (Civ. 
* Code, §{ 158, 2236)'. , \ > £ ; ' \ ' \ ~ .'\ 
*
! t
*'In administrator's action against decedent's 
husband to annul joint tenancy deed, evidence 
held to rebut presumption of undue influence 
by husband, under Civ. Code,' §1 158, 2235. 
3. Husband and wife <§=>266—Marriage <S=»I I 
—Invalidity of one divorce decree would not 
Inevitably nullify husband's subsequent mar-
riages and acquisition of property rights from 
later wife. •$ * . t -
Invalidity of one divorce decree for want 
of jurisdiction to render it would not inevitably 
nullify husband's subsequent marriages and 
transactions whereby he obtained property 
rights from subsequent wife. 
4. Divorce <g=»65—Wife's pro confesso, filed in 
v
 husband's divorce suit, constituted appear-
ance, giving court Jurisdiction of defendant. 
Pro confesso, executed by wife and caused 
to be filed as record in husband's divorce suit, 
reciting that she waived notice, copy," pleading, 
and term, and agreed to immediate trial, con-
stituted appearance, giving court jurisdiction 
of defendant. 
5. Divorce <$=>329—Evidence held not to show 
fraud or collusion invalidating husband's for-
eign decree of divorce from former wife. 
Evidence held not to show fraud or collusion, 
invalidating foreign divorce decree granted hus-
band in suit brought by him against former wife 
without substituted service after she filed bill 
for divorce against him in another state. 
6. Divorce <g=»326—Parties remarrying are es-
topped to deny validity of foreign divorce. 
Parties to foreign divorce decree are es-
topped by remarriage to other persons to deny 
validity of decree, even if void on collateral at-
tack as showing want of jurisdiction on its face. 
7. Divorce <S=>327—Husband requesting wife to 
accompany him to another state, qualifying 
himself to practice medicine therein, remain-
ing there some time, and not returning to 
former state, held bona fide resident when 
granted divorce therein. >~« 
Husband requesting wife in good faith to 
accompany him from Massachusetts to Tennes-
see, qualifying himself to practice medicine in 
$=»For other cases see same topic and KEY-NU 
latter state, remaining there * several months 
after sanitarium of which he was medical di-
rector closed, and not returning to Massachu-
setts, but going to and remaining in California, 
held a bon$ fide resident of Tennessee at time 
of divorce decree granted him therein. J "* 
x 8. Divorce 3=>326—Tennessee divorce Judg. 
( ment will not We held invalid on collateral at-
- tack for failure to allege plaintiff's residence 
in state and defendant's desertion or absence^ 
for statutory time (Shannon's Code Tenn. { 
4203, and § 4201, subds. 4, 8) . '_ ;/' J 
Judgment of divorce, granted in Tennessee 
will not be held invalid on collateral attack be-
cause statutory requirements of two year's resi-
dence by plaintiff in that state and desertion or 
absence of defendant for two years (Shannon's 
Code Tenn. § 4201, subds. 4, 8, and section 4203) 
were not alleged in complaint nor incorporated 
in judgment, -,
 A , , ' - v 
9. Evidence <£=>80(l)—Laws of another state 
are presumed same as those of state on siml-
_ lar subjects. , . , -, 
, Supreme Court must presume, in absence of 
contrary showing, that laws' of another state 
are the same as those of California affecting 
similar subjects. 
10. Judgment <$=»503—Judgment of court hav-
ing general Jurisdiction of subject-matter can* 
not be successfully attacked collaterally be-
cause of imperfect or defective complaint. 
Judgment of court having general jurisdic-
tion of subject-matter cannot be successfully 
attacked in collateral proceeding because of im-
perfect or defective complaint in action in which 
rendered; judgment in accord with prayer of 
such complaint being nothing more than error. 
If. Divorce <§=> 168—Failure to allege plaintiff's 
residence for statutory time does not affect 
court's jurisdiction as respects collateral at-
tack (Civ. Code, § 128). 
As respects collateral attack, failure to al-
lege that plaintiff in divorce suit resided in 
state and county in which brought for time pre-
scribed by Civ. Code, § 128, does not affect 
court's jurisdiction to hear and determine ac-
tion, if it obtained jurisdiction of defendant. 
12. Divorce <§=>327—Divorce obtained on sub-
stituted service outside state of matrimonial 
domicile by simulating residence therein may 
be held void in any other state. 
Where one spouse ^oes to another state 
than that of matrimonial domicile, and there ob-
tains divorce under residence simulated for 
such purpose and not in good faith, judgment is 
not binding on courts of other states, and may 
be held void therein on proof of fraudulent res-
idence and substituted service only. 
13. Marriage <S=»40(II), 50(1)—Proof of prior 
marriage and parties' continued life is insuf-
ficient to make case against second ceremonial 
marriage but proof that first marriage was 
not set aside is required. i 
Mere proof of prior marriage and continued; 
life of both spouses is not sufficient to make *; 
case against second ceremonial marriage, but 
there must be further showing that first mar*j 
riage had not been set aside by judicial decreeJ 
WBER in ail Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes 
^€aL) *T KELSEY v. (263 
|^4.i Marriage <§=>40(I)— Legality of carriage 
,regulariy solemnized Is presumed.., - , ^
 n ^ 
afa There is a very strong presumption in favor 
^fofithe. legality of a marriage regularly solem-
^15^Marriage <S=>40(ll)—In view*of burden of 
Ifproof^parties to regular marriage In state | we re husband and wife, absent evidence that 
ihusband was not divorced from former wife. 
_JInTabsence of testimony in former wife's 
^deposition as to whether she had obtained di-
hrojr.ce, decree or affirmative showing that hus-|band7had not obtained valid decree against her, 
fij^and* one whose marriage to him was regu-
llarly solemnized in California after foreign di-
jjyolrce decree assailed as void were husband and 
fi1 under laws of such state whatever their 
arriage status before, in view of burden of 
fpfobf on' one attacking second 'marriage. 
Divorce <§=»168, 172—Final divorce decree 
tlsjbinding on all as to determination of mari-
rial status, and Immune from collateral attack 
fonTother than statutory grounds (Code Civ. 
EPro&i 1916). 
?Final~ divorce decree, being a judgment in 
eof/establishing and dissolving matrimonial 
Status is binding on all the world as to determi-
nation of such status and immune from collat-
eral^  attack on grounds not specified by Code 
£tProc. i 1916. 
Jr>!vorce ^=> I—Marriage <g=»2—Marriage 
and divorce are questions of publio policy 
largely within state's sound discretion. 
(Marriage and divorce are questions of pub-
SJpolicy committed largely to sound discre-
ibnrof the several states. 
©^Marriage <^ =>40( I)—Judgment upholding 
fmarriage status of persons seriously affected 
[must be sustained, if reasonably possible. 
^Policy of law requires that trial * court's 
j^udgment upholding marriage status of persons 
[Seriously affected thereby be sustained, if rea-
tsonably possible. 
fjjK Witnesses <@=>204( I )•—Letter instructing 
^attorney to get writer's share of property for 
this children by former marriage if anything 
^happened to him and wife held Inadmissible 
[as privileged. * 
; In action to annul joint tenancy deed to 
plaintiff's decedent and her husband, letter from 
husband to his attorney, stating that he wanted 
kitteri to get husband's share for his children 
[performer marriages, "for whom I am doing |&anyKof these things/' if anything happened to 
bun* and wife on automobile trip, held properly 
Included from evidence as privileged and of 
ggfe» if any, relevancy. 
£Bank/ 
_PPeal from Superior Court, Los Angeles 
Sgntyf John M. York, Judge. 
option by Frank M. Kelsey, special admin-
^jitor of the estate of Mary Moore Miller, 
gftsed, against Jared H. Miller. Judgment 
defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Af-
aed. 
MILLER 201 
p> ,. * 
0 Anderson &> Anderson, Victor T.^Watkins, 
and John L. Richardson, all of Los Angeles, 
for appellant , ^ 
Kimball Fletcher, A. P. Thomson, MacDon-
ald &, Thompson, and Hunsaker, Britt & Cos-
grove, all of Los Angelesrtfor respondent^ 
» SEAWELK J.% This appeal/ Jl A. No. 8539, 
which will presently receive' our attention, is 
the first in numerical order of three separate 
appeals pending in this court from judgments 
affecting the estate of Mary Moore Miller, de-
ceased. The second appeal, L. A. No. 8894, 
263 P. 213, is entitled "Frank M. Kelsey, as 
Special Administrator of the Estate of Mary 
Moore Miller, Deceased, Plaintiff
 %and Appel-
lant v. Jared H. Miller, Defendant and Re-
spondent, Security Trust & Savings Bank; a 
Corporation, Citizens' National Bank, a Cor-
poration, and Citizens' Trust & Savings Bank, 
a Corporation, Defendants," and was taken 
by the special administrator from a judgment 
awarding plaintiff costs only In an action 
brought to compel Jared H. Miller to account 
to said estate for all moneys belonging to 
said Mary Moore Miller which might have 
come into his hands or that were received 
by him from her during a seven-year period 
of assumed marital relations, which was ter-
minated by her death, and during which pe-
riod of time said Jared H. Miller and Mary 
Moore Miller held themselves out to be and 
lived together as husband and wife Said 
third appeal, L. A. No. 9013, 263 P. 214, en-
titled "George W. Moore, Contestant and Re-
spondent, v. Jared H. Miller, as Executor of 
the Estate of Mary Moore, Deceased, Lillian 
Hays, Formerly Lillian Miller, and Russell C. 
Miller, Respondents and Appellants," was tak-
en from a decree revoking the probate of the 
last will and testament of said Mary Moore 
Miller, deceased. All of said actions, includ-
ing the instant case, were doubtless brought 
on behalf of the collateral kindred of said de-
cedent and arise out of the same state of facts 
and involve many similar issues of law and 
fact 
The complaint herein L. A. No. 8539, which 
was twice amended, will be referred to as 
the "complaint," rather than as the "second 
amended complaint" The action was brought 
to obtain a decree of annulment of a certain 
deed, dated November 10, 1915, wherein the 
grantees, Mary Moore Miller, since deceased, 
and her husband, Jared H. Miller, defendant 
ami respondent, were named as joint tenants; 
with the right of survivorship, in and to lot 
35, Kensington Place, situate in the city of 
Los Angeles, and valued at $16,500. The 
money furnished to pay the purchase price 
of said real property was taken from funds 
acquired by the wife before marriage, Iw*l-
dental to the main purpose of the action, 
plaintiff prays, as the special administrator 
of said estate, to be let into the possession 
fete <£»For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes 
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to be compensated, under the evidence 
for pain and suffering and a loss of 22lh 
days wages, irrespective of prospective 
damages, which the jury and trial court 
evidently doubted. Obviously, the jury 
failed to consider these items of damage. 
The verdict was defective in form in that 
it did not comprehend all the items of 
damages contained in the instructions 
given by the court, it was therefore insuf-
ficient 
• * • • • • 
If counsel be permitted to remain mute 
when a verdict is insufficient or informal, 
he gains an unfair strategic advantage 
[and since] there must be reasonable rules 
to control the termination of litigation, if 
counsel has an opportunity to correct er-
ror at the time of its occurrence and he 
fails to do so, any objection based there-
upon is waived1* 
[8] In the present case the plaintiff 
alleges the verdict is insufficient as to dam-
ages suffered as a result of the delivery of 
the Warranty Deed. The plaintiff was un-
der a responsibility to object to this patent 
insufficiency at the time the verdict was 
rendered. Since the plaintiff did not avail 
himself of the opportunity to object to the 
verdict before the jury was dismissed, any -
later objection to its insufficiency is 
waived.11 
CROCKETT, C. J., and WILKINS, HALL 
and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
O |R£YIIUMB£RSySTEIi> 
18. Id, 491 P.2d at 1214. 
19. The plaintiff could realize definite advantage 
in the present case because of the complexity 
of the factual issues involved, the duration of 
the trial and the vast volume of evidence 
presented The instructions given to the jury 
by the court appnsed them of the applicable 
law governing the recovery of damages in this 
action. In those instructions the jury was told 
that in determining the liability of the defend-
ant Sather the jury was to consider the possi-
Sheila Penrose Larsen LAND, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
William Dennis LAND, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 16238. 
Supreme Court of Utah* 
Jan. 22, 1980. 
On cross motions to modify a divorce 
decree, the Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Christine M. Durham, J., entered 
an order for appraisal of certain real prop-
erty and for conveyance by the husband to 
the wife. The husband appealed, and the 
Supreme Court, Hall, J., held that the trial 
court acted within its discretion in applying 
the commonly accepted definition of the 
term "equity" in interpreting a written 
stipulation of the parties which was incor-
porated into the divorce decree. 
Affirmed. 
Maughan, J., concurred in the result 
1. Divorce *=>252^ 
In dividing property between divorcing 
spouses, trial court is governed by general 
principles of equity. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5. 
2. Divorce «=>164 
Court which issues divorce decree re-
tains continuing jurisdiction over the par-
ties and may modify the decree due to a 
change in circumstances, equitable consider-
ations governing. 
bility of mitigation of damages by Ute-CaT* 
tender of the monies expended by Sather as 
guarantor of the loan. They were also instruct-
ed on the restrictions to awarding speculative 
damages and the plaintiff admitted the exact 
amount received as rents could not be calculat-
ed. The plaintiff had ample opportunity, to. 
present evidence concerning the damages sufjj 
fered during the trial and no injustice is ren^ j 
dered by denying the plaintiff an opportunity tO\ 
"try again" with a new jury. 
3. Divorce <*=» 249.2 
When a divorce decree is based on a 
property settlement agreement devised by 
the parties and sanctioned by the court, 
equity must take the agreement into con-
sideration. 
4. Equity *=>23 
Equity is not available to reinstate 
rights and privileges voluntarily contracted 
away simply because one has come to regret 
the bargain made. 
5. Divorce «=*249.2, 254(2) 
The trial court has discretion to adopt 
or reject an agreement between divorcing 
parties as part of the original decree or a 
modification thereof, as equity may dictate. 
6. Husband and Wife «=»279(2) 
The law limits the continuing jurisdic-
tion of a divorce court where a property 
settlement has been incorporated into the 
decree and the outright abrogation of such 
an agreement may be resorted to only for 
compelling reasons. 
7. Husband and Wife *=> 279(1) 
Where parties to written stipulation 
that was specifically adopted in divorce de-
cree used the term "equity" without equivo-
cation or elaboration and, seemingly, in its 
usual and ordinary context, it was appropri-
ate for the court to interpret the term in 
accordance with common usage. 
8. Contracts <*=» 147(2) 
Where possible, the underlying intent 
of a contract is to be gleaned from the 
language of the instrument itself. 
9. Contracts «=»169 
It is only when contractual language is 
uncertain or ambiguous that extrinsic evi-
dence need be resorted to. 
10. Contracts <*=> 143(2) 
Mere fact that parties urge diverse def-
initions of contract terminology is not suffi-
cient to render the terminology ambiguous. 
11. Husband and Wife *=>279(1) 
Trial court acted well within its discre-
tion in applying the commonly accepted 
definition of the term "equity" to interpret 
605 PJd—27 
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Cit* as, UUh, 60S PJd 1248 
written stipulation, incorporated into di-
vorce decree, wherein parties agreed that 
wife would receive as sole property a 50 
percent interest in the "present equity" of 
certain real property and that the husband 
would receive as sole property a 60 percent 
interest in that "equity." 
Paul N. Cotro Manes, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and appellant 
Neils E. Mortenson, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and respondent 
HALL, Justice: 
Defendant appeals, challenging the dis-
trict court's interpretation of the term "eq-
uity" as it appears in the stipulation and 
property settlement agreement of the par-
ties. 
Plaintiff obtained a decree of divorce 
from defendant on November 19, 1974. 
Said decree specifically adopted the provi-
sions of the written stipulation in question, 
and, where pertinent to this appeal, the 
stipulation provided: 
7. The parties agree that the business 
known as the Eat'n House located at Salt 
Lake City, Utah, shall be awarded entire-
ly to Defendant with Defendant having 
full ownership of all assets and full re-
sponsibility for all debts arising there-
from. 
8. The Defendant agrees to assume as 
his sole obligation all debts and obliga-
tions incurred by the parties up to the 
29th day of October 1974 except those 
specifically mentioned herein and agrees 
to defend and hold the Plaintiff harmless 
therefrom. 
9. The parties agree that the Plaintiff 
shall receive as her sole property a 50 
percent interest in the present equity of 
the home and real property located at 
5171 South 2870 East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah and the Defendant shall receive as 
his sole property a 50 percent interest in 
that equity. The value of the equity 
shall be determined not later than Janu-
ary 1, 1975 by at least two independent 
appraisers selected by the parties for that 
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purpose. Should the appraisals fail to 
agree, the two appraisers shall select a 
third appraiser- and an average value 
shall be determined. The percentage in-
terests shall be paid to the parties at the 
time of receipt of funds on any sale of 
the property, or shall be paid by the 
Plaintiff within two years following the 
date of majority or emancipation of the 
youngest surviving child of the parties. 
The 50 percent interest awarded to the 
Defendant shall bear interest at 3 percent 
per annum from January 1, 1975 until 
paid. Any increase in equity in the home 
and real property after the fixing of the 
interests described herein shall accrue to 
the benefit of the Plaintiff and Defend-
ant shall have no rights over any such 
increase. 
* * * * * * 
11. The Plaintiff specifically agrees to 
assume as her sole obligation the first 
mortgage on the home and to make the 
required payments on that mortgage. 
The Defendant specifically agrees to as-
sume as, his sole obligation the second 
mortgage on the home and to make the 
required payments until this mortgage is 
paid in full. 
The debts and obligations recited in the 
stipulation (in addition to the two mortgag-
es), were mostly associated with defend-
ant's business establishment, the Eat'n 
House. Certain of said debts (totalling 
some $27,000), had been reduced to judg-
ment and hence constituted liens on the real 
property at that time. 
This matter came before the district 
court on cross-motions to modify the decree 
of divorce for various reasons not pertinent 
here. In addition, plaintiffs motion sought 
to compel defendant to quit-claim to her all 
>of his interest in the subject real property. 
Plaintiff asserted that defendant had no 
• * „ r • 
1. Despite the provisions of paragraph 9 of the 
stipulation, no appraisal of the property was 
undertaken. However, the undisputed affidavit 
of plaintiff estimated the value of the property 
at the time of the divorce to be $52,000. Inas-
much as the liens on the property totalled $27,-
000 and the two mortgages totalled $25,000, 
the remaining equity would be nominal at best. 
actual interest in the property by reason of 
the fact that no equity existed therein. 
This was so, explained plaintiff, because the 
total of the mortgages and the other liens 
exceeded the value of the property at the 
time of the stipulation and decree of di-
vorce.1 
The court below ordered that appraisal be 
made as of January 1, 1975, and that de-
fendant convey to plaintiff (upon payment 
to him of the value, if any, of the interest 
granted him by the stipulation), all interest 
in the property. This interest was to be 
measured by calculating the "equity" in the 
property as the market value as of January 
* 1, 1975, less any liens, mortgages, obliga-
tions or other encumbrances as of that date. 
It is only from that order that defendant 
appeals. 
Defendant's sole contention on appeal is 
that the court below failed "to do equity" in 
interpreting the stipulation. However, he 
concedes that the record is silent "as to just 
what was meant by the parties for the 
calculation of the equity in the real proper-
ty." He simply asserts that the trial court 
should have calculated the equity as the 
appraised value, less the amount of the first 
and second mortgages only. 
[1-6] Defendant's contention that the 
court must look behind his stipulation in 
order to do equity is without merit True it 
is that, in making a division of property by 
a decree of divorce a trial court is governed 
by general principles of equity.2 It is like-
wise true that the court retains continuing 
jurisdiction over the parties and may modi-
fy the decree due to a change in circum-
stances, equitable considerations again to 
govern.1 It must, however, be added that, 
when a decree is based upon a property 
settlement agreement, forged by the parties 
and sanctioned by.the court, equity must 
• assuming the accuracy of the trial court's inter-
; pretation (discussed infra). 
2. U.CJL, 1953, 30-3-5. 
, 3. id. See also, Carson v. Carson, 87 Utah 1, 47 
PM 894 (1935). 
LAND v. LAND 
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take such agreement into consideration.4 other liens.10 
Equity is not available to reinstate rights 
and privileges voluntarily contracted away 
simply because one has come to regret the 
bargain made.5 Accordingly, the law limits 
the continuing jurisdiction of the court 
where a property settlement agreement has 
been incorporated into the decree,1 and the 
outright abrogation of the provisions of 
such an agreement is only to be resorted to 
with great reluctance and for compelling 
Utah 1251 
The courts have generally 
followed the foregoing definitions of the 
term.11 
reasons.' 
[7] The parties chose to use the term 
"equity" without equivocation or elabora-
tion, and, seemingly, in its usual and ordi-
nary context. Consequently, we deem it 
appropriate for the trial court to have 
placed a common usage meaning upon the 
term and that is precisely what it did. By 
interpreting the term "equity" as it did, the 
court made an effort, not to supplant the 
original agreement, but simply to construe 
it in the manner as contemplated by the 
parties at the time it was drafted. 
The term "equity" is described as the 
money value of a property or of an interest 
in property in excess of claims or liens 
against it8 It is the amount of value of a 
property above the total liens or charges.1 
It is the value in excess of mortgage or 
4. 47 Am.Jur.2d Judgments, Sec 1082, Niemj-
nen v. Pttzer, 281 Or. 53, 573 P2d 1227 (1978) 
5. Defendant concedes that he would normally 
be bound by his stipulation but dtes the case of 
Klein v Klein, Utah, 544 P.2d 472 (1975) as 
supportive of his position. , Such reliance is 
misplaced. That decision dealt with a situation 
wherein an original decree of divorce, not itself 
the product of any agreement, was modified by 
the trial court according to the terms of an 
alleged stipulation which the appellant denied 
making. The trial court has discretion to adopt 
or reject an agreement between the parties as 
part of the original decree (or a modification 
thereof), as equity might dictate. See Nelson 
on Divorce, (2d ed, 1945), § 13.45. 
6. Callister v. CaUister, 1 Utah 2d 34, 261 P.2d 
944 (1953); see also Clark, The Law of Domes-
tic Relations, Sec 16.13. 
7. See LeBreton v. LeBreton, Utah, 604 P.2d 469 
(1979). 
[8-10] Where possible, the underlying 
intent of a contract is to be gleaned from 
the language of the instrument itself; only 
where the language is uncertain or ambigu-
ous need extrinsic evidence be resorted to.12 
No such ambiguity is present in this case, 
nor was it asserted. Also, the mere fact 
that the parties urge diverse definitions of 
contract terminology does not, per se, ren-
der it ambiguous.13 
[11] The trial court acted well within its 
discretion in applying the commonly accept-
ed definition of the term "equity" as used 
in the context of the stipulation u and its 
judgment is therefore affirmed. No costs 
awarded. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and WILKINS and 
STEWART, JJ., concur. 
8. Webster's Third New International Diction-
ary, Unabridged, 1961. 
9. Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 1979. 
10. Funk & WagnalTs Standard Comprehensive 
International Dictionary, 1976. 
11. See e. g., Comstock v. Fioretla, 260 Cal. 
App.2d 262, 67 CaLRptr. 104 (1968), Pierson v. 
Bill. 138 Fla. 104, 189 So. 679 (1939); Des 
Moines Joint Stock Land Bank v. Allen, 220 
Iowa 448, 261 N.W. 912 (1935). 
12. Oberhansly v. Earie, Utah, 572 P2d 1384 
(1977); Bennett v. Robinson's Medical Mart, 18 
Utah 2d 186, 417 P.2d 761 (1966). 
13. Camp v. Deseret Mutual Benefit Ass'n. 
Utah, 589 P.2d 780 (1979). 
14. \Pu$h v. StockdaJe, Utah, 570 P.2d 1027 
(1977); Commercial Bldg. Corp. v. Blair, Utah, 
565 P.2d 776 (1977). 
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OSMUS v. OSMUS. 
No. 7152. 
Supreme court or uiah. 
Oct 14, 1948. 
1. Divorce ^269(12), 311 
Before a divorced husband can be 
found guilty of contempt for failure to 
comply with alimony and support provisions 
of divorce decree, and can be committed 
to jail, it must be found that he was able 
to comply with court's order or that he 
intentionally deprived himself of ability to 
comply with such order.1 
2. Divorce €=>269(9), 311 
Fact that divorced wife received $5,000 
for equity in home of parties did not excuse 
divorced husband from complying with 
court order with respect to alimony and 
support money for support of children. 
3. Divorce <£=>I64, 269(9), 311 
If, because of change in circumstances 
of parties, divorce decree is inequitable or 
impossible to comply with, divorced hus-
band may petition for modification, but, 
so long as decree stands, he must comply 
with it, or make .every reasonable effort 
to do so, or be subject to punishment for 
contempt, regardless of how financial 
situation of divorced wife may have 
improved. 
4. Divorce C=>269(9), 3fl 
Fact that divorced husband, instead of 
accepting employment as a fry cook for 
$8 a day, took work at an eating place 
where he received board, room, and $1 a 
day for spending money, and a promise 
lHiUyard v. District Court, 68 Utah 
220, 249 P. 806, 809. •; 
2 Cody v. Cody, 47 Utah 456, 154 P. 
952; Chaffee v. Chaffee, 63 Utah 261, 
225 P. 76; Bockwood v.' Rockwood, 65 
that when owner paid off her capital invest-
ment, he should have a half interest in the 
business, did not excuse payment of ali-
mony and: support money in ; accordance 
with divorce decree. 
5. DIvorcee=>269(9), 31! 
... Fact that-if, divorced husband worked 
for wages, he. would be annoyed with 
creditor's bills and garnishments, was no 
excuse for husband's failure to take em-
ployment so as to be able to pay alimony 
and support money as required by divorce 
decree. 
i 
6. Divorce <§=>269(I), 311 
Where divorced husband, instead of 
securing employment as fry cook at $8 
a day, took work at eating place for board, 
room, and $1 a day spending money because 
he was promised a half interest in the 
business after capita) investment was re-
couped, because wife had received $5,000 
for equity in home of the parties, and 
because he feared that creditors would 
garnishee his pay checks if he took regular 
employment, and he failed to pay alimony 
and support required by divorce decree, he 
was guilty of contempt of court1 
7. Divorce <£=245(3), 309 
To entitle either party to modification 
of alimony or support provision of divorce 
decree, such party must plead and#prove a 
change in circumstances, such as to require, 
in fairness and equity, a change in terms 
of decree.2 
8. Divorce <&=>245(2), 309 
Where there were no changed condi-
tions between date of divorce decree and 
petition for modification of alimony and . 
support provisions of decree, no modifica-
tion of decree was proper.2 
Utah 261, 236 P. 457; Carson v. Car-
,:son, 87 Utah 1, 47 P.2d 804; Jones v. 
Jones, 104 Utah 275, 139 .
 tP.2d 222; 
Gardner v. Gardner, Utah, 177 P.2d 743. 
19SP.2d—15 Ms 
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Appeal from District Court, Third Judi-
cial District, Salt Lake County; J. Allan 
Crockett, Judge. 
Suit for divorce by Faye Walker Osmus 
against Harry Osmus, wherein the plaintiff 
was awarded a decree a divorce requiring 
defendant to pay alimony of $100 a month 
and $150 a month for support of the three 
children of the parties. From a judgment 
holding the defendant in contempt of court 
for failure to pay alimony as required by 
the divorce decree, the defendant appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
C. Vernon Langlois, of Salt Lake City 
(Ray S. McCarty, of Salt Lake City, of 
counsel), for appellant. 
Benjamin Spence, of Salt Lake City, for 
respondent. 
WOLFE, Justice. 
Appeal by the defendant from an order 
and judgment of the Third District Court 
holding defendant in contempt of court for 
failure to pay alimony as required by the 
terms of an interlocutory divorce decree 
entered by that court, and from the court's 
order denying defendant's petition for mod-
ification of the alimony decree. The parties 
are referred to as they appeared in the 
court below. 
The undisputed facts are that the plaintiff 
and defendant were married in March, 1940 
and that three children, all of whom are 
now living, were born to them. On March 
14, 1947, plaintiff commenced an action 
against defendant for separate mainte-
nance, and on July 15, 1947, the parties 
entered into a stipulation whereby defend-
ant agreed to pay to plaintiff $100 per month 
as alimony and support money, payable $25 
per week, and the further sum of $50 for 
attorney's fees. Pursuant to that stipula-
tion, Hon. Roaki A. Hogenson, judge of the 
Third District Court, signed an order pro-
viding for payment of temporary alimony 
and support money as stipulated. ' ' • 
On October 7, 1947, plaintiff filed her 
second amended complaint wherein she 
pra\ed for a divorce and alimony in the 
sum of $250 per month, and on the same 
day defendant filed his appearance and 
consent that his default might be entered 
forthwith, upon the condition that the 
alimony and support money to be awarded 
should be not more than the total amount 
of $250 per month. The matter was heard 
upon the same day, "and the court granted 
plaintiff an interlocutory decree of divorce, 
providing for alimony in the sum of $100 
per month and $50 per month support 
money for each of the three children, or 
a total of $250 per month. 
Defendant paid plaintiff $50 in October, 
but made no other payments between the 
time the interlocutory decree was entered 
and December 18, 1947, when defendant 
was served with an order to show cause 
why he should not be punished for con-
tempt, for failure to make the payments of 
alimony and support money required by the 
interlocutory decree. At about the same 
time defendant filed a petition for modifi-
cation of the alimony decree. The two 
matters were heard at the same time. The 
evidence at the hearing was as follow: 
Defendant testified that he was and 
always had been a fry cook; that up to 
February 15, 1947, he had been employed 
by one D. F. Anderson on a profit-sharing 
arrangement whereby he earned about $800 
per month; that on that date (about a 
month before plaintiff first filed suit against 
him) his employment with Anderson ter-
minated; that between February 15th and 
May 16th he had not worked at all; that 
on the last mentioned date he went to work 
for Mrs. Theo. Carlson, who operated an 
eating establishment on south State Street; 
that all that he received from this employ-
ment was board and room, and spending 
money to an amount not to exceed $1 per 
day; that Mrs. Carlson's business had not, 
up to that time been profitable, but that it 
was hoped and expected that it would even-
tually become profitable; that when it did 
become profitable and Mrs. Carlson had re-
couped her capital investment, defendant 
was to receive a fifty per cent interest in the 
business. 
Defendant further testified that the pre-
vailing wage scale for fry cooks was $8 
per day; that union men worked five and 
non-union men worked six days a week; 
that he had not attempted to secure employ-
ment as a fry cook because he had several 
OSMUS v. OSMUS 
Cite as 198 P.2d 233 
Otah 235 
bills outstanding, and he feared that if he 
accepted employment for wages that his 
wages would be garnisheed, and for the 
further reason that he expected that Mrs. 
Carlson's business could be built up to a 
very profitable business, and that he would 
then be in a much better financial position 
than he would be if he were working for 
wages. 
He testified that he stipulated to the sum 
of $250 per month as alimony and support 
money upon the advice of his attorney, 
who had assured him that such amount 
could later be reduced to an amount consist-
ent with his ability to pay. (It should be 
noted here that counsel for both parties in 
the present proceedings are not the same 
counsel who represented them in the orig-
inal divorce proceedings). Defendant also 
admitted that he was more interested in 
Mrs. Carlson than he was in his own 
welfare. 
Plaintiff testified that prior to the time 
the divorce proceedings were commenced, 
she and her husband had contracted to 
purchase a home; that the home was in her 
name; that she sold the equity in the home 
for $5,000; that she used $2,000 as a down 
payment on a home, and used up the 
balance of the $3,000 for living expenses for 
herself and her family; that the entire 
$5,000 was exhausted in October, 1947, and 
during November and December, plaintiff 
had ,had to have financial aid from the 
County Welfare Department. 
Mrs. Theo. Carlson substantially corrob-
orated the testimony of defendant as to 
the terms of his employment by her. 
Four assignments of error are raised by 
defendant, but only two substantial ques-
tions are involved: 
1. Did the court err in finding defendant 
in contempt of court for failure to make 
the payments of alimony and support money 
during the months of October, November, 
and December, 1947, as required by the* 
terms of the-interlocutory divorce decree? 
2. Did the court err in denying defend-
ant's petition for modification of the decree 
in respect to alimony and support money? 
We shall consider the questions in the 
order stated. 
/ [1J There is no ^dispute between the 
parties that "it is a prerequisite in contempt 
proceedings of the nature here under 
review to an order committing to jail that 
the one charged should be found able to 
comply with the court's order or that he luxd 
intentionally deprived himself of the ability 
to comply with such order" (Italics 
added.) Hillyard v. District Court, 68 Utah 
220, 249 P. S06, 809. The question which 
divides the parties is whether there was 
evidence to support the court's finding of 
fact No. 5 that defendant "is still able, with 
a reasonable effort to earn sufficient to 
comply with the terms of said decree, but 
disregarding the order of the court and 
decree herein, has wilfully failed and neg-
lected to find employment or seek employ-
ment or earn money with which to meet his 
obligations under said decree; * * * " 
There is no conflict in the testimony 
that during the months in question the 
defendant worked for Mrs. Carlson for 
board and room and received in addition 
thereto a small amount of cash for spending 
money. It is likewise undisputed that de-
fendant had not attempted to secure em-
ployment at regular wages. The reason or 
excuses he gave for not so doing were 
these: 
(1) He knew that his wife, plaintiff, had 
received $5,000 for the equity in the home, 
and he did not think that she had immediate 
need for the alimony and support money. 
(2) That he anticipated in the "long run" 
it would be ( to his financial advantage to 
stay with'.Mrs. Carlson and have a one-
half interest in her business. 
(3) That he had bills outstanding in the 
total sum of about $366 and he feared that 
creditors would garnishee his checks if he 
took a job for wages. 
[2,3] * The fact that plaintiff received 
$5,000 for the equity in the home did not 
excuse the defendant from complying with 
the order of the court. The existence of 
independent means might be a factor to be 
considered by the court in fixing alimony, 
or in considering a petition for modification 
of a decree, or perhaps, under certain cir-
cumstances, in mitigation of punishment 
for contempt. But no discretion is left, to 
a divorced husband, to determine whether 
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he should or will comply with an alimony 
decree. So long as such decree stands, 
it is incumbent upon him to comply with 
it, or at least to exercise every reasonable 
effort to comply with it. If because of 
change in the circumstances of the parties 
it appears that the decree is inequitable, or 
impossible to comply with, he may petition 
for modification. But so long as that 
decree stands, the husband must comply 
with it, or make every reasonable effort 
to do so, and this is true regardless of how 
the financial situation of his former wife 
may have improved. Any failure to comply 
or to make a reasonable effort to comply is 
contempt, and punishable as such. 
[4] Nor does a man have a right to 
sacrifice the present needs and welfare of 
his family, and particularly of his infant 
children, to the end that at some indefinite 
future time he may better his own financial 
status. His first duty is to provide for 
those whom he is legally and morally 
obligated to support, and if it becomes 
necessary for him to forego business oppor-
tunities with bright future prospects but 
with no present realization, in order to per-
form his obligations, the law, in the absence 
of exceptional circumstances, will require 
him so to do. From all the evidence and all 
the fair inferences therefrom, the court 
could reasonably find that defendant enter-
ed into his business relationship as much 
for the purpose of depriving his wife'of the 
alimony and support money to which she 
was lawfully entitled, as for the purpose of 
bettering his future from a financial point 
of view. But if the defendant be given the 
benefit of all doubts, and his explanation 
that he expected eventually to receive pro-
fits from the business which would con-
siderably exceed what he would earn as 
wages, be accepted as true, defendant's 
legal position would not be improved. He 
has neither the right nor the privilege, to 
ignore, for a protracted period of time, his 
legal obligations to his family for the self-
ish purpose of advancing his own financial 
benefit. 
[5] The argument of defendant that if 
he worked for wages, he would be annoyed 
with creditor's bills and garnishments is so 
flimsy as to be hardly worthy of notice. I t 
is altogether probable that if defendant 
indicated a genuine desire on his part to^ 
meet these obligations, his creditors would 
be willing to inter into some mutually sat-
isfactory arrangement for the payment of, 
these bills in small installments. But be 
that as it may, whatever inconvenience, 
annoyance, or embarrassment might be oc-
casioned to defendant by these outstanding 
claims, he was not thereby excused from 
meeting, or at least making a reasonable" 
attempt to meet, his legal obligations to 
his family. 
[6] There was no error in the court's 
ruling and order adjudging defendant in 
contempt of court. 
[7,8] The second question, namely, 
whether the court erred in denying defend-
ant's petition for modification of the decree, 
poses no difficulty. It is a principle now 
firmly established in this jurisdiction that 
to entitle either party to modification of a 
decree of alimony or support money, that 
such party plead and prove a change in 
circumstances such as to require, in fairness
 t 
and equity, a change in the terms of the"? 
decree. Cody v. Cody, 47 Utah 456, 154, 
P. 952; Chaffee v. Chaffee, 63 Utah 261,^ 
225 P. 76; Rockwood v. Rockwood, 65 Utar^ 
261, 236 P. 457; Carson v. Carson, 87 Utah, 
1, 47 P2d 894; Jones v. Jones, 104 Utah 275, j 
139 P.2d 222; Gardner v. Gardner, Utah1; 
177 P.2d 743. In this case there has been: 
neither pleading nor proof of change of; 
circumstances. On the contrary, defendant^ 
expressly concedes, in his brief, that there^ 
were no charged conditions between the. 
date of the divorce decree and the petition 
for modification. Under the rule of the, 
cases above cited, the trial court could not_ 
properly make an order modifying the* 
decree. 
~ '\T 
What defendant is really contending issv 
that the alimony awarded by the interlock 
utory divorce decree was excessive. De-1 
fendant is in a poor position to complain. „ 
He stipulated to an alimony decree of $250 , 
per month, apparently without any expecta-( 
tion of ever complying with it. He is hard-
 4 
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ly \u a favorable position i\ow to assert 
that tlie alimony awarded is excessive. 
Courts are not to be trifled with by 
litigants. This is particularly true in di-
vorce cases, which, although not ordinarily 
involving problems of great legal magnitude, 
quite frequently involve social problems of 
the utmost delicacy and importance—prob-
lems of such nature that the state, as well 
as the litigants, has an interest in their 
solution. A freedom-seeking spouse may 
not, in his eagerness to be speedily released 
from his matrimonial bonds, make rash and 
reckless agreements and promises, upon 
which the court may rely in fixing the 
amount of alimony, and then return a. few 
months later and complain that the award 
for alimony is excessive or unfair. Such 
is apparently what was attempted in this 
case. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
MCDONOUGH, C. J., and LATIMER, 
J., concur. 
PRATT, Justice (concurring in the re-
sult). 
I concur in the result. One cannot es-
cape the conclusion that appellant has not 
acted in good faith in this matter. His rele-
gation of his family obligations to a posi-
tion of least importance in his scheme of 
life and his desire to acquire the divorce 
even at the expense of creating, by stipula-
tion, false impressions in the mind of the 
lower court as to his ability to pay alimony 
evidence a character weak in moral and 
ethical standards. As a result his incarcer-
ation for contempt does not strike any sym-
pathetic chord in the hearts of those who 
read about his case. However, if we are 
not careful we may confuse matters in 
our analysis by burying important points 
under a barrage of punitive ideas aimed at 
appellant. To overemphasize the idea that 
he has made his thorny bed and now he 
should lie in it, loses sight of the fact that 
if he does lie in it, his children may be the 
real sufferers. Be his character ever so 
weak, it is not bread and butter in their 
mouths to carry on the fiction of his ability 
to support to the extent the lower court 
found merely because he, in his selfishness 
vras v^Ty inst?<ar&tnt<i\ in initiating that 
fiction. They are certainly innocent victims 
in the case. 
. It is true that there is no actual change 
of circumstances shown that would sup-
port a modification of the decree, and for 
that reason I am constrained to concur in 
affirming the lower court's decision; but I 
do not feel that under proper circumstances 
it should require a great deal of evidence to 
change this decree to fit actual facts rather 
than possibilities,'if it will be to the in-
terests of the children to do so. 
In other words, if appellant in good 
faith acquires a position as fry cook that 
pays him only union wages, although it will 
not support alimony of $250 a month, should 
he not be allowed a modification of the de-
cree upon the theory of a change of cir-
cumstances; or is he to be limited in his 
emplo>ment to enough to pay $250 per 
month alimony, simply because the lower 
court accepted the implications of the stip-
ulation without inquiry into the actual facts 
of the case? It would seem to be to the 
best interests of all concerned to consider 
actualities in preference to possibilities, 
WADE, Justice (concurring in the re-
sult). 
I concur with the result for the reasons 
herein stated. 
I think the allegations of the petition of 
the defendant were sufficient to justify a 
finding that there has been a change in 
circumstances since the decree was entered 
requiring a reduction in the amount of the 
award of alimony and support money, but 
I do not think the evidence supports such 
a finding. Defendant's petition alleges in 
substance that the decree was entered on 
October 7, 1947, ordering petitioner to pay 
$250 per month alimony and support money; 
that the court made no findings of the 
amount of petitioner's earnings at the time 
but found him capable of earning $500 per 
month; and alleged that he was then not 
capable of earning in excess of $40 per 
week and that since February 15, 1947, he 
has earned less than $100 per month. This 
is not a statement that he was incapable 
of earning $500 per month at the time of 
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the decree and even if it were,, the decree 
judicially'determined that'question and for 
the purpose of this appeal neither the par-
ties thereto or the courts can go behind that 
determination. 'But the petition alleges that 
he is now incapable of earning in excess 
of $40 per week In my opinion, that is a 
sufficient 'allegation of a change of cir-
cumstances since the decree. 
However, I do not believe that the evi-
dence would justify a finding that there has 
been such a change in the circumstances 
since the decree to justify a reduction in the 
amount of the alimony and support mone> 
award. Plaintiff, in her original complaint, 
asked for separate maintenance. Therein 
she alleged that defendant is a capable 
manager of eating establishments and for 
a long time as such has earned in excess of 
$800 per month. Defendant answered by 
admitting that in the year 1946, as a mana-
ge r of eatmg establishments, he had earned 
an average of $760 per month, but alleged 
that he was then out of steady employment. 
Later plaintiff filed an amended complaint 
wherein she asked for a divorce but still 
retained the allegations as to his earning 
capacity, and defendant thereupon stipu-
lated that his default might be entered on 
condition that the award of alimony and 
support money should not exceed $250 per 
month. If the proof was in harmony with 
these allegations, the court could reason-
ably find that he was capable of earning 
$500 per month even though he was not 
steadily employed at the time. 
But now he testifies that he is only a fry 
cook with a union wage scale of only $40 
per week and actually not earning that 
much. He says that his girl friend, with 
whom he was keeping company prior to 
the divorce, purchased an eating establish-
ment on May f<5", 194?t ancf since tfiat time 
he has worked in that
 r establishment for 
his room, board, and clothing and a little 
spending money. He says that when this 
business gets on a paying basis, and his 
girl friend gets her bills paid off and he 
gets his bills paid off, he will then become 
a partner in the business and then he will 
be able to pay as much as $25 per week to 
the support of his former wife and children. 
In the meantime, he is only a fry cook, 
not a capable manager of eating establish-
ments and his earning capacity is iimited 
to $40 per week. He makes no claim that 
he has ever tried to obtain the kind of em-
ployment which he used to have or to get 
any other work than to work for his board 
and room and clothing where he now works. 
He says he owes about $200 in debts and 
indicates that he is not going to have any 
earnings until he' gets that paid off. He al-
so indicates that in the summer of 1948, 
which is now past, he will be able to pay 
something to his former wife and children. 
But that at the time of the hearing the 
business was not paying sufficient to justify 
him paying anything to that end. 
Under these circumstances the trial court 
was justified in holding that he had made 
no reasonable effort to comply with the 
order of the court and that there is no show-
ing that he is not capable of earning $500 
per month if he tried to do so. In other 
worefs, ne is o6vibus/y acting in 6ac/ fai'tn 
and the court was justified in refusing to be-
lieve that he is doing all he can or that 
his earning capacity has so suddenly de-
creased. 
I therefore concur with the result 
o | KT MUMMR mrtM, 
ERKMAN v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMIS-
SION OF PROVO CITY et al. 
No. 7120. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Oct. 7, 1948. 
I. Municipal corporations <§=3l85<7) 
Charges fifed with city civif service 
Commission by police chief against dis-
charged officer, sufficiently informed officer 
that conduct which would be relied upon to 
Support order of chief discharging officer 
Was officer's appearance before and state-
ment to city commission demanding the re-
moval of chief and another officer for ad-
mitted parts in transactions whereby tires 
ho longer usable on emergency vehicles, 
were placed in hands of persons not en-
titled to have tires. U.CA.1943, 15—9—21. 
PORTER v. 
ate as 577 
celling of reasons.7 Consistent with that 
>olicy, upon our analysis of the undisputed 
acts shown here, it is our opinion that it 
ihould be ruled as a matter of law that 
>ecause of his failure to timely act thereon, 
:he executor should be deemed to have 
waived any right conferred in the will to 
direct the disposal of the deceased's remains 
and that he should remain buried where he 
is.8 
Our conclusion as just stated on the issue 
of waiver renders it unnecessary to consider 
the appellant's (objector's) further conten-
tions. 
Reversed, 
costs. 
The parties to bear their own 
MAUGHAN, WILKINS and HALL, JJ., 
concur. 
ELLETT, C. J., concurs in result. 
Anne W. PORTER, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Don L. PORTER, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 15073. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 15, 1978. 
Appeal was taken from an order of the 
Fourth District Court, Utah County, Allen 
B. Sorensen, J., granting judgment in favor 
of a wife in a divorce action, and awarding 
custody of the two children of the parties 
and child support to the wife, and visitation 
privileges to the husband. The Supreme 
7. See King v. Frame, 204 Iowa 1074, 216 N.W. 
630 (1927), cited in 21 A.L.R.2d at page 476, see 
also annotation commencing at 472. 
PORTER Utah m 
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Court, Maughan, J., held that: (1) the trial 
court properly found jurisdiction on the ba-
sis of the husband's bona fide residency in 
the county, but (2) considering that the 
husband would be required to travel from 
Utah to Texas in order to visit the children, 
the allowed visitation hours, occurring only 
the first and third Saturdays of each month 
between the hours of 2 p. m. and 8 p. m., 
were too restrictive and the cause would be 
remanded for the purpose of having the 
trial judge order periods long enough to 
justify the husband making the long trip 
required. 
Remanded. 
1. Divorce <s=*139% 
In divorce action, district court in Utah 
County properly found jurisdiction on basis 
of bona fide residency of husband in Utah 
County, even though wife's complaint al-
leged only that she was herself bona fide 
resident of Utah County and husband, in his 
answer, admitted such allegation, where, 
had court's ruling on residency been ad-
verse to wife, she could have immediately 
filed another complaint based on husband's 
residency. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 
15(b). 
2. Divorce <s=>299, 312.7 
Trial court order, which was no doubt 
influenced by ages of children at time of 
trial, permitting former husband total of 26 
visitation days per year, on first and third 
Saturdays of each month between hours 2 
p. m. and 8 p. m., was too restrictive and 
would be remanded for purposes of having 
trial judge order other and more reasonable 
visitation privileges, in view of increased 
ages of children and considering fact that 
former husband would be required to travel 
from Utah to Texas in order to see children; 
visitation periods should be long enough to 
justify former husband making long trip. 
Don L. Bybee, Salt Lake City, for defend-
ant and appellant. 
8. Fowlkes v. Fowlkes, Tex.Civ.App., 133 
S.W.2d 241 (1939), cited in Jackson, The Law 
of Cadavers 2d 1950, at page 117. 
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Cullen Y. Christensen, Provo, for plaintiff 
and respondent. 
MAUGHAN, Justice: 
Before us is a judgment granting to 
plaintiff a divorce, custody of the two chil-
dren of the parties, child support, and visi-
tation privileges to defendant. We affirm, 
but remand for modification of visitation 
privileges. No costs awarded. All statuto-
ry references are to U.C.A. 1953, the rule 
citation is to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The principal issue here is whether the 
court had jurisdiction. We deal only with 
that and the visitation issue, the issue as to 
the propriety of the divorce and custody is 
without merit 
In May 1976 plaintiff paid a visit to her 
parents in Dickinson, Texas. While there 
she decided to obtain a divorce. The record 
also indicates that sometime, about the 
second week in June 1976, she decided to 
relocate permanently in Dickinson. Never-
theless, on July 2, 1976, she filed her com-
plaint in Utah County alleging herself to be 
an actual and bona fide resident of Utah 
County, and for a period of more than 3 
months immediately preceding the filing of 
the complaint. Defendant, in his answer, 
admitted this allegation. He now calls into 
question plaintiff's residency, and claims 
the court lacked jurisdiction because of it. 
If there is any question about jurisdic-
tional residency of plaintiff, there can be 
absolutely no question about the bona fide 
residency of defendant in Utah County, and 
the state of Utah, for the required period of 
time; and the court so found. 
Pursuant to Rule 15(b) issues which are 
not raised by the pleadings but "are tried 
by express or implied consent of the parties 
. shall be treated in all respects as 
if they had been raised in the pleadings." 
The evidence before the trial court concern-
ing defendant's residency showed clearly 
the statute had been satisfied, and such 
evidence was unrefuted. In the General 
1. Utah, 545 P.2d 502, 506 (1976). 
2. Buehner Block Co. v. Glezos, 6 Utah 2d 226, 
310 P.2d 517, 519 (1957). 
Ins. Co. of America v. Carnicero Dynasty 
Corp.1 we said "implied consent may be 
found where one party raises an issue mate-
rial to the other party's case, or where 
evidence is introduced without objection." 
[1] Had the court's ruling on residency 
been adverse to plaintiff, she could have 
immediately filed another complaint based 
on defendant's residency.2 Thus, the trial 
court's ruling expedited the judicial process 
since the issue could be "conveniently and 
effectively handled in one trial without in-
jury to substantive rights."3 
The court allowed defendant a total of 26 
visitation days per year. These days could 
only occur on the first and third Saturdays 
of each month between the hours of 2 p. m. 
and 8 p. m. Considering the distance de-
fendant must travel from Utah to Texas, 
and the limited time he is allowed to see his 
children, we think such an arrangement is 
too restrictive. No doubt the court was 
influenced by the ages of the children at 
time of trial. 
[2] In view of the increased ages of the 
children, we remand for the purpose of 
having the trial judge order other and more 
reasonable visitation privileges. Such peri-
ods should be long enough to justify de-
fendant making the long trip from his home 
to Dickinson, Texas. But for this modifica-
tion the decree is affirmed. 
ELLETT, C. J., and CROCKETT, WIL-
KINS and HALL, JJ.f concur. 
O I KEYNUMBERSYSTEM 
3. Jackson v. Cope, 1 Utah 2d 330, 266 P 2d 500, 
503 (1954). 
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teen, had the effect of imposing majority 
upon both males and females at age eigh-
teen. The amendment to Section 15-2-1 
has served to further clarify the status of 
Utah law and establishes as a matter of 
public policy the age of majority for both 
sexes at age eighteen. 
The Court again holds, for the purposes 
of this case only, males are to be treated as 
adults at age eighteen, rather than with-
holding the privilege of adulthood to the 
female person in this lawsuit until age 21, 
and this case shall have no retroactive ef-
fect 
Reversed and remanded with direction to 
enter judgment in favor of plaintiff for 
costs only in the amount of $437.38. 
WILKINS, J., concurs. 
CROCKETT, Justice: (concurring with 
the decision, but with separate comments.) 
It is my conviction from which I am 
unwilling to depart, that the setting of the 
age of attaining majority is a legislative 
function. Furthermore, that so long as the 
legislature has determined that there is a 
reasonable basis for differentiation of 
classes, and all persons within the same 
class are treated equal, there is no imper-
missible discrimination. It is not my under-
standing that our "age of majority statute" 
has been declared invalid, but rather that 
the Stanton I decision said that our statute 
should be applied without discrimination on 
the basis of sex. 
This court remanded this case to our dis-
trict court under that mandate. That court 
ruled that in applying the statute equally to 
both sexes the age of majority should be 21. 
My agreement with the instant opinion that 
that ruling was not properly applied in this 
case is based on two propositions: First, the 
reasons stated therein. Second and more 
important in my mind is something which 
seems to have been forgotten or overlooked. 
This is a case in equity, a controversy 
between two individuals, not as to current 
and ongoing support money for a minor 
child, but for an alleged accumulation of 
past due support money of $100 per month 
RICE Utah 305 
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for three years, totalling $3,600, claimed to 
have accrued under a divorce decree which 
made no such order;, and which could not 
by any logic or reason in law or equity be 
construed to have so provided. 
I reiterate with the firmest possible con-
viction that in my judgment it would be 
wholly discordant to principles of equity 
and justice to impose such an unexpected 
and unplanned for burden upon the defend-
ant by an ex post facto change of the rules 
after the entry of the decree. To avoid 
repetition here, in support of what I have 
said herein I refer to the main and concur-
ring opinions in our prior decision in this 
case, Utah, 1976, 552 P.2d 112, and authori-
ties therein cited. 
ELLETT, Chief Justice: (concurring and 
dissenting). 
I concur, except that I think costs should 
be awarded to the prevailing party pursu-
ant to Rule 54(dXl), U.R.C.P. The defend-
ant is the prevailing party and should have 
his costs. 
MAUGHAN, Justice: (dissenting). 
For reasons stated in my dissenting opin-
ion in Stanton v. Stanton, Utah, 552 P.2d 
112, 116 (1976), I again dissent. 
( o f KCY«UMB£RSYSTEM> 
Glenn A. RICE, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, -
v, 
Kristie Lee RICE, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 14748. 
Supreme Uourt of Utah. 
May 5, 1977. 
Natural mother, who had remarried, 
sought custody of two-year-old daughter, 
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custody of whom had been awarded to fa-
ther on divorce. The Second District Court, 
Davis County, J. Duffy Palmer, J., left con-
trol with the father, and the mother appeal-
ed. The Supreme Court, Ellett, C. J., held 
that although both parties had remarried 
and established similarly modest living 
styles the mother was not entitled to any 
statutory presumption of preference. 
Affirmed. 
Crockett, J., filed concurring opinion in 
which Maughan, J., joined. 
Wilkins and Hall, JJ., concurred in re-
sult. 
1. Infants <s=> 19.2(2), 19.3(2) 
Considerable discretion is allowed the 
trial court in child custody matters; con-
trolling factor is the best interest and wel-
fare of the child. (Per Ellett, C. J., with 
one Judge concurring, two Judges concur-
ring in result and one Judge specially con-
curring.) U.C.A.1953, 30-3-10. 
2. Infants e=>19.1 
Child custody proceedings are and 
should be equitable in the highest degree. 
(Per Ellett, C. J., with one Judge concur-
ring, two Judges concurring in result and 
one Judge specially concurring.) 
3. Divorce <s=>303(2) 
Although following divorce both moth-
er and father remarried and reestablished 
similarly modest living styles, the mother, 
seeking custody of two-year*old daughter, 
was not entitled to any statutory presump-
tion or preference of custody; likewise, no 
special preference was available to the 
mother since all factors were not compara-
tively equal in that division of family serv-
ices report expressed serious reservations 
about the mother's ability to adequately 
meet the child's needs. (Per Ellett, C. J., 
with one Judge concurring, two Judges con-
curring in result and one Judge specially 
concurring). U.C.A.1953, 30-5-10. 
1. Section 30-3-10, UCA1953, 2d Replace-
ment Vol 3, Hyde v. Hyde, 22 Utah 2d 429, 
454 P2d 884 (1969), Arends v Arends, 30 
Utah 2d 328, 517 P.2d 1019 (1974); Baker v 
Brian R. Florence, Florence & Hutchison, 
Ogden, for defendant and appellant 
Melvin C. Wilson, Kaysville, for plaintiff 
and respondent 
ELLETT, Chief Justice: 
The parties to this appeal were divorced 
on August 26, 1975, at which time the fa-
ther, respondent here, was awarded the 
temporary care, custody, and control of 
their then two-year-old daughter. The 
mother subsequently, pursuant to the terms 
of the divorce decree, requested an order to 
show cause why she should not be awarded 
custody of the child. At the second hearing 
the lower court refused to change the con-
trol of the minor child and left her with the 
father. The mother appeals that decree. 
The precise issue before this Court is 
whether or not the district court abused its 
discretion by granting custody of the minor 
child to the respondent. 
[1] Our statutes and case law are con-
sistent and clear with respect to the con-
siderable discretion allowed the trial court 
in child custody matters, with the control-
ling factor being that which is in the best 
interest and welfare of the minor child.1 
[2] Child custody proceedings are and 
should be equitable in the highest degree. 
At the hearing from which this appeal was 
taken, the trial court received evidence in-
ter alia from the Division of Family Serv-
ices which investigated the family condi-
tions of both appellant and respondent. 
Two separate reports were filed, one en-
dorsing the extremely good job respondent 
has done in raising his daughter; and the 
second expressing serious reservations 
about the mother's present and future abili-
ty to adequately meet the child's needs 
The first report concluded that to remove 
the daughter from her present environment 
and ask her to adjust to a new one would 
Baker, 25 Utah 2d 337, 481 P2d 672 (1971), 
Sampsell v Holt, 115 Utah 73, 202 P2d 550 
(1959) 
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only be foolhardy at best. The court appar-
ently chose to believe the evidence present-
ed by the agents of the Division of Family 
Services. 
[3] While the evidence shows that both 
parties have remarried and reestablished 
similarly modest living styles, we do not 
feel that the mother as such is entitled to 
any statutory presumption of preference. 
We have formerly held2 that this presump-
tion in Section 30-5-10s does not apply to 
divorce cases. 
We also recognize that no special prefer-
ence is available to the mother in this case 
because all factors are not comparatively 
equal4 according to the Division of Family 
Services' evaluation and other evidence be-
fore this Court. 
On the basis of the standard rules favor-
ing the findings and determination of the 
trial court in such matters, the decree of 
the district court is affirmed. Costs are 
awarded to the respondent. 
MAUGHAN, J., concurs in main opinion 
and also in concurring opinion of CROCK-
ETT, J. 
WILKINS and HALL, JJ., concur in re-
sult. 
CROCKETT, Justice: (concurring, with 
added comment). 
It is true that this court has pointed out 
that Sec. 30-3-10, U.C.A.1953, relates ex-
pressly to cases of separation;l however, as 
clearly pointed out in Steiger v. Steiger* 
through Chief Justice McDonough in apply-
ing the general equitable powers granted in 
Sec. 30-3-5, U.C.A.1953: 
This court has stated that a divorced 
mother has no absolute right to the custo-
dy of minor children . but the 
policy of our decisions has been to give 
weight to the view that all things being 
equal, preference should be given to the 
2. Arends v. Arends, supra, Note 1. 
3. U C.A 1953, Replacement Vol. 3. 
4. Smith v. Smith, Utah, 564 P.2d 307 (1977). 
SMITH Utah 307 
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mother in awarding custody of a child of 
tender years, . , .. And this view is 
based upon the oft-stated purpose of the 
award of custody to provide for the 
child's best interests and welfare, 
[Citing authorities.] 
In my opinion this is the sound view on the 
problem and represents a correct statement 
of law. 
Randy SMITH, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Linda K. Jacobson SMITH, Defendant 
and Respondent 
No. 14695. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
May 6, 1977. 
Former husband appealed from an or-
der of the Second District Court, Weber 
County, Calvin Gould, J., taking custody of 
two children from him and awarding custo-
dy to his former wife. The Supreme Court, 
Crockett, J., held that: (1) evidence that 
the former wife was sick and upset at the 
time she consented to the divorce, but was 
Subsequently in good health, was married to 
a man who loved her and the children and 
would treat them well and had a suitable 
home and sufficient income to provide for 
the children, was sufficient to establish a 
change of circumstances and warrant modi-
fying the divorce decree; however, (2) the 
trial judge was in error in referring to a 
statutory presumption of a natural mother 
to custody of children of tender years and 
she had no absolute right to their custody. 
1. See Arends v. Arends, footnote 2 main opin-
ion, and cases therein cited including Sampsell 
v. Holt, 115 Utah 73, 202 P.2d 550, exposition 
thereon by Justice Wolfe. 
2. 4 Utah 2d 273, 293 P.2d 418. 
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only be foolhardy at best. The court appar-
ently chose to believe the evidence present-
ed by the agents of the Division of Family 
Services. 
[3] While the evidence shows that both 
parties have remarried and reestablished 
similarly modest living styles, we do not 
feel that the mother as such is entitled to 
any statutory presumption of preference. 
We have formerly held * that this presump-
tion in Section 30-3-10 * does not apply to 
divorce cases. 
We also recognize that no special prefer-
ence is available to the mother in this case 
because all factors are not comparatively 
equal4 according to the Division of Family 
Services' evaluation and other evidence be-
fore this Court 
On the basis of the standard rules favor-
ing the findings and determination of the 
trial court in such matters, the decree of 
the district court is affirmed. Costs are 
awarded to the respondent 
MAUGHAN, J., concurs in main opinion 
and also in concurring opinion of CROCK-
ETT, J. 
WILKINS and HALL, JJ., concur in re-
sult. 
CROCKETT, Justice: (concurring, with 
added comment). 
It is true that this court has pointed out 
that Sec. 30-3-10, U.C.A.1953, relates ex-
pressly to cases of separation;l however, as 
clearly pointed out in Steiger v. Steiger2 
through Chief Justice McDonough in apply-
ing the general equitable powers granted in 
Sec. 30-3-5, U.C.A.1953: 
This court has stated that a divorced 
mother has no absolute right to the custo-
dy of minor children . . . but the 
policy of our decisions has been to give 
weight to the view that all things being 
equal, preference should be given to the 
2. Arends v. Mends, supra, Note 1. 
3. U C A 1953, Replacement Vol. 3. 
4. Smith v. Smith, Utah, 564 P.2d 307 (1977). 
SMITH Utah 307 
P.24307 
mother in awarding custody of a child of 
tender years, . .. And this view is 
based upon the oft-stated purpose of the 
award of custody to provide for the 
child's best interests and welfare, . .. 
[Citing authorities.] 
In my opinion this is the sound view on the 
problem and represents a correct statement 
of law. 
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Randy SMITH, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Linda K. Jacobson SMITH, Defendant 
and Respondent 
No. 14695. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
May 6, 1977. 
Former husband appealed from an or-
der of the Second District Court, Weber 
County, Calvin Gould, J., taking custody of 
two children from him and awarding custo-
dy to his former wife. The Supreme Court, 
Crockett, J., held that: (1) evidence that 
the former wife was sick and upset at the 
time she consented to the divorce, but was 
Subsequently in good health, was married to 
a man who loved her and the children and 
would treat them well and had a suitable 
home and sufficient income to provide for 
the children, was sufficient to establish a 
change of circumstances and warrant modi-
fying the divorce decree; however, (2) the 
trial judge was in error in referring to a 
statutory presumption of a natural mother 
to custody of children of tender years and 
she had no absolute right to their custody. 
1. See Arends v. Arends, footnote 2 mam opin-
ion, and cases therein cited including Sampsell 
v. Holt, 115 Utah 73, 202 P.2d 550, exposition 
thereon by Justice Wolfe. 
2. 4 Utah 2d 273, 293 P.2d 418. 
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Remanded. 
Hall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, the 
result of which was concurred in by Wil-
kins, J. 
1. Divorce <*=»172 
Even in divorce matters, where court 
has continuing jurisdiction to make subse-
quent orders with respect to children and 
property rights as may be equitable and 
just, where there has been adjudication 
upon one set of facts, that should be res 
judicata thereon and there should be no 
modification of such adjudication unless it 
is shown that there is some substantial 
change in circumstances that would war-
rant doing so. 
2. Divorce *=*303(7) 
Evidence that former wife was sick and 
upset at time she consented to divorce, but 
was subsequently in good health, was mar-
ried to man who loved her and children and 
who would treat them well and that she 
had suitable home and sufficient income to 
provide for children, was sufficient showing 
of change of circumstances to warrant 
changing custody of children from former 
husband to former wife. 
3. Parent and Child <*=>2(3-2, 8) 
There was no statutory presumption 
that natural mother had right to custody of 
children of tender years, nor did she have 
any absolute right to their custody. 
4. Divorce *=>303(1) 
Award of custody of children in divorce 
proceeding is not permanent, but if circum-
stances change so that their welfare and 
best interests would be served thereby, 
court has continuing jurisdiction and au-
thority to make appropriate changes. 
PeteN. Vlahos, of Vlahos & Knowlton, 
Ogden, for plaintiff and appellant. 
Russell J. Hadley, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and respondent. 
CROCKETT, Justice: 
Plaintiff, Randy Smith, appeals from an 
order in proceedings supplemental to a di-
vorce in which the trial court took custody 
of the couple's two children, now. aged 8 
and 3, from him and awarded custody to his 
former wife, Linda K. Jacobson Smith (now 
Moore). 
Plaintiff contends (1) that there was not 
a sufficient showing of a change of circum-
stances to warrant modifying the decree; 
(2) that defendant has no absolute right to 
custody of minor children under ten years 
of age. 
The plaintiff and defendant were married 
in North Salt Lake, Utah on March 23, 
1968. Plaintiff filed this divorce action on 
August 23, 1975. On that same day, de-
fendant signed a waiver consenting to the 
entry of her default and that custody of the 
children be awarded to the plaintiff; and 
upon an ex-parte hearing, Judge Ronald 0. 
Hyde of the Second District Court granted 
plaintiff a divorce, made a division of the 
parties' property and awarded him custody 
of the two children. A motion by the de-
fendant Linda to set aside the judgment, 
seeking modification of the decree as to 
property, and asking for custody of the 
children, was denied. 
On October 10, 1975, plaintiff remarried 
to Vickie Smith. On November 1, 1975, 
defendant remarried to Randy Moore. On 
November 10, 1975, defendant filed a peti-
tion to modify the decree. The matter 
came before Judge Calvin Gould of the 
same court and he ordered an investigation 
of both homes. The report gave them both 
a favorable evaluation as to custody of the 
children; and showed the plaintiff's home 
to have a combined monthly income of 
$1,296 and the defendant's $1,380. Both 
parties rely on the report as supporting 
their claims to custody of the children. 
Upon his appraisal of the total situation, 
Judge Gould concluded that it would be in 
the best interest of the children to be in the 
custody of their mother, defendant Linda, 
but with liberal visitation rights to their 
father, plaintiff Randy, which includes as 
minimums: one 24-hour period each week-
SMITH v. 
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end, one 2-hour evening period each week, 
one month during the summer school recess, 
with an equal division of holidays. 
" [1] As to (1) above, we agree that even 
in divorce matters, where the court has 
continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent 
orders with respect to the children and 
property rights as may be equitable and 
just,1 when there has been an adjudication 
upon one set of facts, that should be res 
adjudicata thereon; and there should be no 
modification of such an adjudication unless 
it is shown that there is some substantial 
change in circumstances that would war-
rant doing so.2 
[2] The trial judge appears to have act-
ed in full awareness of and in conformity 
with this rule. The changes of circum-
stances claimed by the defendant Linda 
upon which the trial court based the change 
in the decree are: that whereas defendant 
was sick and upset at the time she consent-
ed to the divorce, she is now in good health; 
is married to a man who loves her and the 
children and who will treat them well; that 
they have a suitable home and sufficient 
income to provide for them. 
[3] As to (2) above: there is no doubt 
about the correctness of the plaintiff's con-
tention that the trial judge was in error in 
referring to the "statutory presumption of 
a natural mother" to custody of children of 
tender years; and that she has no absolute 
right to their custody. However, appropri-
ate to be considered on this problem is the 
fact that, irrespective of any statute, the 
invariably declared policy stated in our de-
cisions is that "all things else being equal, 
preference should be given to the mother in 
awarding custody of children of tender 
years [and this is true even 
when] . . the divorce is granted to 
the father."8 
1. Sec. 30-3-5, U C.A 1953. 
2. Anderson v. Anderson, 13 Utah 2d 36, 368 
P.2d 264; Perkins v. Perkins, 522 P2d 708 
(Utah). 
3. So stated for this court through Justice Ellett 
in Hyde v. Hyde, 22 Utah 2d 429, 454 P.2d 884 
SMITH Utah 309 
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[4] The trial court seems to have exer-
cised considerable care to make what in his 
judgment was the best possible arrange-
ment as to the custody of these children, in 
full awareness of the disappointing and dis-
heartening effects it may have upon some 
of the parties involved, but with greater 
consideration for the welfare of the chil-v 
dren. In that regard, it is further appropri-
ate to have in mind that an award of custo-
dy of children in a divorce proceeding is not 
permanent. If circumstances change so 
that their welfare and best interests would 
be served thereby, the court has continuing 
jurisdiction and authority to make appropri-
ate changes.4 
We have no way of knowing whether the 
distinction between the "statutory pre-
sumption" and the natural presumption, or 
policy of the law, as explained above would 
make any difference to the determination 
and arrangement which appears to have 
been carefully considered and arrived at by 
the trial court. However, the plaintiff has 
correctly pointed out that the trial court 
was in error in stating that there is a "stat-
utory presumption" in favor of the defend-
ant in regard to custody of these children; 
and that he is entitled to have an adjudica-
tion thereon without applying any such 
statutory presumption. This controversy 
has been fully tried and considered by 
Judge Calvin Gould and it seems inadvisa-
ble that the parties and the courts be put to 
the necessity of a plenary re-trial. This 
case is therefore remanded to Judge Gould 
for the purpose of giving any further con-
sideration to this matter he deems advisa-
ble, not inconsistent with the views ex-
pressed herein. 
Remanded. No costs awarded. 
ELLETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN, J., con-
cur. 
and authorities cited therein, and see also 
McBroom v. McBroom, 14 Utah 2d 393, 384 
P.2d 961. 
4. See Sec 30-3-5, footnote 1 above, and see 
also Cox v Cox, 532 P2d 994 (Utah) 
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HALL, Justice (dissenting): 
I respectfully'dissent * One need only 
urn to the memorandum decision of Judge 
rould to ascertain that the change of custo-
y was made on a basis previouslyj con-
idered by this court"and found to be waht>-
lg.1 The provisions of Judge Gould's order 
hat are pertinent here read as follows: 
I find as a fact that the defendant 
mother did not sign her Stipulation under 
duress or coercion, but that her signature 
thereon was a free and voluntary act; 
but that this order of child custody is 
based on materially changed circumstanc-
es since the Decree, to wit: 
1. The remarriage of the defendant; 
2. The acquisition of the new home by 
defendant and her husband; and the de-
cision is based upon what the court con-
siders to be the best interest of the chil-
dren on a finding that the parties are on 
an equal footing with respect to being 
able to care for the children, but the 
mother being accorded the statutory pre-
sumption of a natural mother. [Empha-
sis added.] 
In Arends, supra note 1, Justice Ellett, 
peaking for a unanimous court, determined 
hat the statutory provision of Section 30-
t—10, U.C.A. 1953, relied upon by the trial 
ourt, has no application to divorce cases 
tnd that the section applicable is 30-3-5, 
J.C.A. 1953, which reads: 
When a decree of divorce is made, the 
court may make such orders in relation to 
children, property and parties, and the 
maintenance of the parties and children 
as may be equitable, . . . . 
The court further stated that in divorce 
jases the welfare of the minor children is of 
mramount importance in determining cus-
tody, citing Sampsell v. Holt2 wherein it 
vas said: 
l. Arends v. Arends, 30 Utah 2d 328, 517 P.2d 
1019 (1974). 
L 115 Utah 73, 202 P.2d 550 (1949). 
I. 7 Utah 2d 263, 323 P.2d 16 (1958). 
I. Cody v Cody, Al Utah 456, 154 P. 952 (1916), 
Anderson v. Anderson, 13 Utah 2d 36, 368 P.2d 
Child custody proceedings are equitable 
in the highest degree, and this court has 
consistently held that the best interests 
and welfare of the minor child is the 
controlling factor in every case.^ 
, The case of Johnson v. Johnson* is sup-
portive of the same proposition and Justice 
Crockett, speaking for the court, stated it 
as follows: 
. . . it likewise exemplifies the 
wisdom of the prior adjudications of this 
court that questions of custody are al-
ways equitable and that the controlling 
consideration is the welfare of the chil-
dren involved. . . . Parental love 
must find expression, to some extent at 
least, in sacrifice for the happiness and 
welfare of the children, rather than in 
merely insisting upon privileges of par-
enthood. [Emphasis added.] 
Moving now to the real issue of whether 
or not a substantial change of circumstanc-
es was shown as to warrant a change of 
custody, the main opinion aptly observes 
that when there has been an adjudication 
upon one set of facts that should be res 
judicata and there should be no modifica-
tion unless it is shown there are some sub-
stantial changes that would warrant doing 
so. The cases are replete in regard to what 
constitutes a showing of substantial change 
of circumstances, but none say the acquisi-
tion of a new marriage partner and a house 
are adequate.4 
The main opinion recites that at the time 
defendant consented and agreed that plain-
tiff should have custody she was "sick and 
upset." Such is contrary to the specific 
finding of Judge Gould, supra. Also, it is to 
be noted that defendant moved to vacate 
and set aside the initial decree on such 
grounds, and others, but was denied such 
relief by Judge Hyde, which prompted the 
264 (1962); Johnson v. Johnson, 7 Utah 2d 263, 
323 P.2d 16 (1958); Robinson v. Robinson, 15 
Utah 2d 293, 391 P.2d 434 (1964); Perkins v. 
Perkins, Utah, 522 P.2d 708; Rogwh v. Rogich, 
299 P.2d 91 (Idaho 1956); Wamecke v. War-
necke, 28 Wash.2d 259, 182 P.2d 699, Hennck-
son v. Hennckson, 358 P.2d 507 (Or. 1960). 
SMITH v. 
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present proceeding to modify the decree. 
No appeal was taken therefrom. 
In Cody, supra note 4, Justice Frick, 
speaking for the court, treated the issue as 
follows: 
Where a party is dissatisfied with the 
original allowance or distribution of prop-
erty, or the disposal of the children, he 
must prosecute a timely appeal to review 
the courts orders or decrees in that re-
gard, and in such cases the review must 
be had upon the evidence adduced upon 
the original hearing. 
Cody, supra, was referred to in Anderson 
v. Anderson, supra, note 4, and Justice 
McDonough stated: 
. . . Title 30-3-5, U.C.A.1953, 
contemplates an opportunity for divorced 
litigants to come into court for modifica-
tion of the original decree based on 
changed conditions, and that any dissatis-
faction with such decree is a matter of 
appeal. Absent an appeal, it is not sub-
ject to modification except where 
changed conditions are demonstrated. 
[Emphasis added.] 
The upshot of the main opinion is that if 
a mother does recognize the fitness of the 
father as a custodial parent, and consents 
thereto, and the court relies thereon, that it 
must thereafter alter custody if she later 
decides to exercise the claimed "natural 
presumption" as to her better fitness, and 
that same court is obligated to respect her 
change of heart. Such is not the law and 
this court should not now so hold. 
Much is to be said for the ability of not 
only litigants to be able to rely upon custo-
dy orders, but also for children to be able to 
place reliance on them so that they will not 
be uprooted at the whim of one parent who 
may be only presently doing well with a 
new marriage. Robinson v. Robinson, su-
pra note 4, is a case specifically in point. 
There the trial court denied a petition of a 
divorced wife to have custody of minor 
children taken from her former husband. 
On appeal, this court sustained the order 
adopting the following language: 
Notwithstanding the desires and con-
tentions of the parties, the welfare of the 
SMITH Utah 3 H 
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children is one of the primary concerns of 
the courts. Steiger v. Steiger, 4 Utah 2d 
273, 293 P.2d 418. In that regard impor-
tant considerations are the facts that at 
the time of the divorce they were award-
ed to the father where they have since 
resided; and they have known no other 
home. Where the custody has been de-
termined and the children appear to be 
comparatively well adjusted and happy, 
they should not be compelled to change 
their home unless there appears some 
substantial reason for doing so. Other 
circumstances being equal, this require-
ment would not be satisfied by the mere 
fact that economic circumstances may be 
better with the other spouse. [Emphasis 
added.] 
The Oregon case, Henrickson v. Henrick-
son, supra note -4, holds that every child 
custody order is res judicata and in any 
later modification the moving party must 
bear the burden of showing that it would 
enhance the welfare of the child. The Ida-
ho case, Rogich v. Rogich, and the Wash-
ington case, Warnecke v. Warnecke, supra, 
note 4, also adopt the same criteria, i.e., the 
welfare of the child is the sole matter with 
which the court is concerned and not with 
the whims of the parents. 
Now looking back to the trial judge's 
order and deleting therefrom the statutory 
presumption indulged in that is not applica-
ble, though lip service was made of materi-
ally changed circumstances, there actually 
are none since only the new marriage and 
the new house remain. Otherwise, each 
parent is on equal footing and the order 
changing custody should be reversed. 
WILKINS, J., concurs in result of Justice 
HALL's dissent. 
rw 
O & KEY NUMBER SYSTEM EM> 
~STEVENS v. SOUTH OGDEtf LiCSD^BUILDING & IMP. CO, Si 
P, Sand ^reduce them - to * essential -aiie-
pfstatutes to generally«facilitate * the 
$$ procedure, and preclude defendants 
i t ing advantage of mere technicalities, 
*do not prejudice them. '^Where there 
Infa legal conviction, but an erroneous 
idt-thereon, which resulted,*according 
law, in a discharge of the convict on 
^jloflhe Judgment,-a law enacted isub-
uJit^o the commission of the crime, that, 
ftich'a reversal, the court in which the 
.fiction was had should, on return of the 
Srd,'pass such sentence thereon as the ap-
iW**court should direct, was not an er 
jfcfacto law." Marion v. State, 20 Neb. 
|j>29 N. W. 911; Gut v. State, 9 Wall. 35; 
Ehcan v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 377, 14 Sup. 
>570; Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386. 
Upon examination of the record, we find 
terror in the ruling of the court admitting 
ffdence objected to by the defendant, or in 
jy^portions of the charge excepted to. We 
|o%ot deem it necessary to particularly ex-
hiine in this opinion such alleged errors. 
^e^flnd no errors against the defendant in 
Sis record. Therefore the Judgment of the 
ourt below Is affirmed. 
ITCH and MINER, JJ., concur. ' ' 
groan, itt) - » .. • •» 
EVENS et al. v. SOUTH OGDEN LAND, 
BUILDING & IMPROVEMENT CO. et al 
upreme Court of Utah, Dec 9, 1896.) 
lEPpKATioNS—-OFFICERS— ACTION FOB FBATO— 
PARTIES—RECEIVERS. 
i*When the same persons, officers of several 
prorations, form a fraudulent design to use 
•the property and credit of such corporations for {their own advantage, to the injury of the other 
Stockholders, and do fraudulent acts in carrying 
Rut'such design, all the parties affected by such 
Nets are proper parties to & complaint based up-
BpJEftuch fraudulent design. The persons perpe-
Brating the fraud, and all others whose gains or 
Bosses are traceable thereto, are proper parties 
Ignta action based upon fraud. ij£L * "**- ' 
•p2.<When a fraudulent /conspiracy is the •com-|mon point of litigation, the conspirators and all (persons affected by the fraud are proper parties 
Ro*a suit based upon it v ' * - '* • 
H o . When the business of corporations is mis-
managed, and their property is misappropriated |by-their officers, and such mismanagement and jgisappropnation is likely to continue, courts of 
•**uity will appoint receivers for them. ' * 
Syllabus by the Court) » a w ^ * 
Appeal from district court, Weber county; H.* 
LRolapp, Judge. \
 { *\,^ . i 
Action by Sidney Stevens and others against 
jtpe South Ogden Land ,^ Building & Improve-
ment Company and others, to set aside convey-
and for the appbbtment lot a^recelver. 
>m a Judgment sustaining *a demurrer to ^ the! 
^mplalnt, plaintiffs appeal. Reversed/^%^ , 
^ L. R. Rhodes, for appellants, t Evans & Rog-
and A. G. Horn, for .respondents. ^  ^ ,t ' 
'ZANB, 0. J. The courVbeW having sus-
Wned a demurrer to the complaints and plain-* 
V . 4 7 p . n n 1 _ A 
tiffs having failed to amend, the court'entered a 
-Judgment ^dismissing *the action,' from #whlch 
the plaintiffs have taken this appeal.jf*8£te$fc£g 
^The complaint contains numerous allegations," 
among*whieh -are*«the following:U^That Mhe 
South|Ogden"Land, -Building & Improvement 
Company^was'incorporated onthen18th day^of 
Apriy-1892,*with authority to l)uy and sell real' 
estate,touildiroads, parks, hotels, railways, bou-. 
levards,*pleasure resorts, and do a general con-' 
tracting and building business, to construct wa-
ter ditches, canals, aqueducts, reservoirs, and 
lay and construct water works, and to build 
power dams 'for propelling machinery,, and 
everything necessarily incident to the transac-
tion of such business; that the business was re-
quired to be conducted according to the articles 
of incorporation, and its by-laws; that the num-
ber of shares in the company were 5,000, of 
which Sidney Stevens subscribed for 1,646 
shares, Sidney O. and Frank J. Stevens 10 
shares each, Solomon C. and William J. Steph-
ens 1,666 shares each, and David Kay 2 shares; 
'that the capital stock of the corporation consist-
ed of numerous lots and tracts of real estate, 
described in the complaint; that it was further 
provided that Sidney Stevens, William J. Steph-
ens, Solomon C. Stephens, Sidney O. Stevens, 
Frank J. Stevens, and David Kay should be 
directors until the first Monday in May, 1893, 
and until the election and qualification of their 
successors; that Sidney Stevens should be pres-
ident, Sidney O. Stevens secretary, Frank J. 
gtevens treasurer, and William J. Stephens 
vice president It was further alleged that the 
South Ogden Mercantile Company, on the same 
day, was also incorporated; that the object of 
this incorporation was a wholesale and retail 
mercantile business, and the acquisition of such 
land as might be essential to the business:*that 
the capital stock of the corporation was divided 
into 250 shares, of which Sidney Stevens sub-
scribed for 73% shares, Frank J. and Sidney 0. 
Stevens 5 shares each, William J.and Solomon 
G. Stephens 83% shares each; that the officers 
of 4he corporation consisted of five directors, 
- president, .vice president, secretary, and treasur-
er; *that,r until the'meeting of the stockholders 
on the first Wednesday in May, 1893, and the 
election and qualification of officers thereto, -the 
board o^f directors should be Sidney Stevens, 
Solomon <X and W.~ X Stephens, -and Frank J. 
'and Sidney rO.*Stevens; that Sidney Stevens 
should.be president, William J. - Stephens vice 
/president,&Sidney * O. Stevens ^ secretary, i and 
Frank ~ZJ Stevens treasurer; that the * capital 
stock consisted of real estate, described In the 
complaintTThe^ plaintiffs further alleged that 
'the South Ogden Clay & Manufacturing Com-
pany "was "also Incorporated on the same day; 
?that $heT purpose "*of the corporation .was ,the 
^manufacture*of brick, tiling, ^ew"er^plpe7rpot-' 
tery,<*the erection and operation of flouring mills, 
the /onanufacturlng of tinware, the ^erection 
and operation of woolen mills, manufacture of 
^wagons-and other "vehicles and fanning imple-
ments,^ and the erection and operation of ironr 
foundries, glass factories, and manufacture vt 
t w o o d e ^ r ^
 r 
j ^ r p ^ t t p ^ w ^ of 
^whici'gojomon^d and. W.? J^ Stepnens^ SabicritH" 
^ , l , ^ S n a r e s each,* Sidney Oi S$evenij?i,661, 
/ahare^f and: Frank .J* and, Sidney^ Stevens .2 
fshares each;, that the ofQcers ,ot t^ejorporation 
Iconslsted^of: a: boaM'ofuflTe.;dlr^r^iij presi-
Ldent& vice-president, \ secretary^ and/ft 
^that^iiita^the mee t ing^ fhe\ sta^holders on 
t^hQ flrgt,Tuesday in May,^893/. and, th^ election 
tand.qualification of officer^thedlrectbrs_should 
[ber Solomon 0. and. William! J* Stephens/ and 
*J|idneyf p,£Frank J.t and, Sidney ^ Stevens; -that 
fsai<j'Solomon 0. Stephens" should bevpresident, 
• Sidney,Stevens.vice preridenta^Sidnegrip. Ste-
rvens secretary, and Frank Jf; Stevens treasurer; 
^thai\ theTcapital st()ck insisted o t alL the title 
: and interest of WillianrJ^Stejjhens'and Solo-
&monQJ Stephens to and in a certain option con-
Ltract fori certain iandSidescribedjinvthe^ com-
fpTam^Flaintiffs aisol alleged that£inj\May, 
f!89% the South Ogden^  Water Company "was in-
; corpor^ted^ with authority, to purchase i water, 
- to^construct waterworks for South,, Ogden and 
.a portion of Ogden City, and also to acquire and 
.hold the necessary real and personal property, 
-and; to;sell the same when necessary or desir-; 
;'able;iythat its capital stock was divided • into < 
• 5,000 shares, of which Sidney: Stevens subscrib-. 
/'ed for 1,646 shares, Solomon 0. and William J.; 
^ Stephenso; 1,666 shares each, Sidney O.: and: 
Frank J. Stevens 10 shares each, and David' 
.Kay 2 shares; that the capital stock of this! 
corporation consisted of the rigfct to the waters. 
- of certain creeks and reservoirs mentioned in 
the complaint The plaintiffs, further alleged 
that the four corporations; named .were organ-
ized to prosecute one enterprise* and that they 
Lwere, to be, in effect, subject, to one manage-
ment, and that their business became so Inter-
mingled and connected mat it was necessary to 
make them all parties to the same action; that 
all of the subscribers still own their stocky with 
the exception of one share assigned ta John J. 
Hill, and a few shares assigned to Paul Bens. 
Plaintiffs further allege that Sidney Stevens 
turned over to the South Ogden Mercantile Com-
pany, soon after its organization, in payment 
for' his stock, a stock of goods of the value of 
$14,000, and that he placed to the credit of the 
South Ogden Laud, Building & Improvement 
X5ompany $10,000 in payment for stock Issued; 
that, after the organization of said corporations, 
Solomon C. Stephens became general manager 
of the business of the South Ogden Clay & 
Manufacturing Company; and. Wiliiam J. 
Stephens of the South Ogden Land, Building & 
Improvement Company, and Sidney. O. Stevens* 
-of the/business and affairs of the South Ogden 
Mercantile Company; that Solomon C. Stephens 
andt-.Wilnam ^Stephens, represented: to these 
plaintiffs ;that they were; interested in a large 
number'of building contracts in various parts of 
theory o t Ogden, Park City,.Heber City, and 
;pth(er. places in Utah territory,* and that such 
buaines8 had been entered into by them under 
the?firin name of Stephens Bros.; but that they 
wouldiiurn over to, the South Ogden Land, 
Biii?ulng; ^ Mprojreinent, Company; 
arising jfromJ^Wr^uhrac^f a n d thai tiie good 
, and' tradero^ectedtwlth said building.opera 
.tions-should.go",to.the benefit of.the^South Og 
den;, Mercantile^;Company, and'that, all pa; 
, which,they; were to^receive for the constructioi 
. of su<±i buildings shpujd be paid into.the,treaa 
j ury of/the JBaldJSoitSlOgdenXand; Building i 
ImproveinentlComp^ny, in consideration of cej 
/tain credits, -tpjwhich proposal plaintiffs agreed 
that thereuponiWilliam X- and^ Solomon . C 
Stephens began to use, in such building opera 
tiona;;the. $10,000 of credit in. favor, of, th 
South Ogden? HandV- Building & lmprovemen 
Company placed,there by plaintiff Sidney St$ 
vena, and also began to use the $14,000 worth p 
goods and merchandise of the South Ogden Mei 
cantile Company, and they also began to pui 
chase, from^various firms in Ogden City am 
the Bast* goods, wares, and merchandise, to b 
used by them in and about said building opera 
flora; ,\ that,';aboutthe 1st'day of Septembei 
1892, plaintiffs,ascertained that;William J 
and Solomon (Xt. Stephens had drawn the fu] 
amount of the $10,000 placed to the credit o 
the South .Ogden' Land,. Building. & Improve 
ment Company, and that they had incurred obi] 
gations against that company to the extent o 
about $17,000, all of Which, to the amount o 
about $20,000, had been used by S. C. and V) 
J. Stephens in the 'execution of said contract! 
and, in addition thereto, they drew from th 
stock -of. merchandise about $10,000, and, M 
sides this amount of about $30,000, the said S 
C. and W. J. Stephens had also contracte 
debts against the South Ogden Land, Buildio, 
& Improvement Company to the amount o 
, about $17,000; that, upon their representations 
the last-namea company borrowed the sum o 
$15,000, and.gave mortgages to secure th 
same on all of the property of the four corpora 
tions; that the said S. C. and W. X Stephen 
refused to turn over any part of the proceed 
to said companies, or either of them, and b; 
means of force and violence took possession d 
the offices of the companies, and ejected plain 
tiffs therefrom, and held the same. The plain 
tiffs further alleged, in their complaint, tha 
said W. J. and 8. C. Stephens have a majorit; 
of the stock in. each of the four corporations 
that they held elections of stockholders, and di< 
not elect plaintiffs,; or^  either of them; that th 
directors .elected,' intending to defraud plaii? 
tiffs, and to render their stock in the companie 
absolutely worthless, and for the purpose o 
transferring, in the end, all of the property o 
the said corporations to their own private us< 
entered upon, the, books of said corporation 
various faJse~enMesi by which said Solomon C 
and WiDlam'J.. Stephens were credited wit! 
false and fictitious credits; that they caused t 
be recorded,'on the records of Weber counts 
numerous mortgages and trust deeds, in favo 
of said S. 0. and W.! J. Stephens, on the propel 
ry of said corporations, while they were indebi 
ed to the companies, and that they are still s 
indebted;' that said; mortgages and .deeds o 
trust were given, without any consideration, an 
;upon a rraufluient tmderstanoing and congp] 
^ betweenivsat&? directorsj^tiiat^ thei defi 
?bave sol f ttfrprop^gol'lhe said corniSHiS^ 
L and theJl>r<>ce^*thereoiffhave been converted' 
?to the t ^ o £ s / C ^ W . t. Stent 
j four companies* arorSSu<l nave apparentl^ berea? j 
. U W h , * * « u ^ w use the p^ol^ert^ahd^aredlt of iheb 
fl^fpojatlons named, foi^tbelf^wil%beiiefitf,iq| 
rthe Injury of the other parties?? and, ia prose^ 
routing'that purpc*se,%they^ffldfa*number of, 
'\ctajby which the taterestsjBind'rlghts of theh 
*9|njrjpartie8 were^affeirtedlfftjrherefore, the,* 
&>1 
prosecoted^d^taSHed^oAr'And, thiall^the 
c^fes ^ _ , _ _^r 
have beef defrauded of $36,000, and thafthey 
Inever r^ifetf anything from their investments 
ffir said^r^ratfoiS^and? further, that'W&ei 
Bendants reftae tf consult with plamtinifor'tof 
Bay' anj^ttention* to'their requests7 anJPde** 
^ a n d s l ^ j t o resj^ecT-their' rights. Therplah£ 
|tiffs pranred^  the ^ coprt| to"1 appoint a receiver^ 
Iwith poW^oja£ef possession of ail the proper* 
|p[* books^andv accounts' due or to become due 
|W*J saJd^cor^nftions; "and. with authority^ to' 
Bring all ^ necessary suits to obtain the'posses* 
fsjbn of the,books^ property, and evidences of in: 
fdebtedness belonging to them, and to set aside 
rfrauduleilt;conveyances, and require Jac-
untinga, and, generally, to take charge'of and 
up the business thereof. * ^ ^ 
_Jendai&* demurred to the plaintiffs' com; 
.^nfWtwo principal grounds: (1) Because 
|wasf multifarious,—that distinct and Inde-
ident matters were blended; (2) that there 
at} misjoinder of parties as co-defendants*. 
ie Immediate object sought by the com* 
t'was'the appointment of a receiver for 
s four corporate defendants, and, ultimate-
'compensation for the loss caused by the 
8management'and fraud of the defend-
is in conducting the business, disposing of 
*o property, and using the credit of the said 
•rate defendants. It appears from the 
mplaint that all the other parties to the ac-
pion were owners of stock Issued by the re-
spective corporations, and that they were or-
ganized and Intended to be used as Instru-
mentalities in the prosecution of a general de-
Ijg&r-'that It was believed the enterprises 
Contemplated could be more successfully car-
g|ed out by the four corporations than by a 
"\B number. It further appears that a fraud-
&nt design and conspiracy of the defend-
msjp** w a 5 arc natural persons, caused losses 
ETthe corporate' defendants, as well as the 
tiffs; ^  that the defendants perpetrating 
^Jfraud affected injuriously all the other 
gSl^at^the losses of the other parties 
frjceable to and centered in the fraud of 
TOjjral^defendants." The plaintiffs base 
^rtsbt^to^the remedy they ask on that 
f^fflng^the allegations of the complamt to 
^ ^ J a s we must for the purposes of the 
^rer^the defendants William' X Ste-
F^Mtelomon 0. Stephens, David Kay, John 
fr**^?aui Beus, and J. O. Stevens formed 
^raudulent'design, and entered into a con-
parties'doing the fraudulentUcts/ and all oth*l 
^fraud, and the transactions, connected there? 
withfTind to ascertainfthe* respective rightaj 
and interests of the parties, ^ at^such orders ^ 
and such a decree mighj be.made as would; 
^secure the rights and interests of all those af-^  
fected by the fraud; and this, though some 
.o^the defendants might have* separate and 
distinct defenses.^ The ends* of, distributive" 
justice manifested by this complaint call for 
a liberal application of the flexible principles 
of equity. The gist of the action, as set forth 
in the complaint, is the fraud and misman-
agement of defendants William J. Stephens, 
Solomon C. Stephens, 'J. O. Stevens, David 
Kay, John J. Hill, and Paul Beus In control-
ling,' disposing of, and appropriating the prop-
erty of the corporations named, transacting 
their business, and using their credit, by 
which the rights and interests of all the other 
parties were affected. In this there is one 
common point of litigation., That being so, 
they^ were all proper parties; and, for the 
same or similar reasons, the complaint cannot 
be regarded as multifarious. North v. Brad-
way, 9 Minn. 183 (GIL 109); Donovan v. 
Dunning, 69 Mo. 436; Fellows T. Fellows, 4 
Cow. 682; Bobb T. Bobb, 76 Mo. 419; Wil-
liams v. Bankhead, 19 WalL 563; PhiL Code 
PL | 453; Cook, Stock, Stockh. & Corp. Law, 
f 738; Story, Eq. PL (9th Ed.) § 639. It clear-
ly appears, from the allegations of the com-
plaint, that the natural persons named as 
defendants were directors and officers of the 
four corporations mentioned, and that they 
so mismanaged the business of the companies 
as to cause the plaintiffs, who were stockhold-
ers, great loss, and that they will sustain fur-
ther loss unless a receiver is appointed. We 
are of the opinion that the order sustaining 
the demurrer and the judgment dismissing 
the action were erroneous. The judgment ap-
pealed from Is reversed, and the cause is 
remanded, with directions to set aside the 
order sustaining the demurrer. 
**v4 *~ 
- BARTOH and MINER, JJ., concur. 
(14 Utah, 265) 
STEPHENS v. AMERICAN FIRE INS. CO. 
(Supreme Court of Utah, Oct 20, 1896.) 
ACTION ON INSURANCE POLICY—PLBADIVG—SET-
TING FORTH INSTRUMENT IN FULL—DEMURRER, 
I 1. Under our system, in a suit upon a written 
contract, it makes no difference whether a con-
tract is set out in hsec verba, or whether it is 
annexed, and by proper reference made a part 
of the pleading However, matters of substance, 
which are preliminary or collateral to the instru-
ment, must be properly averred, so that the ulti-
258 16 OTAH 2d 
"commercial" consumption (Sec. 59-15-4 
(b) (2)) by its other subdivisions, (b), (d), 
(e), (f), and (g) also expressly taxes a 
wide gamut of other services such as trans-
portation, amusements, hotels, motels, cafes 
and laundries, all of which are properly 
classified as "commercial" and includes with 
them "common carrier" operations. Sub-
section (e) imposes a sales tax on: 
«* * *
 ajj s e r v i c e s for repairs or 
renovations of tangible personal prop-
erty, or for installation of tangible per-
sonal property rendered in connection 
with other tangible personal property." 
Apart from specific activities which we 
held in the prior decision not to amount to 
"repair, renovation, or installation," the 
record amply supports the Commission's 
finding that plaintiff's business consists gen-
erally in rendering services to its parent 
common carrier companies, and that its use 
of coal was for a commercial purpose. That 
being so, and because under the Commis-
sion's findings the coal plaintiff uses does 
not qualify as exempt under the Sales Tax 
Act, the order of the Tax Commission is 
not disturbed in that regard. But the de-
cision is modified as indicated herein, to the 
effect that exemptions under the Sales Tax 
Act also apply to the Use Tax Act. (All 
emphasis added) 
No costs allowed. 
HENRIOD, C. J., and McDONOUGH, 
WADE, and CALLISTER, J J., concur. 
REPORTS 
399 P.2d 147 
Frelda J. Wassom TOLMAN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Albert M. WASSOM, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 10229. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 15, 1965. 
Habeas corpus proceeding by mother 
who had been awarded custody of children 
by Oregon divorce decree to obtain return 
of child taken by father. The Third Dis-
trict Court, Salt Lake County, Marcellus K. 
Snow, J., dismissed petition, and the mother 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Henriod, 
C. J., held that Oregon divorce decree was 
entitled to full faith and credit in Utah 
habeas corpus proceeding, in absence of 
claim or showing of any changed circum-
stances warranting either trial court's de-
cision dismissing petition or its assumption 
of jurisdiction to make it under Utah selec-
tion statute. 
Remanded with instructions. 
I. Habeas Corpus €=^99(6) 
In habeas corpus proceeding instituted 
by mother, who had been awarded custody 
of children by Oregon divorce decree, to 
obtain return of child taken by father, Utah 
statute giving child over ten years of age 
right to select which parent he chose to live 
with was not applicable. U.C.A.1953, 30-
3-5. 
2. Habeas Corpus <§=>99(l) 
District court erred in dismissing ha-
beas corpus petition by mother, who had 
been awarded custody of children by Ore-
gon divorce decree, to obtain return of 
child taken by father, in absence of claim 
or showing of changed circumstances war-
ranting either court's decision or its as-
sumption of jurisdiction to make it under 
Utah selection statute. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5. 
3. Divorce <S»402(I) 
Oregon divorce decree awarding cus-
tody of children to mother was entitled to 
full faith and credit in Utah habeas corpus 
proceeding instituted by mother to obtain 
return of child taken by father in absence 
of claim or showing of changed circum-
stances warranting either court's decision 
dismissing petition or its assumption of ju-
risdiction to make it under Utah selection 
statute. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5. 
TOLMAN v. WASSOM 2 5 9 
Cite aa 10 Utah 2d 258 
taken and retained custody of one of the 
children awarded by an Oregon court to the 
petitioner mother. It was not in accord 
with the visitation rights decreed by the 
Oregon divorce decree. 
Dansie, Ellett & Hammill, Murray, for 
appellant. 
Mitsunaga & Ross, Salt Lake City, for re-
spondent. 
HENRIOD, Chief Justice. 
This matter was initiated by petition for 
writ of habeas corpus, the father having 
Petitioner took the position that full 
faith and credit must be accorded the Ore-
gon judgment. We agree. The trial court 
questioned the 11-year-old girl in chambers 
who said she preferred to be with her fa-
ther. That was all. There wasn't any evi-
dence showing any changed circumstances 
since the Oregon decree, save the passage 
of time. 
The trial court dismissed the petition on 
the argument of counsel and the preference 
of the girl, on the ground that a selection 
had been made by the child, who was over 
ten, as to which parent she chose with 
whom to live. This was based on the pro-
visions of Title 30-3-5, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953. 
[1-3] The trial court was in error for 
several good reasons: 1) The matter was 
not a divorce proceeding, and therefore the 
Utah statute with respect to selection was 
inapropos; 2) There was no claim of or 
showing of any changed circumstances war-
ranting either the trial court's decision or 
its assumption of jurisdiction to make it un-
der the Utah statute; 3) All this being so, 
full faith and credit must be accorded the 
judgment of the sister state of Oregon. 
260 16 OTAH 2d 
It seems inescapable, therefore, to decide 
anything other than that the Utah court 
should have granted the petition, and we 
remand this case with instructions to do just 
that 
MCDONOUGH, WADE, and CALLIS-
TER, JJ., concur. 
CROCKETT, J., concurs in the result. 
399 P.2d 202 
Benner J. CABLING, Plaintiff, 
v. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Utah and 
Consolidated Western Steel Division Unit-
ed States Steel Corporation, Defendants. 
No. 10177. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 19, 1965. 
Original proceeding to review order 
of Industrial Commission denying a claim 
for workmen's compensation for impair-
ment of hearing which plaintiff claimed to 
have suffered as result of loud noise created 
while he was operating an air-tamping gun. 
The Supreme Court, Crockett, J., held that 
the Industrial Commission's conclusion that 
the plaintiff's loss of hearing did not result 
REPORTS 
from a single incident, nor from an "acci-
dent" arising out of and in the course of 
his employment, was supported by a rea-
sonable basis in the evidence. 
Affirmed. 
1. Workmen's Compensation <£=>5I4 
The term "accident" should be given 
a broad meaning; it connotes an unantici-
pated, unintended occurrence different from 
what would normally be expected to occur 
in usual course of events. U.C.A.1953, 35-
1-45. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Workmen's Compensation <S=>5I4 
An "accident" is not necessarily re-
stricted to some single incident which hap-
pens suddenly at one particular time and 
does not preclude possibility that due to 
exertion, stress or other repetitive cause a 
climax might be reached in such manner 
as to properly fall within definition of ac-
cident but such occurrence must be dis-
tinguished from gradually developing con-
ditions which are classified as occupational 
diseases and which are not compensable 
except as specifically provided. U.C.A. 
1953, 35-1-45, 35-2-1 et seq. 
3. Workmen's Compensation <S=»I946 
Reversal of order denying workmen's 
compensation claim because of erroneous 
statement by Industrial Commission would 
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low, 102 Hi; 272'; Graham v. Scripture,1' 26 
How. Prac . 501; Meyer v. Van Collem,' 28 
Barb. 230; McKerras v. Gardner, 3 Johns^ 
137; Lee v. Selleck, 33 N. Y. G15; Burckle 
v. Eckhart , 3 N. Y. 132. 
Counsel for the respondent cited Wallace 
v. McConnell, 13 Pet. 136, but it does not 
mili tate aga ins t ' t he - pr inc ip le s hereinbefore 
stated. Mr. Just ice Thompson, delivering 
the opinion of the court, said: "The place 
of payment in a promissory note, or in an 
acceptance of a bill of exchange, is a lways ' 
mat te r of a r rangement between the part ies 
for their/ mutual accomodation, and may be 
st ipulated in any manner tha t may best suit 
their convenience." Unquestionably, this is 
the law, and is ju s t wha t was done by the 
part ies in this case. They stipulated in the 
note t h a t it should be paid a t a certain 
place, but the promisor failed to do so, and 
this fact is admitted. Therefore immedi-
ately upon such failure the breach occurred, 
the wrong was done, and the cause of action 
then and there arose; and under the man-
date of the constitution the action must be 
commenced where the cause arose. I t is 
true, under the former practice, before 
statehood, a t ransi tory action, like the one 
a t bar, could be brought where the defend-
an t resided, but t ha t practice no longer ex-
ists in this state. The people in their 
sovereign capacity, by their fundamental 
law, have ordained otherwise, and neither 
by interpretat ion nor legislative enactment 
can the old practice be restored. Sess. 
Laws 1S9G, c. 93, in so far as it authorizes 
the bringing of an action upon a contract in 
the county where the defendant resides, 
when such contract, by stipulation therein, 
is to be performed in another, is in conflict 
wi th Const, a r t 8, § 5, and is void. 
F rom the foregoing considerations, we a re 
of the opinion tha t the cause of action in 
this case arose in Salt Lake City and county 
whore the note was made payable, and t ha t 
the suit was improperly brought in Tooele 
county. The case must therefore be re-
versed and remanded, with direction to the 
court below to dismiss the action. I t is so 
ordered. 
ZANE, C. J., and MINER, J., concur. 
(17 Utah, 341) 
WILSON v. SULLIVAN. 
(Supreme Court of Utah. June 11, 1S9S.) 
ACTIONS— JOINDER — PARTNERSHIP—ASSIGNMENTS 
FOR CREDITORS—EXECUTION—ESTATE CONVEYED 
- P O W E K S OF ASSIGNEE-—FRAUD —PLEADING— 
DAMAGES—INTEREST. 
1. Plaintiff was assignee of property belong-
ing to S. & Co., and in a complaint against de-
fendant, alleges that defendant, as sheriff of 
Juab county, with notice of plaintiffs rights 
therein, broke into the store containing the 
goods assigned, and levied a writ of attachment 
upon the contents of said store (said writ hav-
ing been issued in a suit of P. against S. & Co.), 
and continued to hold the property under the 
writ; that the writ was dissolved, by order of 
the court, as improperly issued; that defend-
ant continued to hold, wrongfully, the posses-
sion of said property, until a judgment was ob-
tained in the suit of P> against S. & Co., when-
said defendant levied an execution issued on 
the judgment, and converted to his own use, as 
sheriff, the greater part of said property; that, 
while defendant was in possession of said prop-
erty, he injured and damaged it,—and alleges 
damages for wrongfully holding the store, and 
for injuries to the goods and building, and for 
withholding accounts assigned, so that they be-
came worthless. Held, on demurrer, that as the 
subject-matter was for a tort arising out of cer-
tain wrongful, continuous, official acts, the sev-
eral causes of action are properly joined, and 
the complaint reaches substantial rights with-
out resorting to a needless multiplicity of ac-
tions. 
2. The right of a partnership to assign the 
firm's assets without including the individual 
property of each partner, under sections 2471 
and 2472, includea the right of the creditor to 
proceed against the individual property of the 
parties composing the partnership, when the 
partnership property shall prove .insufficient to 
pay the firm debts, and is reconcilable with the 
provisions of section 2470, Comp. Laws Utah 
1SSS. 
3. A deed of assignment of realty, containing 
the words, "grant, bargain, sell, convey, assign, 
and deliver to the party of the second part," is 
sufficient to convey a fee-simple interest, un-
der section 1081, Rev. St. (Sess. Laws 1800, p. 
88), without the use of words of inheritance, 
such as "heirs," etc. 
4. The assignment of choses in action clothes 
the assignee with all the rights of the assignor; 
and he may collect debts, and give remittances, 
even though the deed of assignment contains no 
power of attorney. 
5. Where partners execute a deed of assign-
ment, and are described therein as comprising 
the firm, and each of the co-partners executes 
the deed by signing and acknowledging the 
same, it is not necessary that the assignment be 
signed by the partnership name. 
6. Allegations in an answer that an assign-
ment was made with intent to delay, hinder, 
and defraud creditors, and was void and of no 
effect, are insuflicient for the introduction of 
evidence tending to prove fraud, which, when 
relied upon as a defense, must be specifically 
pleaded in an answer, as well as in a com-
plaint, by setting forth the facts and circum-
stances relied upon, in order that the party 
charged may be prepared to meet the allega-
tions, and the court may know that there is 
such fraud as will avail the pleader. 
7. I t was error to allow interest on goods 
returned to the plaintiff, after damages had 
been allowed for their injury and depreciation, 
and when no conversion thereof had been al-
leged. 
(Syllabus by the Court.) 
Appeal from distr ict court, Fif th district; 
E. V. Higgins, Judge . 
Action by R. G. Wilson against ,]ohn T. 
Sullivan for conversion. Plaintiff had judg-
ment, and defendant appeals. Modified. 
Moyle, Zane & Costigan, for appellant. 
Dey & Street and W. H. Bramel, for re-
spondent. 
MINER, J. I t appears from the com-
plaint: Tha t in August , 1806, WT. F . Send-
ver and H a n n a h Tucker were co-partners 
doing a general merchanti le business at 
Eureka under the firm name and style of 
W. F . Schriver & Co. On the 20th day of 
August, 1S0G, Schriver & Co. made a general 
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assignment of all their property, for .the ] 
benefit of their creditors, to plaintiff, R. G. 
Wilson, as" trustee, Wilson immediately 
took possession of the assigned property, 
consisting of a store building, with a large 
quantity of merchandise and other property. 
On the 25th day of August, defendant, Sul-
livan, as sheriff of Juab county, with notice 
of plaintiff's rights therein, broke into said 
store, and levied a writ of attachment upon 
said store and contents, issued in a suit of 
Parsons against Schriver & Co., and con-
tinued to hold possession of said property 
under said writ. On November 2, 1896, said 
writ of attachment was dissolved and dis-
charged by order of court, as having been 
improperly issued. , Thereafter defendant 
wrongfully continued to hold possession of 
said property until judgment was obtained 
in the suit of Parsons against Schriver & 
Co., when said defendant levied an execu-
tion issued on said judgment upon said prop-
erty, and sold and converted to his own 
use, as such sheriff, the greater part of said 
goods, to satisfy said execution, amounting 
to $5,212.8S, and the remainder of said goods 
were afterwards returned by said defendant 
to the plaintiff, as assignee, in a damaged 
and worthless condition. That while said 
sheriff had possession of said goods he dam-
aged and injured them, and they were de-
preciated in value to the amount of over 
$1,000. Plaintiff claims damages for the 
wrongful withholding of the possession of 
the store building, and for injuries to the 
glass in the building while so occupied by 
him, and for detaining books of account, 
bills receivable, and accounts assigned for 
so long a time that the debtors became in-
solvent, and collections thereon lost, for 
which specific damages were claimed, and 
that said sheriff failed to perform his duty 
as such, to the total damages of plaintiff 
amounting to over $6,000. 
The defendant filed his demurrer to said 
complaint, and, among other grounds, alleged 
that the several causes of action are improp-
erly joined, and not separately stated. It 
is plain that the subject-matter of the ac-
tion was for a tort arising out of certain 
wrongful, continuous, official acts of the de-
fendant as sheriff, whereby the rights of the 
plaintiffs were injuriously affected The 
wrongful acts are set forth with some par-
ticularity, and the damages resulting there-
irom are separately stated as arising from 
a breach of official duty. These acts axe 
all connected, as being one continuous, tor-
tious act, and all arising out of the same 
kind of action, and connected with the same 
subject of action, and are stated in ordinary 
and concise language. In serving a writ 
of attachment which directs the taking of 
property of a particular person, an officer 
acts officially. In taking the property of a 
person not named in the writ, the sheriff 
was guilty of a breach of official duty, and 
such act was wrongful, although it was an j 
attempt to perform an official duty. When 
an officer acts thus wrongfully, the act is 
official, and he is liable for such wrongful 
act. Counting as the complaint does upon 
official acts resulting in injury to the plain-
tiff simplifies the procedure, without violat-
ing its rules, and reaches substantial rights, 
without resorting to a multiplicity of suits 
for their redress. The demurrer was prop-
erly overruled. Rev. St. Utah, §§ 29G0, 296\; 
Lammon v. Feusier, 111 U. S. 18, 4 Sup. Ct. 
286; Stevens v. Tuite, 104 Mass. 334; Ir-
rigation Co. v. Mclntyre, 16 Utah, —, 52 
Pac. G2S; 5 Enc. PI. & Prac. 719; Frizzell 
v. Duffer (Ark.) 25 S. W. 1111; Razzo v. 
Varni, SI Cal. 289, 22 Pac. 848; Pom. Code 
Rem. § 20; De La Guerra v. Newhall, 53 
Cal. 141; Funk v. Funk, 35 Mo. App. 246; 
Johnson v. Smith, 8 Johns. 3S3. 
Plaintiff assigns error in allowing the deed 
of assignment to be introduced in evidence, 
for the reasons: (1) It does not assign in-
dividual property of the partners; (2) it 
only conveys a life estate in the real prop-
erty assigned; (3) it contains no power of at-
torney to make collections, or give receipts 
or acquittances; (4) it is not executed by 
Schriver 6c Co., or in their behalf. 
The deed of assignment purports to trans-
fer to the assignee all the real and personal 
property of the firm, for the benefit of all the 
creditors of the partnership. With reference 
to the first objection, to the effect that the 
individual property of the partners is not as-
signed, reference may be had to the statute. 
Section 2471, Comp. Laws Utah 1SSS, pro-
vides, "that the assignment of any partner 
in trade made to secure or satisfy any cred-
itor, shall be deemed valid in law." Section 
2472, provides, 'This act shall not be so con-
strued as to authorize the assignment of any 
of the effects of such co-partnership to sat-
isfy the individual claim of any of the par-
ties, or other than such debts as are incurred 
for the effects or proceeds thereof thus as-
signed." This right of a partnership to as-
sign firm assets without including the indi-
vidual property of each partner has been 
questioned by some courts where the stat-
ute is silent upon the subject; but more re-
cent decisions generally concur in holding 
such assignments valid with the right of a 
creditor to proceed against the individual 
property of the partnership. This view is 
now well established, and is'entirely recon-
cilable vwth the provisions of section 2470, 
Comp. Law s Utah 1SS8, which provides "that 
the private pioperty of persons engaged in 
co-partnerships shall be held liable for the 
debts of the firm, when the partnership prop-
erty shall prove insufficient to pay them." 
Burrill, Assignm. (6th Ed.) § 47r Bump, 
Fraud. Con v. (4 th Ed.) p. 369; Bradley v. 
Bischel, SI Iowa, 80, 46 N. W. 755; McFar-
land v. Bate, 45 Kan* 1, 25 Pac. 23S; Ex 
parte Hopkins, 104 Ind. 157, 2 N. E. 5S7; 
Auley v. Osterman, 65 Wis. US, 25 N. W. 
[ 657, and 26 N. W. 568; Drucker v. Well-
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house, 82 < Git 129, 8 S. E.1 40V Harris "r. 
Fisscher, 57 Ga. 229. " " " ^ yyJ* v*' " * , r 
' The second contention of appellant is that 
the deed of assignment only conveys1 a life 
estate in the real property assigned,'and that 
words of JiiheritanceV'-'such as;"heirs,,*'etci, 
are improperly'left'out of the ^assignment 
The deed of assignment contains the words, 
"grant, bargain, sell, convey, assign, and de-
liver to the party of the second par t" This 
objection is''sufficiently answered by section 
1981,* R e r . ^ S t (Sess: Laws 1890, p. 88), 
which, in prescribing the form of a warranty 
deed of conveyance, uses the words "grant 
and convey,"i and provides that such deed 
shall convey in fee simple to the grantee, 
his heirs and assigns, a title to the premises 
named therein, and that such conveyance 
shall include the usual covenants of seisin 
and warranty, more specifically recited in the 
ac t ' « • - - ' - "' » n * l 
' The third objection; that the deed of as-
signment contains no power of attorney to 
collect debts and give acquittances, is equally 
untenable. The deed assigns all notes, ac-
counts, and credits of the firm to the assignee 
in trust. The assignment of choses in action 
clothes such assignee with all the rights of 
the assignor, whether legal or equitable, to 
collect a debt and give acquittances for the 
same, and such rights under the assignment 
will be protected against all persons having 
notice of the assignment 2 Am. & Eng. Enc. 
Law, 1088. 
Appellant's fourth contention, that the deed 
of assignment is not signed by Schriver & 
Co. or in their behalf, is also untenable. 
The two partners executing the deed are de-
scribed therein as comprising the firm of 
Schriver & Co., and each of such co-partners 
executed the deed by signing and acknowl-
edging the same. This was clearly sufficient 
Comp. Laws Utah 18S8, § 2471; Burrill 
Assignm. (Gth Ed.) § 47; Bank v. Hackett 
61 Wis. 335, 21 N. W. 280. The defendant 
in his answer alleged that: "On said 20th 
day of August, 1896, said W. F. Schriver and 
Hannah C. Tucker attempted to assign or 
convey in writing to said plaintiff the prop-
erty mentioned in said complaint; but that 
said conveyance or assignment in writing 
was made with intent to delay, hinder, and 
defraud the creditors of said W. F. Schriver 
and of said Hannah C. Tucker of their law-
ful debts and demands, and particularly the 
Arthur Parsons hereinafter mentioned, and 
was void and of no effect as against such 
creditors and each of them." Under this al-
legation the defendant offered certain testi-
mony tending to show fraud on the part of 
the assignors, and knowledge on the part of 
the assignees. The testimony was rejected: 
(1) Because no fraud is set up in the plead-
ings, or pleaded in the answer; (2) because 
the answer contained no allegation connect-
ing the plaintiff with fraud, or knowledge or 
notice thereof; (3) because the answer con-
tained no allegation showing that defendant 
was defraudea or m any wise jnjurea by'the 
assignment, and 'that the answer only pleads 
a legal conclusion. The appellant, in his an-
swer,' charges no fraud or knowledge of fraud 
on the part of the plaintiff, norr are the par-
ticular acts constituting the specific ground 
ofrfraud* on the part of the plaintiff or the 
assignors alleged, nor is it charged that 
either the attaching creditors or the defend-
ant1 was injured by any such fraud. Fraud, 
when relied^ upon as a defense, must be 
specifically pleaded in an answer, as well as 
in a^complaintf1 and the facts and circum-
stances relied'upon should be set out In 
order that the court may know whether 
there was such fraud as will be of avail to 
the pleader, and also that the party charged 
with fraud may know the nature of the 
charge, and be prepared to meet i t The al-
legation referre4 to amounts to a legal con-
clusion as constituting fraud, and presents 
no issue of fact, as it does not set forth the 
specific fact which constituted the alleged 
fraud, nor is it charged that the plaintiff 
participated in, or had any knowledge of, 
any fraud. We are of the opinion that the 
evidence offered was properly excluded. 
Yoorhees v. Fisher, 9 Utah, 303, 34 Pac. 64; 
Bliss, Code PI. §§ 211-339; 2 Estoe. PL & 
Prac. 2748; Boone, Code PI. § 148; Eaton v. 
Metz (Cal.) 40 Pac. 947; Gleason v. Wilson 
(Kan. Sup) 29 Pac. 698; Coal City C. & C. 
Co. v. Hazard Powder Co. (Ala) 19 South. 
185; Grocery Co. v. Stinson (Wash.) 43 Pac. 
35; Albertoli v. Branham, 80 Cal. 631. 22 
Pac. 404; Meeker v. Han is, 19 Cal. 279; Dan-
iel, Neg. Ins t § 770; Pettit v. Parsons, 9 
Utah, 223, 33 Pac. 1038; Kain v. Larkin, 131 
N. Y. 300, 30 N. E. 105; Bump, Fraud. Con v. 
(4th Ed.) §§ 560, 337; 9 Enc. PL & Prac. 686, 
687. 
Under instructions from the court, the jury 
allowed interest on goods returned to the 
plaintiff, from August to December 15, 1S96, 
amounting to $9.13, after damages had been 
allowed, for their injury and depreciation in 
value, when no conversion thereof had been 
alleged. This was error, and the sum of 
$9.15, allowed as interest, should be remitted 
and deducted from the judgment We find 
no reversible error in the record. The cause 
is remanded, with instructions to the trial 
court to modify the judgment by striking 
out and remitting therefrom the sum of 
$9 15, erroneously allowed as interest here-
inbefore referred to; and, as so modified, it 
is ordered that such judgment stand af-
firmed. 
ZANE, C. J., and BARTCH, J., concur. 
(17 Utah, 352) 
TARPEY v. MADSEN. 
(Supreme Court of Utah July 1, 1S98) 
RAILROAD LAND GRANT-WHEN TITLE VESTED-
TIME TO FILE NOTICE—FAII DKE TO COMPLT 
WITH LAW—REVERSION TO UNITED STATES 
In an action to trv title to certain land, it 
appears that plaintiff claims title thiuu^h the 
